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Preface 
This report presents the results of a study carried out on behalf of the European 
Commission, Directorate V for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs, 
by NEI. First of all the report gives a description of the Dutch labour-market and 
Dutch labour-market institutions. Furthermore, the most important developments are 
discussed and explained, using existing data and studies. 
The structure of the report is as follows. In chapter 1 a detailed description is given 
of the structure, the development and the prospects of the Dutch labour-market. 
Themes covered are demographic development, labour supply, labour demand, 
unfilled demand, unemployment, wages and macro-economics. Special attention is 
paid to the strong increase of unemployment in the 'seventies and the first half of 
the 'eighties, and the subsequent fall in unemployment in the second half of the 
'eighties. An attempt is made to explain that development. Government policies are, 
of course, among the factors discussed. Are the policies chosen the most appropriate 
ones? In what way can they be improved? 
Chapter 2 deals with labour-market institutions. In the last decade many things have 
changed in the Netherlands concerning labour-market institutions. Major changes are 
the reforms of the Public Employment Service and the social security system. 
Privatisation and decentralisation are the key words if we want to characterise most 
changes briefly. Changes in labour-market legislation go hand in hand with changes 
in labour-market institutions. Legislation is the subject matter of chapter 3. 
Labour-market policies, both passive and active policies, are treated extensively in 
chapter 4. The system of unemployment compensation is changed considerably. 
Reducing inflow in unemployment and stimulating outflow is the basic philosophy 
behind most changes. We know quite a lot about active labour-market policies in the 
Netherlands. Most individual measures have been evaluated. Furthermore, a 
thorough evaluation has been carried out with respect to the 1991 reform of the 
Public Employment Service. Using that information Dutch active labour-market 
policy is described on the basis of such indicators as numbers and characteristics of 
participants and net effects on labour-market efficiency and equity. 
Chapter 5 deals with other fields of policy which affect the labour-market. Education 
and training is perhaps the most important topic addressed in this chapter. Many 
changes are occurring in the Dutch educational system. Schools are more and more 
seen as enterprises and education as a product which is produced for a market. 
Decentralisation, increasing labour-market orientation and a shift from full-time 
initial education to apprenticeships and company training are important changes. 
The report concludes with a discussion of current trends in labour-market policy and 
future perspectives. 

I Labour market analysis and forecasts 
In this chapter we will give an overview of the Dutch labour market. Section 1.1 
deals with demographic trends and changes in the size and structure of the labour 
force. Of course, labour force participation is among the themes covered. The 
structure of the workforce in terms of employment and unemployment is the main 
topic in section 1.2. In section 1.3 attention is paid to the main trends in job creation 
and job loss. In section 1.4 trends in wages and salaries are discussed, followed by an 
analysis of principal causes of the rise in unemployment since 1980 in section 1.5. 
The chapter is concluded with a discussion of macroeconomic policy and 
macroeconomic forecasts (section 1.6). 
1.1 Demographic trends 
1.1.1 Population 
In table 1.1 the population of 15 - 64 years (the potential labour force) is divided 
according to gender and age for the period 1987 - 1994. The average annual growth 
rate of total population is 0.6 to 0.7 percent. Striking is the sharp decrease of the 
population with age 15 - 24. The decreasing share of young people in the total 
population is obvious. This tendency is also visible in age structure of the labour 
force (see section 1.1.2). We observe quite the opposite tendency if we look at the 
age-group between 45 - 54 years which represents the post World War II babyboom. 
Both the share in total population and the share in the labour force of this age-group 
rose significantly. The share of the other age-groups hardly changed. Compared to 
other EU-counrries such as Germany, the Netherlands still has a relatively "young" 
population. 
Table 1.1 Population 15 - 64 years according to gender and age (1987 - 1994) 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Age 
15-24 
2 5 - 3 4 
3 5 - 4 4 
4 5 - 5 4 
5 5 - 6 4 
Total 
Population (in thousands) 
1987 
5,071 
4,953 
2,447 
2,407 
2,214 
1376 
1,381 
10,024 
1990 
5,182 
5,046 
2,311 
2,506 
2,335 
1,686 
1,389 
10,228 
1994 
5,317 
5,156 
2,100 
2,593 
2,335 
2,014 
1,430 
10,473 
Average annual change 
(%) 
1987 - 1990 
0.7 
0.6 
-1.9 
1.4 
1.8 
2.3 
0.2 
0.7 
1990 - 1994 
0.6 
0.5 
-2.4 
0.9 
0.0 
4.5 
0.7 
0.6 
Share of total population 
15 - 64 years (%) 
1987 
51 
49 
24 
24 
22 
16 
14 
100.0 
1990 
51 
49 
23 
25 
23 
17 
14 
100.0 
1994 
51 
49 
20 
25 
22 
19 
14 
100.0 
Source: CBS, Enquête Beroepsbevolking. 
In table 1.2 total population is divided in natives and foreigners1. The native 
population grew hardly over the entire period considered. In 1994 the native 
population even stabilised. The foreign population grows with 4 to 5 percent per 
year, which implies that the share of non-natives in total population grows quite 
rapidly. There are some differences between the various groups of foreigners. The 
growth rate for Turks and Moroccans decreases. On the other hand, the rise in the 
number of Surinamese/An tilleans/Arubans and other immigrants has been stronger 
between 1990 and 1994 than between 1987 and 1990. The difference in the 
development between natives and foreigners is due to a) the positive net 
immigration and b) the relatively high fertility rates among non-natives. 
Table 1.2 Total population 15-64 years according to ethnicity (1987 - 1994) 
Ethnicity 
Natives 
Foreigners 
of which 
Turks/Moroccans 
Surinamese/ Antilleans/ 
Arubans 
Other 
Total 
Population (in thousands) 
1987 
9,186 
838 
165 
188 
486 
10,024 
1990 
9,291 
938 
221 
196 
521 
10,228 
1994 
9,340 
1,133 
285 
237 
611 
10,473 
Average annual change 
(%) 
1987-1990 
0.4 
3.8 
10.2 
1.4 
2.3 
0.7 
1990-1994 
0.1 
4.8 
6.6 
4.9 
4.1 
0.6 
Share of total population 
15 - 64 years (%) 
1987 
91.6 
8.4 
1.6 
1.9 
4.8 
100.0 
1990 
90.8 
9.2 
2.2 
1.9 
5.1 
100.0 
1994 
89.2 
10.8 
2.7 
2.3 
5.8 
100.0 
Source: CBS, Enquête Beroepsbevolking. 
The immigration of persons without the Dutch nationality increased with more than 
25,000 persons from about 60,9 thousands in 1987 to 87,6 thousands in 1993 (table 
1.3). However, in 1994 a sharp decrease of nearly 20,000 persons in the number of 
people immigrating occurred. Figures for 1991 show that almost 40 percent of 
immigration is because of family reunification and family formation2. Between 1987 
and 1991 family formation has become relatively more important and family 
reunification relatively less important as a reason for immigration. The table shows 
also a rapid increase of the number of applications for asylum. There has been a rise 
in applications during the entire period with the exception of 19883. The 1995 level 
will be lower than the 1994 one. Probably, the more strict policy with regard to 
immigration has contributed to this slow down of immigration. Another reason may 
be that the attitude of the native population towards immigrants has become less 
1 Foreigners are defined as persons who are not bom in the Netherlands or do not have the Dutch 
nationality (CBS, 1994). 
2 Sprangers, 1994. The proportion of immigration because of these reasons is especially high for Turks and 
Moroccans. 
3 Surinameses, Antilleans and Arubans need no application for asylum to migrate to the Netherlands. 
tolerant and positive (CBS, Maandstatistiek van de bevolking 1996). Furthermore, the 
decrease in the number of asylum applications may be due to political reforms in 
Eastern Europe. The consequence of these reforms is that inhabitants of these 
countries no longer are acknowledged as refugees. 
Table 1.3 Immigration of persons without the Dutch nationality and number of applications for asylum 
(1987 - 1995, thousands) 
Year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995a) 
Immigration 
60.9 
58.3 
65.4 
81.3 
84.3 
83.0 
87.6 
68.4 
Applications for asylum 
13.5 
7.5 
13.9 
21.2 
21.6 
20.3 
35.4 
52.6 
29.0 
a) Estimated figure on the basis of the first ten months. 
Source: CBS, Maandstatistiek voor de bevolking, february 1996. 
How will the future size and structure of the population look like? Forecasts of the 
CBS (Statistisch jaarboek, 1996) point at a steady growth of the Dutch population up 
to 2010. The figures presented in table 1.4 are based on the CBS base scenario. CBS 
also present low growth and high growth scenarios, but the base scenario is 
considered to be the most likely one. According to the latter one in 2010 the Dutch 
population will exist of nearly 17 million persons compared to about 15.4 million in 
1995. The population growth will be about 1.6 million persons in 15 years time. 
Between 1995 and 2000 the average growth rate will be 0.7 percent and between 
2000 and 2010 0.5 percent per year. So, the growth rate will diminish only very 
slowly. A striking result is the sharp decline in the number of persons in age group 
20 - 39 years. Their share in total population will fall back from nearly one third in 
1995 to one fourth in 2010. The number of people in age group 40-64 years will rise 
and so will their share in total population. In 2010 nearly 15 percent of population 
will be 65 years or older. At this moment this is just over 13 percent. These 
developments will have serious consequences for the labour market. Persons in age 
group 20 - 39 will become more scarcely and the age group 40 - 64 will be available 
in larger quantities. Secondly, the growing share of people of 65 years and older 
implies that, given the present retirement age, the burden of pension premiums will 
increase. 
Table 1.4 Prognoses Dutch population according to gender and age (1995 - 2010, CBS middle scenario) 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Age 
0 - 1 9 
2 0 - 3 9 
4 0 - 6 4 
6 5 - 7 9 
80 and older 
Total 
Population (in thousands) 
1995 
7,627 
7,796 
3,758 
4,982 
4,649 
1,558 
475 
15,423 
2000 
7,925 
8,058 
3,922 
4,799 
5,097 
1,662 
503 
15,983 
2010 
8,371 
8,439 
4,061 
4,231 
6,031 
1,872 
615 
16,810 
Average annual change (%) 
1995 - 2000 
0.8 
0.7 
0.8 
-0.7 
1.8 
1.3 
1.2 
0.7 
2000 - 2010 
0.5 
0.5 
0.3 
-1.3 
1.7 
1.2 
2.0 
0.5 
Share of total population (%) 
1995 
50 
50 
24 
32 
30 
10 
3 
100.0 
2000 
51 
49 
25 
30 
32 
10 
3 
100.0 
2010 
51 
49 
24 
25 
36 
11 
4 
100.0 
Source: CBS, Statistisch jaarboek 1996. 
1.1.2 Labour force 
The labour force increased considerably in the last decennium. In this section we will 
discuss the changes in the size and composition of the labour force. The increasing 
supply of labour is partly caused by the still growing population of working age, 
though the trend of population growth is flattening as we have seen in the previous 
section. The major sources of the labour force growth are the increasing participation 
of women and the net-immigration. Changes in participation will be analysed in the 
next section. The CBS defines the labour force as: 
persons in employment for at least 12 hours a week, or 
persons who have accepted employment for at least 12 hours a week, or 
persons who want to work for at least 12 hours a week, who are available as 
such and who undertake activities to find work for at least 12 hours a week. 
Table 1.5 shows the development of the size of the labour force. In the period 1987 -
1994, the growth has been over 100,000 persons per year on average, which is equal 
to an average growth rate of 1.7 percent per year. Compared with other EC-countries 
the growth of the Dutch labour force has been high. In the period 1984-1992 the 
labour force growth rate in the Netherlands was the highest of all EU-countries and 
the same picture emerges for the period 1993-1996 based on provisional data and 
forecasts. (OECD, Employment Outlook 1995). Between 1993 and 1996 the EU labour 
force as a whole will hardly grow, while the growth rate of the Dutch labour force 
will remain about 1.7 percent per year. 
Table 1.5 Size and yearly change of the labour force 15-64 years (1987 - 1994) 
Year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Labour force (in thousands) 
5,743 
5,867 
5,929 
6,063 
6,189 
6,296 
6,406 
6,466 
Change (%) 
2.2 
1.1 
2.2 
2.1 
1.7 
1.7 
0.9 
Source: CBS, Enquête Beroepsbevolking. 
Table 1.6 shows the changes in the structure of the labour force during the same 
period. Summarizing, we observe: 
an increasing share of women in the total labour force; 
a sharp decrease of the share of young people up to 24 years of age and an 
increase of the share of age-group 45 - 54 years; 
an increased share of non-natives; 
a decrease oí the share of the lowest educated (primary education) and 
persons with lower vocational secondary education. On the other hand, the 
share of persons with higher vocational education and university is growing 
considerably. 
The labour force share of non-natives increased and is still increasing, but the level is 
average compared to the other EU-countries. 
Table 1.6 Structure of the labour force according to gender, age, ethnicity and level of education (1987, 
1990 and 1994) 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Age 
1 5 - 2 4 
2 5 - 3 4 
3 5 - 4 4 
4 5 - 5 4 
5 5 - 6 4 
Ethnicity 
Natives 
Non-natives 
Educational level 
Primary education3 ' 
Lower general secondary education 
Lower vocational secondary education 
Higher general secondary education 
Higher vocational secondary education 
Higher vocational education 
University 
Total 
Share in total labour force (%) 
1987 
65.5 
34.5 
20.2 
30.3 
26.7 
16.1 
6.6 
92.2 
7.8 
100.0 
1990 
63.7 
36.3 
17.9 
31.4 
27.6 
18.2 
5.9 
91.8 
8.2 
12.3 
7.1 
18.1 
4.8 
36.3 
14.6 
6.8 
100.0 
1994 
62.1 
37.9 
14.6 
31.8 
27.1 
20.7 
5.8 
90.6 
9.4 
9.5 
7.2 
15.9 
5.4 
37.9 
16.5 
7.5 
100.0 
a) Includes unknown level of education. 
Source: CBS, Enquête Beroepsbevolking. 
Although the share of women in the labour force is growing, the male labour force 
still exceeds the female labour force by roughly 1.5 million persons. Younger people 
are getting more scarcely on the labour market since the number of young people 
entering the labour force decreases. As we have seen this is caused by the 
demographic development. The fact that young people stay longer in education also 
plays a role. Increased participation in education has led to an increase in 
educational level of the labour force. In 1990 about 58 percent of the labour force 
attended at least higher vocational secondary education (MBO). In 1994 this share 
has risen to 62 percent. Firstly, the trend is that young people tend to choose for a 
higher education on average. Secondly, in the labour force relatively low educated 
elder groups (leaving the labour market) are replaced with relatively high educated 
young groups (entering the labour market). 
1.1.3 Participation 
In section 1.1.1 we observed that during the period 1987 - 1994 the total working age 
population has risen with about 0.7 percent per year. The labour force has grown 
with 1.7 percent per year on average (see section 1.1.2), which means that the 
participation rate also has risen (table 1.7). 
Between 1987 and 1994 the total gross participation rate has grown with nearly 4.5 
percentage points. This growth is due to the sharp rise in the participation of 
women. The participation of women increased from 40 percent in 1987 to over 47 
percent in 1994. The rise in male participation has been quite moderate. So, the 
participation rate of women is catching up with that of men. The last two years of 
the period considered (1993 and 1994) the participation rate of men hardly changed. 
In the age group 55 - 64 years the already very low participation rate has even gone 
down, which is undesirable. 
In most EU-countries the participation rate has remained more or less constant over 
the last decade4. In Germany a slight increase took place from 67.5 percent in 1983 
to 69.5 percent in 1994. For France the corresponding figures are 66.4 and 67.3 
percent. The participation rate even decreased in Italy. The Netherlands is again an 
exceptional case, the participation rate having grown from 59.0 percent in 1983 to 
70.2 percent in 1994. 
OECD, Employment Outlook, 1995. 
Table 1.7 Gross participation rate according to gender, age, ethnicity and level of education (1987, 1990 
and 1994) 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Age 
1 5 - 2 4 
2 5 - 3 4 
3 5 - 4 4 
4 5 - 5 4 
5 5 - 6 4 
Ethnicity 
Natives 
Non-natives 
Educational level 
Primary education3 ' 
Lower general secondary education 
Lower vocational secondary education 
Higher general secondary education 
Higher vocational secondary education 
Higher vocational education 
University 
Total 
Gross participation rate (%) 
1987 
74.2 
40.0 
47.5 
72.3 
69.3 
58.8 
27.5 
57.7 
53.2 
57.3 
1990 
74.6 
43.6 
46.9 
75.9 
71.6 
61.2 
26.9 
59.9 
53.2 
36.7 
39.0 
58.1 
43.6 
73.4 
79.0 
87.1 
59.3 
1994 
75.5 
47.6 
45.0 
79.3 
75.1 
66.3 
26.4 
62.7 
53.7 
36.7 
41.7 
58.8 
49.0 
74.2 
78.4 
86.7 
61.7 
a) The gross participation rate is the number of persons in the labour force (employed and unemployed) 
divided by the total number of persons of working age (15 - 64 years). 
Source: CBS, Enquête Beroepsbevolking. 
The low and not growing participation rate of migrants gives reason for concern. 
The participation rate of non-natives structurally lies below the native's participation 
rate and the gap has widened in the period under observation. The participation rate 
of migrants remained at the low level of about 53 percent, whereas the participation 
of natives increased from 58 to 63 percent. The participation pattern differs among 
the groups of migrants (see table 1.8). The participation of Turks and Moroccans is 
very low, namely 40 percent; especially the participation of women in these groups 
is very low (23 percent). The participation rate of the other four groups of migrants 
distinguished (Surinamese, Antilleans and Arubans, persons from other 
mediterranean countries and other) varies between 56 and 60 percent. The situation 
of Turks and Moroccans is becoming even worse when we also take their high 
unemployment rates into account (see section 1.2.2). 
Table 1.8 Gross participation for different groups of migrants (1994) 
Ethnicity 
Turks 
Moroccans 
Other mediterranean countries3 ' 
Surinamese 
An tilleans/Arubans 
Other 
Total 
Gross participation rate 1994 (%) 
42.4 
40.0 
56.3 
60.3 
55.8 
57.3 
53.7 
a) Persons from Algeria, Greece, Italy, former Yugoslavia, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia. 
Source: CBS, Enquête Beroepsbevolking. 
1.2 Structure of the workforce 
1.2.1 Employment 
1.2.1.1 Some general trends 
Firstly, in this section some general trends in employment will be highlighted. This 
serves as a framework for the more detailed description of the various developments 
in the following sections. Three large structural changes with respect to employment 
have taken place since the early sixties (OSA, 1995). These changes, which are at 
least partly related to each other, are visible in other EC-countries as well. In the first 
place the share in employment of industry, agriculture and fishery is decreasing in 
favour of a growing share in employment of the service and (semi) public sector. 
Recently employment in the (semi) public sector has been put under pressure due to 
cut backs in government expenditure. Secondly, with respect to the occupational 
structure the number of low qualified jobs is diminishing and the number of high 
qualified jobs is increasing and white collar workers replace blue collar workers. In 
the third place lower educated employees are being replaced by higher educated 
employees. One the one hand, this is caused by the changing structure in terms of 
qualification level of the available jobs. On the other hand, there are signs that lower 
educated are displaced by higher educated, even in jobs where a higher education is 
not needed (Teulings, 1990; Social Cultural Planning Bureau, 1995). This may be 
partly the result of substitution, as the relative wage level of higher educated has 
decreased in the last decade (Teulings, 1994). Draper and Manders (1996) find that 
substitution between low- and high-skilled labour is relatively strong, especially in 
the sheltered sector. Furthermore, they conclude that the greater part of the shift in 
demand away from low-skilled labour can be attributed to asymmetric labour-saving 
technological change. 
10 
Other trends in employment, are a sharp rise in part-time employment and a high 
and still growing use of temporary workers and fixed-term employees. The share of 
part-time labour in total employment is very high in the Netherlands: 37.4 percent in 
1995. This is the highest figure for all OECD-countries. The 1995 figures for France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom are: 15.6, 16.3, 6.4, 7.5 and 24.15. 
The incidence of temporary employment is not exceptionally high in the 
Netherlands. In 1994 10.9 percent of employment was of a temporary nature, which 
implies an average score. However, the Dutch figure doubled between 1983 and 
1994, whereas it remained more or less stable or even declined in most EU-countries 
with the exception of France . 
1.2.1.2 Developments in employment 
There has been quite a considerable growth in employment (table 1.9). Both the data 
about the number of employees and the number of employed persons (including 
self-employed) are from the Labour Force Survey . During the period 1987 - 1994 
the number of employees has grown with 600,000 in total, which equals an average 
growth of 1.8 percent per year. The average growth of the number of employed 
persons has been 1.7 percent per year. Between 1987 and 1992 the growth has been 
rather strong (employees 2.5 and employed persons 2.3 percent per year on average). 
In 1993 and 1994 employment growth stagnated. However, provisional figures for 
the year 1995 point at a considerable growth in employment again. 
Table 1.9 Number of employees and employed persons (1987 - 1994) 
Year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Employees3 ' 
Number (thousands) 
4,647 
4,774 
4,858 
5,016 
5,162 
5,258 
5,261 
5,222 
Change (%) 
2.7 
1.8 
3.3 
2.9 
1.9 
0.1 
-0.7 
Persons in employment1^ 
Number (thousands) 
5,257 
5,378 
5,477 
5,644 
5,790 
5,885 
5,925 
5,920 
6,074 
Change (%) 
2.3 
1.8 
3.0 
2.6 
1.6 
0.7 
-0.1 
2.6 
a) Average number of employees with employment for at least 12 hours per week. 
b) Average number of persons with employment (employees and self-employed) for at least 12 hours per 
week. 
Source: CBS, Enquête Beroepsbevolking. 
5 OECD, Employment Outlook, 1996. 
6 OECD, Employment Outlook, 1996. 
7 The Annual Employment and Wage Survey (an establishment based survey) measures the number of jobs 
of employees (one person may occupy more than one job). 
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The above figures are in terms of persons. Many of the new jobs are part-time jobs. 
Therefore employment growth has been less impressive in terms of full-time 
equivalents, although still quite high. If we also take account of the structural 
reduction in worktime, we observe that total labour hours did not grow for a long 
time (De Beer, 1994). 
Table 1.10 gives the results for the period 1987-1994. The figures on the number of 
employees in this table, which are based on the Labour Accounts of the CBS, are not 
comparable with the figures in the previous table . The growth in full-time 
equivalents and working hours lies structurally below the growth in persons (on 
average 0.5 percentage point a year). 
Although the labour volume in hours rose in the period 1987 - 1994, the level in 
1994 is comparable with that in the late sixties and the early seventies. So, taken over 
a longer period (more than thirty years!) the number of working hours has not 
grown at all, implying that the same total number of working hours is now 
distributed over a far larger number of people. Both the increasing share of part-time 
workers and the collectively agreed reductions in the contractual work time (for full-
time employees) most probably have contributed to this redistribution process. 
Table 1.10 Employees, full-time labour years and working hours (1987 - 1994) 
Year 
1987 
1990 
1994 
Employees 
Number 
(thousands) 
5,140 
5,563 
5,775 
Annual average 
change (%) 
2.7 
0.9 
Full-time labour years 
(employees) 
Number 
(thousands) 
4,406 
4,702 
4,786 
Annual average 
change (%) 
2.2 
0.4 
Hours worked (employees) 
Number 
(millions) 
7,694 
8,185 
8,329 
Annual average 
change (%) 
2.1 
0.4 
Source: CBS, Labour Accounts. 
Part-time work can not only lighten the unemployment problem by dividing the 
available volume of employment over a larger number of people, but it can also 
offer employees the opportunity to combine work with care taking tasks (at home or 
elsewhere). In the Netherlands part-time work is expanding more than total 
employment (table 1.11), but this concerns only women. The number of men working 
less than 35 hours a week has not increased in the period 1987 - 1994. In 1994, only 9 
percent of the men worked less than 35 hours; for women this percentage was equal 
to 56 percent. Persons who work less than 12 hours per week are not counted as 
employed in the Labour Force Survey. Their number grew with 200,000 between 
1987 and 1994 (from 572,000 to 772,000)9. 
Table 1.9 contains the number of persons in employment for at least 12 hours a week. Table 1.10 is based 
on the total number of employees, regardless of the number of hours per week. So, also employees 
working less than 12 hours a week are incorporated in the figures. 
More than two-thirds concerns students and housewives/men (CBS, Enquête Beroepsbevolking 1994, 1995). 
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Table I.ll Employment according to working hours per week and gender (1987, 1990 and 1994) 
Gender and working 
hours per week 
Male 
12-19 hours 
20 - 34 hours 
35 hours or more 
Total male 
Female 
12 - 19 hours 
20 - 34 hours 
35 hours or more 
Total female 
Total male and female 
Employed (in thousands) 
1987 
.72 
291 
3,173 
3336 
262 
572 
887 
1,721 
5,257 
1990 
75 
287 
3,324 
3,686 
312 
690 
955 
1,958 
5,644 
1994 
65 
287 
3,396 
3,747 
321 
895 
956 
2,172 
5,920 
Average annual change (%) 
1987 - 1990 
1.4 
-0.5 
1.6 
1.4 
6.0 
6.5 
2.5 
4.4 
2.4 
1990 - 1994 
-3.5 
0.0 
0.5 
0.4 
0.7 
6.7 
0.0 
2.6 
1.2 
Source: CBS, Enquete Beroepsbevolking. 
In the previous section we showed that the incidence of part-time labour is very 
high in the Netherlands. In 1994 just over 65 percent of the active women worked 
part-time (defined as working shorter than the contractual full-time working time). 
For men this figure was 15 percent. Research by Delsen (1995) indicates that a larger 
share of part-time work in total employment (the Netherlands, Denmark) goes 
together with a relatively high share of "large" part-time jobs. 
Four sectors in particular have very high percentages of part-time work: health care, 
'other' services, the government sector and the educational sector. In these sectors 
part-time work can be found in more than 90 percent of the organisations. For the 
economy as a whole this figure equals 69 percent (OSA, 1994). Part-time work is 
more common in larger than in smaller organisations. 
Finally, we pay some attention to the development of self-employment. The figures 
in the table below include family-members working in the company owned by their 
partner or their parents. The number of self-employed is increasing. Remarkably, 
self-employment has grown less than total employment during the period 1987 -
1990, but faster during the period 1990 - 1994. Especially in 1993 and 1994, when 
economic growth was relatively low, the number of self-employed has grown 
considerably. The growth in self-employment in these two years has been 71,000 
persons, whereas the total number of employed (including self-employed) grew with 
only 35,000 persons. In the preceding years with a stronger economic growth the rise 
in self-employment has not been that high. So, it seems that the rise in self-
employment is negatively correlated with economic growth. Perhaps, a shortage of 
jobs stimulate people to start their own business. 
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Table 1.12 Self-employment (1987, 1990 and 1994) 
Year 
1987 
1990 
1994 
Number of self-employed (thousands) 
610 
628 
698 
Average annual change (%) 
1.0 (1987-1990) 
2.7 (1990-1994) 
Source: CBS, Enquete Beroepsbevolking. 
1.2.1.3 Employment structure 
This paragraph deals with the developments in employment according to some 
characteristics of the employed (see table 1.13). First, the number of employed 
women is growing much faster than the number of employed men. Secondly, the 
number of employed young people up to 24 has decreased quite rapidly, especially 
in the period 1990 - 1994. The employment of persons with age 25 - 54 has risen 
during the whole period. The strong rise in employment in age group 45 - 54 is 
striking. Thirdly, the number of employed migrants is growing at a relatively fast 
rate. Finally, employment is growing for the higher educated. The number of 
employed persons with primary education is diminishing. 
The developments described above are caused by a combination of supply and 
demand factors. Changes in the structure of the labour force (which have been 
discussed in section 1.1.2) will almost automatically have consequences for the 
structure of employment. This is most obviously true for the age-structure. On the 
other hand, demand factors also play an important role. Sectors differ strongly 
according to the structure of employment in terms of age, gender and education. 
Sectoral differences in employment growth therefore will influence the structure of 
employment. 
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Table 1.13 Employed labour force according to gender, age, ethnicity and level of education (1987, 1990 and 1994). 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Age 
1 5 - 2 4 
2 5 - 3 4 
3 5 - 4 4 
4 5 - 5 4 
5 5 - 6 4 
Ethnicity 
Natives 
Non-natives 
Educational level 
Primary education3 ' 
Lower general secondary education 
Lower vocational secondary education 
Higher general secondary education 
Higher vocational secondary education 
Higher vocational education 
University 
Total 
Employed 
1987 
3,536 
1,721 
1,009 
1,596 
1,418 
870 
365 
4,898 
359 
5,257 
1990 
3,686 
1,958 
973 
1,773 
1,561 
978 
359 
5,233 
411 
641 
383 
1,023 
256 
2,109 
844 
388 
5,644 
1994 
3,747 
2,172 
819 
1,877 
1,609 
1,255 
360 
5,435 
484 
511 
411 
932 
308 
2,303 
1,006 
449 
5,920 
Average annual change (%) 
1987 - 1990 
1.4 
4.4 
-1.2 
3.6 
3.3 
4.0 
-0.6 
2.2 
4.6 
2.4 
1990 - 1994 
0.4 
2.6 
A.2 
1.4 
0.8 
6.4 
0.1 
1.0 
4.2 
-5.5 
1.8 
-2.3 
4.7 
2.2 
4.5 
3.7 
1.2 
a) Includes unknown level of education. 
Source: CBS, Enquête Beroepsbevolking. 
Table 1.14 shows the shift in sectoral structure of employment in the period 1985 -
1993. Trade, hotel, catering and repair services and the sector banking, insurances 
and other business services have a growing share in employment. The shares of the 
industrial sector and the building and construction sector are decreasing. The share 
of 'other services' is more or less constant. However, 'other services' includes the 
public sector which shows a declining share in employment. 
15 
Table 1.14 Employment according to sector (1985, 1990 and 1993) 
Agriculture and fishery 
Minerals extracting industry 
Industry 
Public utilities 
Building and construction sector 
Trade, hotel and catering, repair services 
Transportation and communication services 
Banking and insurances and other business 
services 
Other services 
Total2 ' 
Jobs of employees 
(thousands) 
1985 
71 
9 
965 
47 
325 
794 
320 
517 
1,684 
4,732 
1990 
87 
10 
1,034 
45 
353 
1,001 
362 
677 
1,837 
5,407 
1993 
98 
10 
972 
44 
339 
1,090 
377 
721 
1,921 
5,573 
Share in total employment (%) 
1985 
1.5 
0.2 
20.4 
1.0 
6.9 
16.8 
6.8 
10.9 
35.6 
100.0 
1990 
1.6 
0.2 
19.1 
0.8 
6.5 
18.5 
6.7 
12.5 
34.0 
100.0 
1993 
1.8 
0.2 
17.4 
0.8 
6.1 
19.6 
6.8 
12.9 
34.5 
100.0 
a) Persons with unknown profession not included. 
Source: CBS, Enquête Beroepsbevolking. 
1.2.1.4 Temporary and fixed-term employment 
Information on temporary and fixed-term workers is only available for the most 
recent years. The category workers with a flexible contract (table 1.15) consists of: 
1. Employees with a fixed-term contract for a duration of less than one year 
without the notice of a permanent contract. 
2. Employees who do not have a contract for a fixed number of hours per 
week. 
Temporary workers, that is workers who work through mediation of a Temporary 
Work Agency (TWA), are included in this definition. In 1995 just under 9 percent of 
the employees working 12 hours or more per week have a flexible contract (481,000 
employees). Although the period concerned is very short, there are indications that: 
a) fixed-term workers are the first ones to become redundant as soon as 
economic prospects are deteriorating (for example in 1993) 
b) when the economy is recovering and demand for labour is rising, the first 
reaction of employers is to hire flexible workers (for example in 1994 and 
1995). 
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Table 1.15 Development of the number of employed with a flexible contract (1992 -1995) 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Number of employees with a 
flexible contract (thousands) 
399 
393 
425 
481 
Change (%) 
-1.5 
8.1 
13.2 
Share in total number of 
employees (%) 
7.6 
7.5 
8.9 
9.0 
Source: CBS, Enquete Beroepsbevolking. 
Table 1.16 provides some information about temporary work. Most interesting is the 
development in the total number of worked hours by temporary workers. Up to 
1993 total hours worked by temporary workers developed more or less parallel with 
the business cycle, for which the total number of vacancies (last column of the table) 
may be taken as indicator. From 1994 on, the relation is less clear. It seems that the 
number of hours worked by temporary workers grows much faster than the number 
of vacancies. This may point at a structural change, temporary work becoming more 
common in the economy. Most likely this development is demand driven, employers 
increasingly preferring temporary work. Increased competition is among the factors 
inducing them to make more use of flexible contracts. Research shows that the great 
majority of the workers prefer stable working relations. Note that the first column in 
table 1.16 refers to persons who have usually worked only part of the year, and in 
many cases on a part-time basis. The numbers strongly decrease if they are 
transformed to full-time equivalents. 
Table 1.16 Information on temporary work (1986-1994) 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Number of persons 
who worked through a 
TWA during the year3 ' 
422,000 
569,000 
648,000 
Number of hours 
worked by temporary 
workers (millions)b' 
160 
174 
195 
209 
195 
183 
165 
198 
253 
Index temporary hours 
(1990 = 100)b> 
77 
83 
93 
100 
93 
88 
79 
95 
121 
Index vacancies0' 
81 
86 
100 
91 
87 
69 
60 
a) Source: NEI (1993, 1995) and Marktplan Adviesgroep (1991) 
b) Source: CBS. 
c) Source: LBA, the annual survey How do employers recruit? 
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1.2.1.5 Discrepancies on the demand side 
Firms do not always succeed in attracting workers with the required qualifications. If 
jobs remain unfulfilled firms may be confronted with a possible loss of production. 
They may try to prevent this in several ways, namely through: 
using forms of flexible work (overtime, temporary work, subcontracting, 
etcetera); 
using a less labour intensive production process or a production process 
which requires labour which is available; 
hiring employees who are not fully-qualified for the jobs; 
improving the labour conditions. 
As far as these alternatives are available, they will increase the costs and thus 
influence the operating results of firms (lower profits, lower sales due to higher 
prices, etcetera). When the alternatives cannot be used to solve the problem, there 
will be a loss of production anyway. 
The number of unfilled vacancies is the most common indicator for unfilled demand. 
This indicator has some drawbacks however. In the first place, a vacancy does not 
always mean that a job is unfulfilled. The job can still be occupied by someone else, 
for instance a worker who is expected to leave. On the other hand, employers do not 
always notify vacancies at an employment service when a shortage of workers 
exists . Besides, supply-side shortages on the labour market in many cases lead to 
wage increases quickly and as a consequence labour demand will decrease. Higher 
wages may not always attract more labour because unemployed workers in other 
sectors may not have the required qualifications. As a result vacancies may 
disappear without more jobs being fulfilled. Finally, firms may compete for a share 
in the market. When this market share is directly related to the possibilities to hire 
new employees, then the filling of vacancies by one firm leads to a loss of market 
share of another firm. In that case, it is questionable whether one can speak about a 
real shortage on macro level. 
Besides the number of unfilled vacancies, table 1.17 contains the percentage of firms 
in industry with production hindrances due to a shortage of personnel as an 
indicator for demand-side discrepancies. Some of the remarks made above are also 
applicable for this indicator. Finally, the share of the unfilled vacancies that is 
considered to be hard to fill is presented. This gives an indication of the problems in 
solving the shortages. 
10 We use survey data from the CBS, so this drawback is not relevant. 
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Table 1.17 Some indicators for discrepancies on the demand side of the labour market (1981-1993) 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Number of unfilled 
vacancies (thousands) 
52 
27 
18 
24 
35 
66 
71 
64 
92 
105 
87 
58 
34 
39 
55 
Share of hard to fill 
vacancies (%) 
53% 
39% 
27% 
31% 
35% 
46% 
48% 
42% 
51% 
47% 
43% 
35% 
18% 
20% 
Share of firms in industry with 
production hindrances caused 
by a shortage of personnel (%) 
1% 
1% 
1% 
2% 
1% 
2% 
3% 
6% 
4% 
2% 
0% 
0% 
Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. 
Obvious is that the number of unfilled vacancies fluctuated strongly in the period 
concerned. The lowest number was reached in 1982 with 18,000 unfilled vacancies. 
After 1982 the number of vacancies increased to 105,000 in 1990, whereupon, 
especially after 1991, a strong decrease has set in to 34,000 vacancies in 1993. The 
number of vacancies coming into existence and the number of filled vacancies 
during a year is many times higher than the number of unfilled vacancies at a 
certain moment. In 1993, the total number of filled vacancies was about 400,000. So, 
behind the low level of stocks in 1993 still goes a great dynamic flow. After 1993, the 
number of unfilled vacancies has risen again to 55,000 in 1995. In 1995 the rise has 
been considerable. 
The share of vacancies that is hard to fill is correlated positively with the number of 
vacancies. In years with a high (low) amount of vacancies a high (low) proportion of 
the vacancies seems hard to fill. Problems with filling vacancies may be partly due 
to requirements (in respect of educational level and work experience for example) 
but also to relatively low wages and working conditions. Table 1.18 gives the total 
number of vacancies and the share of hard-to-fill vacancies according to required 
level of education for the years 1990 and 1994. The number of unfilled vacancies 
decreased at all educational levels. The largest decrease was for those with primary 
education or (lower or higher) vocational secondary education. The share of hard-to-
fill vacancies diminished from 47 to 20 percent of the total number of unfilled 
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vacancies. In 1994, this share is relatively large for vacancies at university, higher 
vocational and lower vocational level. 
Table 1.18 Number of unfilled vacancies and share of hard-to-fill vacancies according to required 
level of education, 1990 and 1994 
Primary education 
Lower general secondary education 
Lower vocational secondary education 
Higher general secondary education 
Higher vocational secondary education 
Higher vocational education 
University 
Total3' 
Number of unfilled 
vacancies (thousands) 
1990 
9.0 
9.6 
30.8 
2.8 
32.1 
12.3 
1.6 
104.7 
1994 
1.0 
4.2 
8.7 
2.0 
12.2 
8.4 
1.0 
39.4 
Change (%) 
1990 - 1994 
-89 
-56 
-72 
-29 
-62 
-32 
-38 
-62 
Share of hard-to-fill 
vacancies in total number of 
unfilled vacancies (%) 
1990 
54 
35 
56 
25 
52 
47 
44 
47 
1994 
10 
7 
29 
10 
17 
26 
50 
20 
a) Including required level of education unknown. 
Source: CBS. 
The percentage of firms in industry with production hindrances due to a shortage of 
personnel follows the same pattern as the number of vacancies. The highest 
percentage is reached in 1990 (about 6 to 7 percent), whereupon the percentage 
decreases to 0 in 1993. 
We have to conclude that the discrepancies on the demand side are limited in the 
present situation. Since 1990 the number of vacancies, the share of hard to fill 
vacancies and the production hindrances due to a shortage of personnel has been 
decreasing. But there are some indications that the discrepancies on the demand side 
are growing again as a result of the positive general developments on the labour 
market in 1995 and 1996. 
1.2.1.6 Regional variations 
Table 1.19 gives some insight into the regional variations in employment growth. A 
first conclusion is that employment growth in metropolitan areas in the "Randstad", 
such as Amsterdam/Zaanstreek/Waterland, Den Haag/Delft and Rijnmond, is 
relatively low. Generally the highest employment growth is found in the other 
regions in the Randstad (West-Utrecht, Kennemer-, Amstel- en Meerlanden and 
Rijnstreek) and regions which are directly adjacent to the Randstad (such as Veluwe, 
Flevoland, Oost-Utrecht, Westelijk Noord-Brabant and Breda). The employment 
growth in the north, the east and south is not far from average, which means that 
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the relative position of these regions has improved. Previously the growth of 
employment in these regions stayed behind the national average. 
Table 1.19 Number of jobs of employees by RBA-region (1987,1990, 1994, thousands)3' 
Groningen 
Friesland 
Drenthe 
IJssel-Vecht 
Twente 
Midden-IJssel 
Veluwe 
Arnhem / Oost-Gelderland 
Nijmegen/Rivierenland 
Flevoland 
Oost-Utrecht 
West-Utrecht 
Het Gooi and Vechtstreek 
Noord-Holland Noord 
Amsterdam/Zaanstreek/Waterland 
Kennemer-, Amstelland and 
Meerlanden 
Rijnstreek 
Den Haag/Delft 
Drechtsteden 
Rijnmond 
Zeeland 
Westelijk Noord-Brabant 
Breda 
Midden-Brabant 
Noord-Oost Brabant 
Zuid-Oost Brabant 
Midden- and Noord-Limburg 
Zuid-Limburg 
Total 
Year 
1987 
175.2 
162.6 
121.9 
98.9 
169.7 
67.0 
174.2 
204.9 
131.4 
42.8 
145.9 
217.6 
83.0 
134.2 
429.6 
244.1 
199.3 
376.8 
117.5 
436.4 
106.8 
67.1 
118.3 
120.0 
170.9 
226.0 
147.6 
197.4 
4,890.6 
1990 
186.2 
175.8 
134.1 
109.1 
182.2 
73.4 
193.5 
223.0 
146.4 
52.6 
160.9 
247.5 
86.3 
147.7 
450.1 
271.0 
221.2 
391.5 
127.4 
457.7 
114.8 
75.1 
132.2 
131.4 
190.0 
246.0 
162.3 
214.7 
5304.1 
1994 
189.8 
184.3 
138.9 
117.6 
195.9 
76.8 
212.9 
227.0 
154.7 
65.1 
176.1 
267.4 
87.4 
160.6 
457.5 
274.1 
234.1 
401.9 
131.2 
464.4 
118.8 
75.8 
138.7 
138.4 
214.1 
248.6 
175.9 
213.0 
5,541.0 
Average annual change (%) 
1987 - 1990 
2.1 
2.6 
3.2 
3.3 
2.4 
3.1 
3.6 
2.9 
3.7 
7.1 
3.3 
4.4 
1.3 
3.2 
1.6 
3.5 
3.5 
1.3 
2.7 
1.6 
2.4 
3.8 
3.8 
3.1 
3.6 
2.9 
3.2 
2.8 
2.7 
1990 - 1994 
0.5 
1.2 
0.9 
1.9 
1.8 
1.1 
2.4 
0.4 
1.4 
5.5 
2.3 
2.0 
0.3 
2.1 
0.4 
0.3 
1.4 
0.7 
0.7 
0.4 
0.9 
0.2 
1.2 
1.3 
3.0 
0.3 
2.0 
-0.2 
1.1 
a) This table concerns the number of jobs of employees by location of the jobs. 
Source: CBS, Annual Employment and Wage Survey. 
21 
1.2.1.7 Informal labour market 
Thus far we have discussed in short the main aspects of the "formal" labour market. 
Besides the formal labour market there is a paid informal labour market, or the so-
called black labour market. On this informal market wages are paid without 
payment of taxes and social security contributions. The increasing importance of the 
informal economy is partly due to the high Dutch tax schemes and the expanded 
system of social security, although the latter has been reduced in the last few years. 
A number of studies have shown that the informal labour market offers little 
opportunity for outsiders to enter the labour market. The persons who are active on 
the informal labour market primarily are persons who are active on the formal 
labour market as well. Persons who have few opportunities to enter the formal 
labour market have also few opportunities to enter the informal labour market. It 
seems that the informal labour market exists primarily to avoid the high tax rates at 
the top. For example a dentist who practices dental care partly in the informal 
economy. The informal labour market does not only consist of blue collar employees 
but the share of white collar employees is also substantial. 
Measuring the extend of the informal economy encounters difficulties. The 
sensitivity of the subject makes that survey results are less reliable. People are less 
willing to admit being active in the informal economy, for example because they are 
afraid of getting caught or because of moral thresholds. This implies an 
underestimate of the extend of the informal economy. Labour without paying taxes 
and social security contributions is not always illegal. Certain groups (students, 
people with income less then the tax-free exempt) do not have to report their income 
below a certain maximum. In surveys it is hard to distinguish between persons work 
without paying taxes and social security contributions legally or illegally. An 
overestimate occurs when legal working persons are also counted as being active in 
the informal economy. 
Research of Van Eck and Kazemier (1990) indicates that there are over one million 
illegal workers (in this survey legal workers, for example students with small 
additional income, were not counted)11. Their activities mainly have the character 
of gaining additional income. Roughly one out of nine persons (of 16 years and 
older) claims to have revenues out of black labour. This is confirmed by the most 
recent study in this field (OSA, 1993). Expressed in terms of money, total illegal 
work amounts to roughly three billion guilders. This amounts to around 1 percent of 
national income. It concerned about 100,000 labour years (of 1,800 hours per year). 
According to the researchers this should be seen as a minimum estimate. 
In table 1.20 the main estimates of the available research are presented. Besides the 
survey of van Eck and Kazemier, the results of two other surveys are shown 
(Koopmans, 1988 and Allaart and De Voogd-Hamelink, 1989). In the latter a 
minimum and a maximum variant are distinguished. The results of the various 
studies cannot be compared with each other directly, because of different definitions 
of the informal labour market. What we can say is that the illegal labour market has 
a large volume. The total amount of money involved is between 1 and 5 billion Dfl. 
The number of suppliers on the informal labour market is 1 to 3 million people. 
11 This research was based on a relatively small number of interviews. 
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They earn between Dfl 1,050 and Dfl 2,300 a year with illegal work. In labour years, 
the informal labour market is estimated to amount 51 to 239 thousand labour years. 
Table 1.20 Estimates of the extend of the informal economy 
Van Eck and Kazemier (CBS) 
Koopmans (SEO) 
Allaart and De Voogd-Hamelink 
(OSA) 
minimum 
maximum 
number of 
suppliers 
(millions) 
1.3 (min) 
3.3 
0.6 
2.5 
Average 
annual 
earnings (in 
Dfl) 
2,300 
1,050 
1,900 
1,900 
Number of 
labour years 
(thousands) 
100 (min) 
239 
51 
206 
Total amount 
(billion Dfl) 
3.0 
3.5 
1.1 
4.8 
Koopmans (1989) confirms our earlier conclusion that the chances of persons on the 
black labour market are mainly determined by the chances on the formal labour 
market. Only a small proportion (13 percent which equals their share in population) 
of illegal work is done by unemployed and disabled. Employees account for half of 
the total amount of illegal work. The informal labour market does not offer special 
opportunities to persons with few opportunities on the formal labour market. And 
the lesser educated do not profit most from the informal labour market. Especially 
persons with professional skills relatively often work illegally. 
If the official wage level would be asked for illegal labour, then a large proportion of 
the demand of private households would disappear. This means that formalizing 
these activities would only be possible if the prices go down. The opposite is true for 
the demand for illegal paid work by firms (Mot en Roozen, 1990); this demand 
would for the biggest part remain if the official wage level would be asked. 
Besides paid illegal labour the informal economy incorporates household work (in 
and around the house), informal assistance and voluntary work (the non-paid part of 
the informal market). Household work accounts for about 6.5 million labour years 
and informal assistance and voluntary work together for about 0.6 million labour 
years (Geurts, 1991). 
1.2.1.8 Latent needs 
Besides the fact that an informal labour market exists, the simultaneous presence of 
latent needs on the one hand and fallow laid labour on the other raises the question 
whether the current mechanisms work sufficient (OSA, Ruimte aan werk 1995). In 
society numerous needs are present, which at this moment remain unfulfilled (or 
maybe are fulfilled through the informal labour market). Latent needs in society 
include for example more security in the streets, guarded bike shed and 
neighbourhood-janitors. The idea of solving part of the unemployment problem with 
the use of latent needs in society has already been presented in the White Papers of 
the European Community. These latent needs are a consequence of changes in way 
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of life, changes in the role the family plays within society, and demographic and 
emancipational developments (OSA, 1995). According the White Papers there exist 
hindrances which prevent the development of services which answer to these needs. 
Fulfilment of latent needs can induce employment growth in two ways. The first 
way is an increase in the consumption of services (labour intensive, like care 
services) at the expense of consumption of capital intensive goods. This shift means 
a more labour intensive production overall. The second way is dissaving. The latent 
needs lead to an increased consumption financed out of savings. Savings can be 
hidden money, savings account balances or deposits etcetera (OSA, 1995). 
Question is why these latent needs are not translated into employment by the 
market mechanism. Regulation by the government as well as by branch 
organisations and by employers/employees organisations is one reason. Changes in 
society with respect to family, the increasing share of elderly and labour could have 
made the existing care taking structure insufficient and inadequate. As the (semi) 
public sector is very active in the care taking sector this could explain why private 
enterprises have not fully taken advantage of the existing latent needs. The major 
role of the (semi) public sector might also explain why there exist discrepancies 
between demand and supply (OSA, 1995). Finally, we may follow Beaumol in 
arguing that labour productivity growth in this type of services is persistently low 
compared to other sectors, implying that the relative costs will increase. 
In the remaining of this section we will, in line with the White Papers, discuss the 
latent needs of two groups in more detail. These two groups are the elderly and the 
two-earner families. The former because of their increasing share in the total 
population and because of the expectation that this group - as a consequence of 
better pension arrangements - will have an improved purchasing power in the 
future. The latter because the number of two-earning families is rapidly increasing. 
Other life and labour patterns lead to contracting out certain family and household 
tasks like day care. 
Not only is the share of the elderly increasing, the elderly are becoming older over 
time. This group is becoming more wealthy, although recent research has indicated 
that this process is very slow (Klaus and Hooijmeijer, 1994). Furthermore can the 
group elderly not be considered as one homogenous group. The differences in 
income among elderly are substantial. With respect to possible changes in the care-
system we can distinguish two employment increasing substitution effects. The first 
is the substitution of expensive care in care organisations with cheap care at the 
home of the elderly. Projections of the integrated elderly care of Nieuwegein and the 
individual care subsidy of Rotterdam indicate that this substitution can create 3,000 -
10,000 jobs for low educated persons. Other research confirms this estimate. The 
figures mentioned are net mutations. Employment loss takes place in the care 
organisations while employment growth is expected in the home care sector. The 
second substitution effect is an increasing demand for practical support to enable 
elder people to stay living independent. This support consists for example out of 
small repair, transport and house maintenance. As these projects are of a very small 
scale the employment growth due to these projects is very moderate. Estimates 
indicate an increase in the number of jobs of 5,000 - 7,000 (De Kemp and Lijsen, 
1995). Noted is that there are some problems with the financing of these projects. 
The means of the elderly are limited. Furthermore are the skills of the unemployed 
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not always sufficient. Not only must they have technical abilities, they must also 
have certain social skills required. Another problem is a lack of motivation. Besides 
all there must be pointed at the risk of crowding out and false competition. 
The traditional family with one breadwinner - usually the husband - is becoming 
less popular. The popularity of two-earning families is expanding. In this section we 
will define a two-earning family as being a family with one partner as breadwinner 
and the other working at least 20 hours per week. Two-earning families usually have 
a lack of time. They do not come round to certain household activities or hobbies. 
Relaxation, maintenance, repair and cleaning of the house, purchasing of durables 
and clothing are the most common. But also shopping is skipped under time 
pressure (OSA, 1995). Contracting out can enlighten the time problem. 
To get an idea of the latent needs of two-earning families table 1.21 shows the latent 
needs and actual use for services for sole-wage earners and two-earning families. 
The column "actual use" shows the percentage of the households that already use the 
service concerned. The column "needs" shows the percentage of the households that 
would like to use the service concerned. This are households who have not yet used 
these services and households who would like to expand their use of these services. 
Table 1.21 Single earners' and two-earner households' latent needs for services 
Domestic help 
Handyman 
Day care: 
- children 0 - 3 years old 
- children > 3 years old 
Direct available baby-sitter 
Care during shopping, eating out, etc. 
Two-earners households (%) 
Actual use 
29 
69 
95 
63 
-
-
Needs 
36 
17 
18 
9 
26 
14 
Single-earners (%) 
Actual use 
9 
63 
65 
72 
-
-
Needs 
21 
11 
28 
9 
15 
15 
Source: Mot and Paape, 1995. 
The latent needs of two-earning households are significant larger than the latent 
needs of single wage-earners except for day care in department stores and 
restaurants and day care for very young children. The table indicates large needs for 
children related services. The insufficient supply of these services is probably due to 
the costs concerned. In particular the responsibility of employers and government in 
this respect should be mentioned (OSA, 1995). 
Although the figures indicate large latent needs, it should be noted that whether 
these needs are real depends on the price families are willing to pay. The SEO 
survey results indicate that the purchasing power of the households is sufficient to 
use the services concerned. The purchasing power of families without any children is 
larger than the purchasing power of families with children. As expected is the 
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financial situation of two-earning families better than single wage-earners. Table 1.22 
presents the results of an estimate (minimum variant) of the employment effects 
when the latent needs of both groups are effectuated. Besides the potential 
employment due to effectuation of latent needs is shown the actual employment 
related to the actual use of the services. Noted is that this concerns the formal as 
well as the informal labour market. The fulfilment of the latent needs could generate 
45,000 full-time labour years, which equals some 60,000 jobs. 
Table 1.22 Employment effects of fulfilling latent needs of single earner households and two-earners 
households (in full-time years) 
Two-earners with children 
- Day care children 
- Domestic help 
- Chores 
Two-earners without children 
- Domestic help 
- Chores 
Single earners with children 
- Day care children 
- Domestic help 
- Chores 
Single earners without children 
- Domestic help 
- Chores 
Latent needs 
16,000 
7,000 
5,000 
4,000 
6,000 
3,000 
3,000 
21,000 
9,000 
7,000 
5,000 
2,000 
1,000 
1,000 
Fulfilled needs 
52,000 
33,000 
16,000 
3,000 
11,000 
8,000 
3,000 
42,000 
23,000 
11,000 
8,000 
2,000 
1,000 
1,000 
Source: Mot en Paape, 1985. 
A specific problem with the transformation of needs into employment is that these 
services are very personal. Parents do not easily let a stranger invade their privacy. 
Let alone that they would let a stranger take care of their young children. A bond of 
trust with the service employee seems necessary. This is especially true for direct 
available baby-sitters. Parents will demand high qualifications. 
Another reason why these services are not fully used is government influence. The 
tax and social security contributions make the formal price for these services perhaps 
too high. Households might resort to the informal labour market (see the previous 
section). The government could stimulate household services by tax reductions. A 
milder tax regime for this kind of labour could reinforce the demand for these 
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,12 services . Furthermore this will imply a partial formalization of the informal 
labour market. This could mean a positive stimulus for the formal employment in 
these branches. In the Netherlands some measures have been taken recently to make 
low skilled labour cheaper (see section IV.2.3). 
1.2.2 Unemployment 
The most prominent problem on the labour market is the high level of 
unemployment. Until the seventies the unemployment level was very low. In this 
period the fulfilment of vacancies was the main problem. The labour market was 
characterised by supply side shortages. From the beginning of the seventies demand 
side shortages have arisen and unemployment has become more and more 
structural. In our discussion we will primarily use the official CBS-figures on 
unemployment. In appendix A this and other probable measures for unemployment 
are discussed. Because of the problems sketched in this appendix, we will first try to 
give an indication of the total volume of the quantitative supply side discrepancies. 
1.2.2.1 Volume of quantitative supply side discrepancies 
Based on the CBS definition of unemployment (the unemployed labour force) the 
level of unemployment is 547,000 persons in 1994. Persons who want to have a job 
for at least 12 hours per week but did not search actively in the reference period (4 
weeks) are excluded in this figure. When this group is included, the number of 
unemployed would be 920,000 (see table 1.23). 
Table 1.23 An estimate for total "unemployment" in 1993 and 1994 
Without a job for 12 hours or more, 
available and searching actively (CBS) 
Persons who want to have work for at 
least 12 hours, are available but do not 
search actively 
Hidden unemployment in Disability 
Insurance (WAO) 
Hidden unemployment is National 
Assistance (ABW) 
Persons in labour market measures 
1993 
481,000 
329,000 
A couple of hundred thousand 
p.m. 
About 200,000 
1994 
547,000 
372,000 
A couple of hundred thousands 
(probably diminishing slightly) 
p.m. 
About 200,000 
12 A tax reduction can be interpreted as a diminished interference of the government in the price 
mechanism. Lower taxes improve the allocative function of prices. 
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But even then we underestimate total unemployment, because we have not counted: 
1. Hidden unemployment in Disability Insurance (WAO). It is not unrealistic to 
assume that a couple of hundred thousand persons receiving a disability 
benefit must in fact be counted as hidden unemployed. This estimate is 
based on both more dated and more recent s tudies . Recently, major 
reforms in the WAO have taken place. These reforms will probably reduce 
the number of hidden unemployed in the WAO. 
2. Hidden unemployment in General Social Assistance (ABW). Persons 
receiving an ABW benefit basically are not available for work. The question 
is what would happen under other circumstances (different regulations with 
respect to benefits, different labour market situation, etcetera)? Most 
probably, some of these persons would offer themselves on the labour 
market. However, figures are not known. Probably the introduction of the 
new ABW will give some clarity . 
3. Persons participating in labour market measures. Those who work in 
Sheltered Workshops or have a job through a job creation scheme 
(additional jobs) are counted as employed according to the CBS definition. 
Besides, persons participating in training measures are not counted as 
unemployed (because they are not available in short notice). 
The level of total unemployment in 1994 amounts to 550,000 for sure and to more 
than 1,200,000 if persons who do not search for a job, hidden unemployed and 
persons who participate in labour market measures are added. 
As was indicated in the previous paragraphes reforms such as the reform of the 
Disability Act may reduce the number of hidden unemployed. However, this may 
lead to an increasing use of unemployment insurance, and therefore of registrated 
unemployment. 
1.2.2.2 Trends in unemployment 
In appendix A four possible measures for unemployment are discussed. Table 1.24 
shows the development of unemployment according to three of these measures . 
They show the same direction of change. Up to and including 1991 the number of 
unemployed has been decreasing. From 1992 on the numbers are increasing. 
Especially in 1993 and 1994 the increase has been considerable. In 1995 a moderate 
decrease occurred. 
13 Van den Bosch and Petersen, 1980 and Aarts and De Jong, 1990. 
14 Since 1996, most persons receiving an ABW-benefit have to search for paid work. This may influence the 
level of official unemployment. 
15 For the number of registered not-working persons at the PES there is no consistent time series available 
for the period under consideration. 
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Table 1.24 Development of unemployment according to three different measures (1987 - 1994) 
Year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Unemployment3' 
Number 
(thousands) 
486 
490 
452 
419 
400 
411 
481 
547 
538 
Change (%) 
0.8 
-7.8 
-7.3 
-4.5 
2.8 
17.0 
13.7 
-1.6 
Registered unem 
Number 
(thousands) 
456 
453 
407 
358 
334 
336 
415 
486 
464 
ployment3' 
Change (%) 
-0.7 
-10.2 
-12.0 
-6.7 
0.6 
23.5 
17.1 
-4.5 
Persons receiving an 
unemployment benefitb' 
Number 
(thousands) 
620 
601 
579 
538 
523 
536 
598 
676 
Change (%) 
-3.1 
-3.7 
-7.1 
-2.8 
2.5 
11.6 
13.0 
a) Source: CBS. 
b) Persons receiving a WW-, RWW- or IOAW-benefit in benefit years. Source: Ministry of SZW and CTSV. 
If we look to the rate of change however, we reveal some differences between the 
various measures. The most strong changes are taking place in the number of 
registered unemployed. The changes in the number of persons receiving an 
unemployment benefit are the most moderate. This will be due to the differences in 
definitions (searching/not searching, registered/not-registered, etcetera). 
From now on we will use the figures on unemployment according to the Labour 
Force Survey for our discussion of the main trends in unemployment. The table 
above shows that unemployment decreased from nearly 500,000 in 1987 (8.5 percent 
of the labour force) to 400,000 in 1991 (6.5 percent of the labour force), whereupon 
the figure has risen to almost 550,000 in 1994 and 1995 (8.5 percent of the labour 
force in 1994, 8.1 percent in 1995). Recently, the unemployment rate has fallen below 
8 percent. 
Table 1.25 gives information on the developments according to gender, age, ethnicity 
and level of education of the unemployed during the period 1987 - 1994. Between 
1987 and 1990 the decrease in unemployment has been 4.8 percent per year on 
average and in the period 1990 - 1994 the average growth of unemployment has 
been 6.9 percent per year. Between 1987 and 1990 unemployment declined especially 
for men, persons younger than 25 years of age and for natives. The decrease in 
unemployment for women and persons older than 34 years has been moderate. 
Finally, unemployment among non-natives rose slightly between 1987 and 1990. Also 
in the period 1991 - 1994, youngsters went relatively better than older people and 
natives better than non-natives. The sharp increase in the number of unemployed 
men is remarkable because the male labour force has not grown strongly in the 
period concerned. It seems that men are hard hit by redundancies in especially 
industry. Furthermore, we see a strong increase in unemployment among the higher 
educated (higher vocational secondary education and higher), which is related to the 
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strong growth of labour supply of this group. The unemployment rate of higher 
educated is still (well) below the average unemployment rate however. 
Table 1.25 Development of unemployment according to gender, age, ethnicity and level of education (1987 - 1994) 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Age 
15-24 
2 5 - 3 4 
3 5 - 4 4 
4 5 - 5 4 
5 5 - 6 4 
Ethnicity 
Natives 
Non-natives 
Educational level 
Primary education 
Lower general secondary education 
Lower vocational secondary education 
Higher general secondary education 
Higher vocational secondary education 
Higher vocational education 
University 
Total 
Unemployed 
(thousands) 
1987 
226 
259 
154 
144 
116 
56 
15 
399 
87 
486 
1990 
179 
240 
112 
128 
112 
52 
14 
330 
89 
100 
46 
75 
36 
94 
43 
24 
419 
1994 
266 
280 
126 
180 
143 
82 
17 
423 
123 
103 
56 
98 
42 
151 
63 
34 
547 
Average annual 
change (%) 
1987-
1990 
-7.5 
-2.5 
-10.1 
-3.9 
-1.2 
-2.4 
-2.3 
-6.1 
0.8 
-4.8 
1990-
1994 
10.4 
3.9 
3.0 
8.9 
6.3 
12.1 
5.0 
6.4 
8.4 
0.7 
5.0 
6.9 
3.9 
12.6 
10.0 
9.1 
6.9 
Unemployment rate 
(%) 
1987 
6.0 
13.1 
13.3 
8.3 
7.6 
6.0 
3.9 
7.5 
19.5 
8.5 
1990 
4.6 
10.9 
10.3 
6.7 
6.7 
5.0 
3.8 
5.9 
17.8 
14.1 
10.7 
6.8 
12.4 
4.3 
4.8 
5.8 
6.9 
1994 
6.6 
11.4 
13.3 
8.8 
8.2 
6.1 
4.5 
7.2 
20.2 
17.1 
12.0 
9.5 
12.0 
6.2 
5.9 
7.0 
8.5 
Source: CBS, Enquête Beroepsbevolking. 
For nearly all groups the unemployment rate in 1994 is back on more or less the 
same level as in 1987. Women are the exception in this respect, although for women 
the unemployment rate is still much higher than for men. For older age groups the 
unemployment rate is lower than for youngsters. The high unemployment among 
non-natives is still alarming. Their unemployment rate is three times as high than 
the unemployment rate for natives. Turks and Moroccans have the highest 
unemployment level, 31 percent in 1994. Surinamese, Antilleans and Arubans and 
persons from other mediterranean countries (than Turkey and Morocco) have 
unemployment rates between 20 and 21 percent. One of the problems of these 
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groups is the low average level of education. Language barriers (especially for Turks 
and Moroccans), differences in culture and customs and of course discrimination 
play a role too. 
Between 1990 and 1994 the unemployment rate has risen for nearly all levels of 
education. Unemployment is the highest among persons with primary education (17 
percent in 1994). Although the number of people entering the labour market with 
only primary education decreased steadily in the nineties, this group still is in a bad 
position to enter the labour market. Firstly, jobs for the lowest educated remain 
relatively scarce. Secondly, there is evidence that higher educated are hired for many 
of the low skilled jobs (Hoe werven bedrijven). 
Although their unemployment level is less worse, persons with lower and higher 
general secondary education are suffering from high unemployment rates too (12 
percent). This could be explained through their lack of vocational education. But on 
the other side their unemployment rate has risen less than average between 1990 and 
1994. The situation is somewhat better for persons with lower vocational secondary 
education. The groups with higher vocational secondary education, higher vocational 
education and university education have below average unemployment rates. 
Interesting question is whether a higher degree of education lowers the chance of 
being unemployed? Or, whether higher educated people have a better labour market 
prospective? The figures indicate that this is the case. The unemployment levels of 
the highest three categories do have less than average unemployment levels. 
Furthermore their participation rate is substantially higher than that of the lower 
categories. 
1.2.2.3 Long-term unemployment 
Indications for a relative bad position on the labour market are not only given by the 
unemployment rate. The duration of unemployment is important too. Long-term 
unemployed have problems with (re)entering the labour market. Furthermore, the 
chance on a job decreases if unemployment duration increases. The degree in which 
certain groups are hit by "hard-core" unemployment can be made clear by looking at 
the distribution of unemployment durations. The duration of unemployment is only 
known for registered unemployment. So, to say something about the incidence of 
long-term unemployment figures on registered unemployment have to be used. 
In 1993 45 percent of all registered unemployed were unemployed for one year or 
longer (table 1.26). In 1994 and 1995 this percentage has risen to 50 and 53 percent 
respectively. The recent economic depression has caused an increase in the share of 
long-term unemployment in total unemployment. That the share of long-term 
unemployment also rose in 1995 (the first year of economic recovery), is due to the 
fact that the most advantaged unemployed (i.e. the short-term unemployed) find a 
job as first when the situation on the labour market is improving. 
A high share of long-term unemployed is primarily found among persons with 
primary education only, non-natives and older people (45 - 64 years). The 
combination of a low level of participation (see section 1.1.3), a high level of 
unemployment (section 1.2.2.3) and a high share of long-term unemployment 
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illustrates the severe problems low educated and non-natives are faced with. For 
elderly the unemployment rate is below average, but those who are unemployed 
stay unemployed rather long in general. For younger people the opposite is true: a 
high unemployment rate and a low proportion of long-term unemployment. 
Table 1.26 Share of long-term unemployed (one year or longer unemployed) in registered unemployment (1993) 
Group 
Primary education 
Lower secondary education (general and vocational) 
Women 
Non-natives 
Younger than 20 years 
45-64 years 
All registered unemployed 
Share in total unemployment of the group 
55% 
43% 
44% 
54% 
11% 
62% 
45% 
Source: CBS, Enquête Beroepsbevolking. 
1.2.2.4 Regional variations 
There are significant differences between regions too. In which regions 
unemployment is mainly concentrated? The level of unemployment is above average 
in the north and the east (the provinces Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe and 
Overijssel) and the four big cities Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag en Utrecht. 
High unemployment levels do not only have (income) effects for the individual but 
they entail social problems for society as well, like impoverishment and crime. This 
is especially true for the four big cities, although a number of medium sized cities 
are confronted with high levels of unemployment too. 
Table 1.27 gives information on differences in the unemployment level between 
regions of the Regional Boards of the Employment Service (RBA's), the so called 
RBA-regions16. Roughly speaking, the level of unemployment in regions with the 
highest unemployment is about twice the unemployment level in regions with the 
lowest unemployment. This means that the differences are significant. 
16 Based on the 28 RBA's existing between 1991 and 1995. Since 1996 there are 18 RBA's. 
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Table 1.27 Regional information on unemployment (1987 - 1994) 
RBA-region 
Groningen 
Friesland 
Drenthe 
IJssel-Vecht 
Twente 
Midden-IJssel 
Veluwe 
Arnhem/Oost Gelderland 
Nijmegen / Rivierenland 
Flevoland 
Oost-Utrecht 
West-Utrecht 
Het Gooi en Vechtstreek 
Noord-Holland Noord 
Amsterdam/Zaanstreek/Waterland 
Kennemer-, Amstelland and Meerlanden 
Rijnstreek 
Den Haag/Delft 
Drechtsteden 
Rijnmond 
Zeeland 
Westelijk Noord-Brabant 
Breda 
Midden-Brabant 
Noord-Oost Brabant 
Zuid-Oost Brabant 
Noord- en Midden-Limburg 
Zuid-Limburg 
Total 
Unemployment rate (%) 
1987 
11.5 
9.9 
8.8 
8.0 
10.0 
9.4 
7.1 
9.7 
11.9 
9.6 
7.2 
7.7 
7.9 
7.3 
12.2 
5.3 
4.9 
7.0 
7.0 
9.5 
6.9 
7.7 
6.8 
8.8 
6.6 
7.5 
6.5 
10.2 
8.5 
1994 
11.0 
9.7 
9.9 
7.3 
10.1 
8.1 
6.0 
8.3 
9.2 
8.2 
6.6 
7.5 
7.7 
7.7 
11.8 
5.8 
6.4 
7.3 
9.0 
11.1 
7.6 
8.7 
6.5 
9.4 
7.2 
7.8 
7.2 
8.4 
8.5 
Index unemployment rate 
(the Netherlands = 100) 
1987 
135 
116 
104 
94 
118 
111 
84 
114 
140 
113 
85 
91 
93 
86 
144 
62 
58 
82 
82 
112 
81 
91 
80 
104 
78 
88 
76 
120 
100 
1994 
129 
114 
116 
86 
119 
95 
71 
98 
108 
96 
78 
88 
91 
91 
139 
68 
75 
86 
106 
131 
89 
102 
76 
111 
85 
92 
85 
99 
100 
Source: CBS, Enquête Beroepsbevolking. 
In 1987 the RBA-regions Groningen, Friesland, Twente, Nijmegen/Rivierenland, 
Amsterdam/Zaanstreek/Waterland and Zuid-Limburg had high levels of 
unemployment. But there have been some changes in time. In 1994, Drenthe and 
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Rijnmond also have above average unemployment levels and the situation in 
Nijmegen /Rivierenland and Zuid-Limburg has improved significantly. 
1.2.2.5 Other discrepancies on the supply side 
There are more disequilibrium phenomena on the supply side than unemployment. 
A person may be forced to accept a part-time job while looking for a full-time job, or 
vice versa. People having a part-time job but who want to work longer, should be 
counted as partial unemployed17. On the contrary, there also are people who want 
to work shorter. From the OSA supply side survey we know that the number of 
people wanting to work shorter is greater than the number of people wanting to 
work longer. This implies that there are possibilities to increase the number of jobs. 
There could be 110,000 jobs more if workers would have a working time according 
to their preferences (Praat and Vosse, 1993). The level of employment and well-being 
could be higher when the available jobs are redistributed among suppliers of labour. 
It is also possible that workers are not satisfied with their job due to other reasons. 
Around 10 percent of the workers is not satisfied with their job, which equals 
600,000 persons in 1993 (OSA, 1993). Reason could be that the job is not in line with 
their education. In a significant number of cases the qualification level of the job is 
lower than the level of education of the worker (Huygen, 1989). With other words: 
there exists a certain degree of under-utilization of education. This applied to one 
third of the employees in 1985. This was a quarter in 1977. Furthermore, the job may 
be not in line with the field of education. This is the case for just over 10 percent of 
the workers (OSA, 1993). Combining those figures however shows that just a small 
part of the workers with a job not in line with their education is dissatisfied. 
Furthermore, the part of the workers that searches for another job because of these 
discrepancies is unknown. Anyway, we may assume that a certain degree of 
mobility of workers could improve the allocation of labour. But here too, the 
discrepancies are especially severe when they are structural. That is to say, when 
people are "imprisoned" in the segment of less attractive jobs. It is less problematic if 
someone has to accept a less attractive job when he or she is entering the labour 
market, but is able to find a better job after some time. 
1.3 Main trends in job creation and job loss 
1.3.1 Introduction 
As on other markets we can distinguish between supply and demand on the labour 
market. The demand for labour includes occupied jobs/positions and unfilled 
vacancies (whether or not hard to fill). The suppliers of labour (job searchers, 
working or not working) interact with the demanders of labour (organisations with 
vacancies) on the labour market. This process involves friction. The friction is caused 
by demand discrepancies as well as supply discrepancies, which are discussed in 
17 In the CBS figures this happens in a certain degree. Persons with a job for less than 12 hours wanting to 
work at least 12 hours a week are counted as (fully) unemployed. 
34 
earlier sections on basis of stock data. But in such an approach, two important 
features of the labour market are neglected: 
1. Friction may be caused by an imperfect match between demand and supply 
too. 
2. Stock data don't give an insight into the dynamic processes on the labour 
market. 
In this section will be dealt with these two topics. 
1.3.2 Match between demand and supply 
A separate problem is the simultaneously occurrence of supply and demand 
discrepancies, though this seems hardly the case in the present labour market 
situation. To which degree is the simultaneous occurrence of discrepancies due to 
frictions within (more or less) homogenous submarkets (frictions within) or to 
frictions between submarkets (frictions between) ? That is hard to say on basis of 
the available figures, because detailed breakdowns are not possible. 
Table 1.28 shows the vacancy rate and the unemployment rate simultaneously (both 
as percentage of the labour force). The vacancy rate is lower as the employment level 
is higher. In the period 1989 - 1991 demand side discrepancies and supply side 
discrepancies were existing simultaneously. Not only the vacancy rate but the share 
of hard to fill vacancies was high too (see section 1.2.1.5), while at the same time the 
level of unemployment still was 7 percent. 
18 Frictions within occur when on a homogenous submarket (for example for electricians) both 
unemployment and vacancies exist. Frictions between occur when on some submarkets unemployment 
exists and on other submarkets demand side discrepancies exist. 
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Table 1.28 Vacancy rate and unemployment rate (1980 - 1995) 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Vacancy rate (number of unfilled 
vacancies as % of labour force) 
1.0 
0.5 
0.4 
0.5 
0.7 
1.2 
1.2 
1.1 
1.6 
1.7 
1.4 
0.9 
0.5 
0.6 
0.8 
Unemployment rate (% of labour force) 
1.0 
6.0 
8.4 
10.2 
10.2 
8.6 
8.5 
8.4 
7.6 
6.9 
6.5 
6.5 
7.5 
8.5 
8.1 
Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. 
The figures suggest that between 1987 and 1994/1995 the efficiency of the labour 
market has improved slightly. Both in 1987 and 1994 the unemployment rate was 8.5 
percent, whereas the vacancy rate in 1987 was two times as high than in 1994. But 
we can not conclude that easy. Firstly, in 1995 the vacancy rate has increased 
significantly but the unemployment rate decreased just slightly. This points at a 
worsening of the efficiency of the labour market again. Secondly, really saying 
something about the efficiency of the labour market is only possible when detailed 
information on labour market flows is available. Sadly, flow data are rather scarce 
and if they are, they often are not comparable to each other. 
1.3.3 Job turnover 
The stock data used in 1.3.2 conceal the dynamic process of job creation, job finding 
and job loss. In reality job turnover is considerable, even during times the 
developments on the labour market are negative. For example, the stock of vacancies 
amounted 55,000 in 1993 whereas 400,000 vacancies were filled during that year. 
Both the CBS and the National Bureau of the Employment Service (LBA) publish 
flow data on vacancies (table 1.29). The series are not mutually comparable due to 
differences in the definitions and the questionnaires used. Figures on job turnover 
are provided by supply side surveys too. Per year, between 800,000 and 1 million 
persons do find a (new) job (Hoe zoeken werkzoekenden). We can only conclude that 
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the flows on the labour market are quite considerable. According to the LBA about 
50 percent of the new hires consist of unemployed and school-leavers. The other half 
concerns persons who have left another job. 
Table 1.29 Flow data on vacancies (1988 - 1995) 
Year 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
CBSa) 
Created vacancies (thousands) 
730 
637 
639 
542 
383 
438 
523c) 
Filled vacancies (thousands) 
708 
633 
661 
575 
396 
428 
505c) 
LBAb) 
Filled vacancies (thousands) 
720 
767 
887 
804 
774 
612 
534 
a) 
b) 
c) 
Source: CBS, Vacancy Survey. Up and including 1993 vacancies at the government and educational sector, 
sheltered workshops, TWA's and lending companies are excluded. From 1994 on, vacancies at the 
government and educational sector are excluded. 
Source: LBA, How do employers recruit? 
Number estimated on basis of the first three quarters of the year. 
Within organisations vacancies can either be created by an expansion of the number 
of workers or by the leave of employees. If an organisation has many unfilled 
vacancies this does not necessarily mean that there is great mismatch between labour 
demand and labour supply. The number of unfilled vacancies is mainly determined 
by three factors (OSA, 1994). 
The first factor concerns the extension of the job turnover. Normally the tendency is 
that the higher the job turnover the higher the number of vacancies. The number of 
vacancies can also be expressed as a percentage of the total number of workers. Of 
course the positive relation than still holds. The sketched relation between job 
turnover and vacancies is less clear during recessions (the relation is cyclically 
sensitive). Probably organisations use a high job turnover to diminish their number 
of workers in times of cyclical distress. Employees who have left the organisation 
voluntarily will not be replaced then. 
The second factor is the development of employment. We expect rising employment 
to go along with a rise in the number of vacancies. From the OSA study turned out 
that organisations which had expanded strongly also had one and a half as much 
vacancies in comparison to organisation which had expanded slowly to average. So 
it seems that strongly expanding organisations form a source of job turnover. 
Thirdly, the time it takes to fill a vacancy plays a role. When it takes more time to 
fill job-openings then the number of vacancies within companies is higher. A note is 
here in place. That an opening exists for a long period of time is not solely due to 
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difficulties with fulfilment. Also other factors contribute to this. Long selection 
procedures and explicit delay of fulfilment are the two most important other 
contributants. 
1.3.4 Job creation and job loss 
Behind the employment development on macro level lies an extensive dynamic 
process. First, the development is different between sectors. Secondly, the dynamic 
process determining total and sectoral development includes changes within current 
enterprises, the start of new companies and the dissolvement of enterprises. In this 
section we pay attention to both the sectoral development and the factors behind the 
growth or loss of employment. 
It is well known that jobs are mainly created in the service sectors and small and 
medium sized enterprises (SME's). Job losses are mainly reported in the industrial 
sectors, the building and construction sector and in large firms1. The sectoral 
trends, based on stock data, were already presented in table 1.14. But within sectors 
differences exist too. Within industry the development is the most negative in the 
chemical industry, the metal and electronical industry and the food, beverages and 
tobacco industry. In printing industry and other industry the developments have 
been less worse. The wholesale services, the retail trade services and the lodging and 
catering services are growing strongly. Within the transport sector job creation takes 
place in road transport and job losses are reported in the maritime and the inland 
shipping transport services. The banking and insurance sector is not growing as 
strong as the other business services. Finally, in the sector other services employment 
in government services is declining whereas the growth in the health care sector is 
considerable. 
Interesting is whether employment growth is correlated with certain characteristics 
of companies, like size, rate of expansion, sector, investment activity, profitable or 
not, turnover per employee, export and turnover development. Are there any 
differences between expanding, shrinking and stable companies? This has been 
examined in a recent OSA study (Van der Hoeven and Verhoeven, 1994). This study 
is based on data at firm-level. 
The company size influences the employment growth. The study results make clear 
that small enterprises (companies with less than 10 employees) have a stable size. 
Large companies on the contrary do have more changes in their size. This concerns 
expansion as well as shrinking. Medium-sized companies are in the middle. The 
results seem to suggest that large companies cannot afford themselves to stay of the 
same size. A stable market-share can mean the end for a large company. The severe 
competition forces them to search continually for new opportunities. To secure their 
long term continuity they must behave actively in their swift changing environment. 
Smaller companies do not necessarily need to expand to secure their continuity. A 
19 It must be noted however that the more positive development of employment in SME's may be the result 
of policies of larger firms (for example large firms may contract out more work to other firms, including 
SME's). 
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lot of small enterprises are satisfied with their turnover and the income which goes 
with it. They can concentrate on their existing customers. 
In general organisations between 5 - 9 years old generate the highest employment 
growth. Very young organisations contribute the least to employment. The older the 
organisation becomes the smaller the annual increase in employment (OSA, 1994). 
As we expect intuitively, expanding companies do have the largest increase in 
turnover. Increasing employment goes with an increased turnover. This effect is 
valid for every sector. Loss making companies are found in all three categories 
(expanding, shrinking and stable-sized companies), but their share is highest in the 
category shrinking companies. Somewhat surprising is that the development of 
investment is equal for expanding, shrinking and stable-sized companies. Investing 
companies do not necessarily generate employment growth. This may be due to 
labour saving investments. 
The change in labour productivity is strongly correlated with the employment 
development. Labour productivity can be approximated by the turnover per 
employee. Remarkable is the effect that expanding companies have a diminishing 
labour productivity (a decreasing turnover per employee). Shrinking and stable-sized 
companies, however, have an increasing labour productivity. To explain this effect 
we presume that in expanding companies the increase in employees proceeds the 
rise in production and turnover. 
As said previously, van der Hoeven and Verhoeven (1994) used data at firm-level. In 
1992 private sector employment has grown with 60,000 jobs, which equals the 
difference between the creation of 240,000 new jobs and the loss of 180,000 jobs. A 
third of the new jobs was created through the start of new enterprises and two-third 
through growth within already existing enterprises. Nearly 40 percent of the loss of 
jobs was due to the closing down of enterprises and 60 percent to the shrinking of 
existing enterprises. As regards existing enterprises the small sized enterprises ( 1 - 9 
employees) take care of a net employment growth in all sectors. To a lesser extend, 
this also applies to medium sized enterprises (10 - 99 employees). The prospects for 
employment in SME's are well too (Coopers & Lybrand, 1994). 
Between 1990 and 1993 the balance in terms of employment change due to the start 
and the closing down of enterprises has been moderate (around 10,000 positive per 
year) but rather constant. On the contrary, the influence of the business cycle has 
been obvious in respect of the change in employment within existing enterprises. In 
1993 the net change has been negative for existing enterprises. 
Between 1987 and 1992 the average annual number of new enterprises was 42,000. 
On the other side, an average of 24,000 enterprises per year ended their activities. 
The average number of workers with a new started enterprise lies between 1,5 and 
2. The enterprises that closed down had between 2,5 and 3 workers on average. 
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1.4 Wages and salary trends 
1.4.1 Introduction 
In this section there will be dealt with the development of wages and the wage 
structure. We will pay attention to the macro level, wages by industry and wages for 
different groups of employees (male and female for instance). 
1.4.2 The macro level 
The wage increase per employee consists of two components. The first element is the 
increase due to collective wage agreements. Indexation (for inflation) is normally 
part of this wage increase. Second element is the occasional (individual) wage 
increase related to promotion, age, number of service years, etcetera. This occasional 
wage increase includes the in and outflow effects. These effects are caused by 
differences in pay between leaving and new personnel. Leaving employees in 
general have a higher wage level than new ones. The net effect is included in the 
occasional wage increase. In the period 1985 - 1990 the general wage increase 
accounted for 75 percent and the occasional wage increase for 25 percent of the total 
wage increase (CBS, 1994, page 210). So, general wage increases seem to be the most 
important component. The wage increase in the Netherlands has been moderate 
during the period 1987 - 1995. This can be seen from table 1.30. Only in 1987 and 
1992 real wages grew substantially. In 1994 and 1995 real wages decreased. 
Table 1.30 Development in nominal and real wages (1987 - 1995) 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994a) 
1995a) 
Nominal contractual wage market sector 
(% change) 
0.8 
0.8 
1.4 
2.9 
3.5 
4.3 
3.1 
1.8 
1.3 
Real contractual wage market sector 
(% change) 
1.8 
0.3 
0.3 
0.4 
0.4 
1.1 
0.5 
-0.9 
-0.8 
a) 
Source: 
Estimates. 
CPB, MEV 1996. 
Due to the low real wage increases the purchasing power has almost not grown. For 
persons at the subsistence level ("de minima") the purchasing power has even 
worsened in the nineties (Ministry of SZW, 1995). 
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The wage cost structure is for the major part determined through the level of taxes 
and (general or employee) insurance contributions. Ultimately the government 
expenditure and the expenditure on social security determine the level of taxes and 
the level of contributions. In the Netherlands, the share of taxes and insurance 
contributions in labour costs is substantial. Table 1.31 contains the structure of labour 
cost per hour worked in 1994 for five sectors . 
Table 1.31 Structure of labour cost per hour worked for five sectors (1994) 
Component 
Total wage costs per hour (in Dfl) 
Of which: 
Direct hourly wage 
Wage for hours not worked 
Special payments 
Legal social contributions 
Contractual social contributions 
Other wage cost 
Total 
Industry 
45.82 
56% 
11% 
7% 
14% 
8% 
4% 
100% 
Wholesale 
42.71 
59% 
9% 
8% 
12% 
9% 
3% 
100% 
Retail 
27.66 
62% 
9% 
6% 
16% 
4% 
3% 
100% 
Banking 
55.79 
50% 
10% 
11% 
14% 
10% 
5% 
100% 
Insurance 
55.21 
50% 
10% 
10% 
13% 
11% 
5% 
100% 
Source: CBS, Sociaal Economische Maandstatistiek. 
In this section not the differences in labour cost structure among the sectors are 
important but the general structure of labour cost will be examined. The table shows 
that there is a large difference between the direct wage and the total wage cost. The 
direct wage accounts for between 50 and 60 percent of total wage cost. This means 
that total labour cost are between 1.6 and 2 times as high than the direct wage. The 
difference between the total labour cost and the direct wage is higher as the direct 
wage is higher. On average an employer must pay Dfl 80 for social and other 
contributions to pay an employee Dfl 100 (gross)21. 
The largest non wage cost component are the legal social contributions paid by the 
employer. The average of these employer expenses are about 13 percent of total 
labour cost in 1994 and vary from 12 percent in the wholesale sector to 16 percent in 
the retail sector. Three other cost increasing factors are of about equal size: wage for 
hours not worked, special benefits and social security contributions as a result of 
collective agreements, which all account for about 10 percent of total labour cost. 
Other wage cost contribute to a smaller extend. Wage cost subsidies (not included in 
the table) hardly effect the total wage cost structure. 
20 In the figures only companies with at least 10 employees are considered. 
21 Furthermore, the employee has to pay taxes and social contributions out of the (gross) direct hourly 
wage. 
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These previous figures do not include the employee taxes and the employee social 
contributions (for the Employee Insurance Schemes). So, the difference between the 
total labour cost for the employer and the net wage of the employee is even greater. 
Table 1.32 contains the overall marginal tax wedge in selected OECD-countries in 
1985 and 1991/1992. From the table we may conclude that the wedge is relatively 
high in the Netherlands. 
Table 1.32 Overall marginal tax wedges in selected OECD countries (1985 and 1991/1992)a) 
UK 
Germany 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Sweden 
the Netherlands 
United States 
Japan 
1985 
54,6 
67,5 
65,8 
75,1 
71,2 
72,3 
48,1 
22,8 
1991/1992 
50,4 
63,8 
66,3 
72,1 
62,6 
70,8 
38,5 
22,2 
a) The "overall tax wedge" contains both employers' and employees' premiums for social security, 
income tax and value added tax. 
Source: OECD, 1994. 
1.4.3 Wages by industry 
In the Netherlands collective labour agreements are an important determinant of the 
level of gross wages. In many of these agreements minimum wage levels are 
determined for the sector concerned. We can distinguish between agreements at 
branch level and agreements at company level. Agreements at branch level can be 
strict and detailed, which may hinder individual enterprises in their operation. 
Agreements at company level offer more room to specify the agreement according to 
the specific situation of the company. 
The wage level differs between sectors. To get a picture of the differences among 
sectors table 1.33 shows the gross wage income for different sectors in 1994. The 
wage level in the minerals extracting industry is far above average. Other sectors 
with high wage levels are the banking and insurances sector, public utilities and the 
educational sector. 
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Table 1.33 Gross wage income per year (special payments included) of full-time employees (* 1,000 
Dfl, 1994) 
Sector 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Minerals extracting industry 
Industry 
Public utilities 
Building and construction 
Trade, repair of consumer products 
Lodging and catering services 
Transport, storage and communication 
Banking and insurances 
Business services 
Government, social security 
Educational sector 
Health and social care 
Culture, recreation, other services 
Personnel in service of households 
Total 
Gross wage 
42.9 
88.6 
58.0 
69.2 
56.1 
51.0 
41.4 
63.3 
71.7 
65.0 
59.7 
68.2 
52.5 
53.7 
31.2 
58.2 
Index (average = 100) 
74 
152 
100 
119 
96 
88 
71 
109 
123 
112 
103 
117 
90 
92 
54 
100 
Source: CBS, Labour Accounts. 
Sectors with a substantially lower wage level are private households with 
employees, the lodging and catering services and agriculture, forestry and fishing. 
From 1990 on, the rank-order of the different sectors has not changed much. In some 
sectors employees receive structurally higher gross wages than others, what will be 
caused at least partially by differences in employment structure in respect of 
educational level between sectors. 
The development of the contractual standard hourly wage during the period 1990 -
1995 has been rather uniform for the various branches of economic activity (see table 
1.34). On average, in 1995 the wages are 13 percent higher than in 1990. Only wages 
in the building and construction sector rose significantly more than average. In the 
public utilities sector the rise has been below average. The wage increase in the 
government and subsidised sector has been somewhat lower than in the private 
sector. 
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Table 1.34 Development of the contractual standard hourly wage 1990 - 1995 
Total 
Sector 
Private enterprises 
Government sector 
Subsidised sector 
Economic activity 
Agriculture and fishing 
Minerals extracting industry 
Industry 
Public utilities 
Building and construction 
Trade, lodging and catering 
Transport, storage and communication 
Banking and insurance, other business services 
Other services 
Index at the end of October 1995 
(1990 = 100) 
113.3 
113.9 
111.8 
112.7 
114.8 
115.0 
113.5 
110.9 
117.0 
114.1 
113.5 
112.8 
112.1 
Source: CBS, Labour and Wages of Employees, 1993, page 206. 
1.4.4 Wages by employee characteristics 
Women earn less than men on average. A male employee finds on average a 43 
percent higher gross wage than his female colleague (CBS, 1994, page 220). This 
difference is partly caused by differences in the average number of working hours. 
But the difference in hourly wages is still 23 percent. The question is whether this is 
due to the fact that women are paid less than men for the same or a comparative 
position, or that differences in wages are caused by an over-representation of women 
in low paid sectors. The Organisation for Statistical Labour Market Research (OSA) 
has done research in this field (OSA, 1994b). It can be concluded that women are 
over-represented in the lower paid sectors. One could say that women work in the 
'wrong' sectors. Furthermore, female employees are younger on average and often 
have lesser years of service22. Women also work more on the basis of flexible 
employment contracts, which pays less than full-time work (CBS, 1994). However, 
even if we correct for these factors an unemplained gap between the wages of men 
and women remains, which may have to do with discrimination. 
22 The difference in wages between men and women is for younger age groups smaller than for older age 
groups. 
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Wages are not the sole rewardance for employees. There also are additional 
payments such as free products (or discount), car arrangements, travel allowance, 
education paid for by the company, savings arrangements or other fringe benefits. It 
turns out that men profit more from these emoluments than women (OSA, 1995). 
This is mainly due to the fact that men are better paid in general; they work in the 
better paid sectors and occupy for the most part the better paid positions. And 
especially these high positions entail extra income arrangements. There is one 
exception howrever. The free or discounted supply of goods is almost equally 
distributed. Free goods arrangements are most common in the trade, catering and 
travel sector. Furthermore, lower income groups take more advantage of free 
products. These two effects can explain why women take as much advantage of free 
products as men. Women are over-represented in the lower income segments and 
women are strongly represented in the sectors previously mentioned. 
Differences in wages are also caused by the level of education (see table 1.35). 
Although the figures concern the year 1991, the table illustrates the influence on 
wages of differences in education. 
Table 1.35 Average gross yearly wage by level of education and sex (full-time equivalents, * 1,000 Dfl, 1991) 
Education 
Primary education 
Lower general secondary education 
Lower vocational secondary education 
Higher general secondary education 
Higher vocational secondary education 
Higher vocational education 
University education 
Total 
Females 
31.2 
34.6 
31.2 
39.2 
40.8 
50.9 
61.7 
40.4 
Males 
48.1 
49.5 
48.0 
56.4 
56.2 
71.8 
85.6 
57.6 
Difference between 
male and female 
(%) 
54 
43 
54 
44 
38 
41 
39 
43 
Source: CBS, National Accounts 1994, 1995. 
As we expected higher levels of education go along with higher wages. This is valid 
for men and women. The large difference in wages between men and women is 
again stressed. The differences in pay between men and women become somewhat 
smaller the higher the educational level. Compared with primary education, the 
wage increase due to lower general secondary education or lower secondary 
vocational education is negligible. Higher (general and vocational) secondary 
education lead to higher wages than primary education. The highest wage levels are 
reached by university graduates. They earn more than people with a higher 
vocational education. So education does not only has a positive effect on the 
participation rate and the unemployment rate, it also has a positive effect on the 
wage level. 
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Not only the level of education, but also the type of education influences the wage 
level. Groot and Mekkelholt (1995) have examined differences in pay between males 
with a technical and a not-technical education. They found that men with a lower 
non-technical education earned on average 11 percent more than men with a low 
technical education. Men with a higher non-technical education earn 1.5 percent 
more than men with a higher technical education. Furthermore they found that the 
start salaries of technical educated persons are lower than those for non-technical 
educated persons. This applies to all educational levels. The wage profile is the same 
for both groups. But the wage profile does differ between the levels of education. 
The wage profile is steeper the higher the educational level. 
1.4.5 Minimum wages 
In the Netherlands a legal minimum wage is effective. Table 1.36 shows the 
development of the minimum wage level for the period 1992 - 1996. There are legal 
youth minimum wages for persons up to 22 years old. The minimum wage level has 
almost been stable during the last five years. In 1994 and 1995 government decided 
not to increase the minimum wages since the ratio between inactives and actives 
worsened. 
Table 1.36 Legal minimum wage level (gross, in Dfl, 1992 - 1996) 0 
Age 
23 and older 
22 
21 
20 
19 
18 
17 
16 
15 
1992 
2,133 
1,813 
1,547 
1,312 
1,120 
971 
843 
736 
640 
1993 - 1995 
2,163 
1,839 
1,568 
1,330 
1,136 
984 
855 
746 
649 
1996 
2,184 
1,856 
1,583 
1,343 
1,147 
994 
863 
754 
655 
a) Excluding 8 percent holiday pay. 
Source: Sociaal info (1992 - 1996). 
The role of minimum wages should not be exaggerated. In most sectors the lowest 
wage scale starts at a level that is far above minimum wage level (Ministry of SZW, 
1995). The wage scales are generally determined by collective agreements. The vast 
majority of workers receive wages which are substantially higher than the minimum 
wage level. In 1993 almost 170,000 workers, about 3 percent of total workers, 
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received a wage equal to the minimum wage . This implies that changes in the 
minimum wage level will have just a small direct effect on employment. It is far 
more important that the social partners agreed upon the introduction of wage scales 
which start at a lower level (near to the minimum wage level). 
1.5 The rise and fall in unemployment 
The basic facts 
The basic facts about unemployment are the following. Firstly, there has been a 
sharp trend-wise increase in the rate of unemployment rate since the early seventies. 
The high level of unemployment was reached in two steps: the first one in the 
'seventies and the second one in the 'eighties. The highest post-war level of the 
unemployment rate - 12 per cent24 of the active population - was reached in 1983. 
Since then the unemployment rate has fallen. In 1994 the unemployment rate was 
equal to 7.5 per cent, and recently it has even fallen below 7 per cent, which is much 
lower than the 1983 level but still much higher than the pre-1980 levels, let alone the 
pre-1970 levels25. 
Figure 1.1 The unemployment rate 1960-1994 
I 9 6 0 1 9 6 5 197Ό 1 9 7 5 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 5 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 5 
Source: Netherlands Economic Institute, series constructed on the basis of the actual definition of 
unemployment 
23 About 70,000 of these workers worked less than one third of the normal worktime. 
24 This of course is an underestimation of the true figure since many unemployed became officially 
'disabled'. 
25 The figures presented in figure 1.1 differ from unemployment rate data presented in previous sections. In 
order to construct a consistent time series over a long period, the data had to be adjusted. 
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The second basic fact about unemployment is the high share of low-educated 
persons among the unemployed. According to section 1.2.2.3 47 percent of the 
unemployed is low-skilled, while the share of the low-skilled in the total labour-force 
is only 33 per cent26. 
Last but not least the share of the very long-term unemployed in total unemployed 
has increased dramatically. Until the eighties it was exceptional that people would 
remain unemployed for more than a year. In 1994 half of the unemployed were out 
of work for more a year (see section 1.2.2.4). 
Labour demand and labour supply are the main determinants of unemployment. 
Therefore, if we are looking for causes of the rise of unemployment factors 
determining supply and demand come to mind first. However, the friction between 
demand and supply is also relevant. Even if demand is higher than supply, some 
unemployment will exist due to friction. Increasing friction may also partly explain 
the rise in unemployment. Neo-classical theory would claim that the wage-
mechanism could bring about equilibrium. However, this mechanism may have been 
weakened due to increasing rninimurn-wage and benefit levels. This is also a 
possible cause for the rise in unemployment. 
In the following sections we will discuss a number of factors which may possibly 
explain the rise in unemployment. Some of these factors can be classified as demand 
or supply factor or as a factor influencing the interaction between demand and 
supply. However, it is not always that easy to classify a factor. Wages, for instance, 
may influence demand, supply and the interaction between the two. If on sub-
market level relative wages are flexible and demand and supply are sensitive to the 
wage level, on macro level friction will be low. 
Fluctuations in economic activity 
Fluctuations in economic activity are, of course, a major cause of fluctuations in 
unemployment. An open economy such as the Dutch economy is extremely sensitive 
to the ups and downs of the world economy. A slow-down of world trade will 
strongly affect Dutch exports, which amount to more than 50 per cent of total GDP. 
Therefore, GDP will depend heavily on exports and a slow-down of world trade will 
have a negative effect on GDP. This will in turn affect employment and, 
consequently, unemployment. Usually, the effects on employment and 
unemployment lag behind one year. To a large extent the rise in unemployment in 
the 'seventies and the 'eighties can be explained in this way. 
Normally, a recession is followed by a recovery. Unemployment could then fall back 
to previous levels. This, however, did not happen. Despite a considerable growth in 
the number of employed persons in the second half of the 'eighties and the first half 
of the nineties, unemployment is still much higher than before 1970. In the following 
sections we will discuss a number of factors which all contributed to this 
phenomena. 
26 Low-skilled are those with primary education, lower general secondary education and lower vocational 
secondary education. 
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The increasing participation of women 
When looking at the rise in unemployment one has to realize that the official 
unemployment figures do not include women who are full-time involved in 
household production. In the Netherlands labour force participation among women 
has remained very low for a long time. In recent decades women participation has 
increased considerably due to the emancipation process. As section 1.1.3 shows in 
1987 the women participation rate was only 40; by 1994 it had almost reached the 
level of 48 percent. 
This development can be interpreted as a redistribution of paid work between men 
and women. Figure 1.2 illustrates this point for people aged below 25 years. Total 
inactivity is defined as every young person who is not in full-time education and 
who does not have a paid job. From the figure it is clear that inactivity as a 
percentage of the potential labour force has not increased to the same degree as 
official unemployment. Total inactivity among young people has remained relatively 
stable through time. During the recession period in the early eighties it did increase, 
but it returned to the 1978 level and even showed a declining trend. 
Figure 1.2 Unemployment and inactivity rates among young people, 1960 - 1994 
30 
25 
20 
15 
IO 
I960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Source: Time series constructed by NEI on the basis of data from the statistical office and the public 
employment service. 
However, the share of men and women in total inactivity has changed dramatically 
as is shown by table 1.37. Nowadays, inactivity is more evenly distributed between 
men and women, although it is still higher among women. In 1960 total inactivity 
consisted almost completely of women; in 1990 this share had dropped to 70 percent. 
Contrarily, the share of women in registered unemployment has increased. 
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Table 1.37 Inactive young people (< 25 years) by gender (percentage shares; 1960, 1970, 1980 and 
1990) 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1990 
Share young women 
96 
94 
78 
70 
Share young men 
4 
6 
22 
30 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Source: Time series constructed by NEI on the basis of data from the statistical office and the public 
employment service. 
Our conclusion is that the rising trend in unemployment partly reflects a 
redistribution of paid labour between men and women. Inactivity among men has 
increased and this increase is to a large extent reflected in the rise in official 
unemployment. However, inactivity among women has decreased, but this has not 
been reflected by the official figures, because most inactive women were not 
registered as unemployed. Furthermore, many women not registered as unemployed 
in the past are now officially as unemployed. Therefore, the rise in official 
unemployment is at least partly an artefact of the way we measure unemployment. 
This reasoning may suggest that we consider the increasing participation of women 
as an exogenous process, which it is not. Not only cultural but also economic factors 
have contributed to the rise in female labour participation. Income per capita growth 
and the increase in educational level lead to an declining birth rate and more 
opportunities for women to accept paid jobs. Improved household technology may 
also have been a factor favouring women labour participation. Last but not least the 
changing structure of employment has played a role. The share of blue collar work, 
traditionally the domain of men, has dropped considerably and the share of 
employment in service professions, in which women have more opportunities, has 
increased. 
The growth in labour supply 
The number of unemployed on a given point in time can be broken down in a flow 
and a duration component. In a static situation the stock of unemployed is exactly 
equal to the product of the inflow of unemployed and the average unemployment 
duration. Therefore, the stock of unemployed will increase if more people are 
entering the labour-market. The labour-market will need some time to absorb the 
new entrants. The Netherlands has experienced a relatively high growth of labour 
supply. The increasing participation of women already dealt with in the previous 
section was one of the two main factors explaining the growing labour supply. The 
other factor was the continuous immigration. 
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Wages 
Starting in the 'sixties there has been a sharp decline in employment in the 
manufacturing industry. Many traditional industries such as ship-building and 
textiles and clothing almost disappeared in the Netherlands and other rich countries. 
Most of the activities concerned moved to - at that time - low-wage countries such as 
Korea. 
It is not very likely that this development could have been stopped by a wage 
moderation policy in the 'seventies. The gap in wage level between the developed 
countries and the developing countries was simply too big. However, wage 
moderation would have contributed to a slower adjustment process. In that case the 
fall in employment could have been partly prevented. The rise in unemployment in 
the first half of the 'eighties would not have been as dramatic as it was now. 
What actually happened is that a wage moderation policy^ was implemented after 
the rise in unemployment had occurred. That policy has been very successful in 
terms of employment creation. This is in line with the results of scientific research 
into the relation between employment and wages. The long term elasticity of 
employment with respect to wages lies somewhere between -0.3 and -1, implying2 
that a 10 per cent decrease in wages leads to a 3 to 10 per cent rise in employment. 
Therefore, we conclude that wages do matter when employment is concerned. 
However, the wage elasticity will differ by industry. Employment is particularly 
sensitive for wages in industries such as the retail trade and the hotel and catering 
sector, but also in the remaining labour-intensive exporting sectors. 
Technology or globalisation 
At the moment a discussion is going on whether the decline in low-skilled labour is 
a result of asymmetric technological change or of the tendency towards 
globalisation . Asymmetric technological change means that technological progress 
is such that low-skilled labour is substituted by capital and high skilled labour. 
Globalisation means that low skilled labour does not disappear, but is transferred to 
low-wage countries. 
Relatively high wages for low-skilled work will strengthen the substitution of capital 
and high skilled labour for low-skilled labour. In the 'sixties and 'seventies there has 
been a rise in the relative wages of low-skilled workers which was mainly due to the 
introduction and subsequent increase of the legal minimum wage. One may argue 
that this development has also stimulated the transfer of a number of traditional 
sectors to developing countries. However, the wage gap between developed and 
developing economies was that high, that this transfer would have occurred 
anyhow. Perhaps, this process would have been more gradual if the relative wages 
for low-skilled work would not have changed. In that case the economy would have 
got more time to adjust to the external shocks. For the explanation of the structural 
27 And in recent years a reform in the social security system and a general cut in government expenditure. 
28 Theeuwes, (1988). 
29 Ruigrol and van Tulder, 1995. 
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development of employment the technology hypothesis seems more convincing than 
the globalisation hypothesis. A strong argument in favour of the technology 
hypothesis is that employment volume as measured by the total number of hours 
worked has remained more or less constant for a very long time . 
Some economists have argued against a policy of prolonged wage moderation . In 
their view this policy will lead to concentration on low-wage activities with a low 
growth potential. This may lead to more employment in the short-run, but in the 
long-run we may be worse off. High growth rates can only be attained in the 
knowledge intensive industries. In those types of industry productivity growth is 
relatively high, but output growth will be even higher, and employment may still 
increase as a result. 
Minimum wages 
Minimum wages were already mentioned as a factor causing substitution of 
particularly low-skilled labour and - less important, we think - transfer of activities 
to low-wage countries. However, high minimum wages can also cause problems in 
labour-intensive home-market services. The retail trade and the hotel and catering 
industry are obvious examples. In these types of sector production costs almost 
completely consist of labour costs. Moreover, most labour in these sectors is low-
skilled labour. Higher minimum wages will automatically lead to higher production 
costs, higher output prices, lower output levels and lower employment levels. 
On average the effects of minimum wages on total employment should not be 
exaggerated, however . It is well known that even without a legal minimum wage 
market wages would be higher than the market clearing level and unemployment 
would prevail. There are two theories explaining this fact. Firstly, according to the 
wage-efficiency theory employers set their wages above the market-clearing level in 
order to keep productivity above average levels. The insider-outsider theory states 
that workers will have a certain amount of monopoly power because of the firm-
specific human capital embodied in them, and can therefore claim wages that lie 
above the market-clearing level. Both theories explain why unemployed people may 
want to work for lower wages than employed workers, but are still not hired. 
During the last decade minimum wages have grown considerably less than average 
wages. In many sectors the lowest contractual wages are much higher than the legal 
minimum wage. Therefore, introducing lower minimum contractual wages seems 
much more effective than a further reduction of minimum wages. This view is 
shared by the government. Collective agreements are only accepted by the 
government if the social partners introduce lower minimum contractual wages. In 
addition, the government has introduced fiscal measures to reduce wage costs for 
low-paid labour. 
30 Therefore labour-time reduction, in the last decade particularly achieved by promoting part-time labour, 
has been extremely important to realize job growth. 
31 Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1994. 
32 A review of studies concerning the impact of minimum wages on employment is given by OSA, 1990. 
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Downward displacement 
One of the reasons why wage reduction may not work is that the high 
unemployment among the low-skilled is to a large degree caused by downward 
displacement. This is caused by the increased skill level of the labour force. In the 
early 'sixties there was a shortage of skilled workers and many workers were 
undereducated, but nowadays many people are doing work below their capacities. 
Employers prefer hiring a skilled worker for simple work and many skilled workers 
are willing to accept a low-skilled job because they cannot find a job on their own 
qualification level. Teulings (1990) has found evidence supporting the downward 
displacement hypothesis. 
We do not know exactly the magnitude in which downward displacement occurs. If 
it is really that important as some labour economists claim, the consequences for 
policy making could be far reaching. It would mean that we do not need more low-
skilled job but more high-skilled jobs. Creation of high-skilled jobs would stop 
downward displacement and the simple jobs would be available for low-skilled 
workers again. This, then, would support the proposition that wage moderation and 
a further reduction of the costs of low-paid labour are not sufficient measures to 
increases the chances for low-skilled workers. 
Increasing friction between demand and supply 
Employers trying to fill their vacancies and job-seekers looking for a job do not meet 
instantly and a 'meeting' does not necessarily result in a job-seeker fulfilling a 
vacancy. This is caused by the heterogeneity of jobs and workers. Both parties will 
have to acquire information about the jobs and the workers that are suitable to them. 
Therefore, a vacancy may stay open for a while despite the fact that jobs-seekers 
with the right qualifications are available. And a job-seeker may stay unemployed 
for some time, although suitable vacancies are available. Furthermore, given the 
heterogeneity of jobs and workers it may not be optimum to accept the first offer 
one gets or to hire the first worker applying. 
There is evidence that the friction between demand and supply has increased over 
time . The three main factors are: 
labour is becoming more and more heterogenous and the labour-market has 
become more segmented. It becomes less easy to find a job in another 
segment; 
33 There is extensive literature in this field. A recent contribution is by Muysken, Bierings and De Regt, 
1993. 
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the social security system has been expanded34. During the 'sixties and the 
'seventies more people have become eligible for the various unemployment 
and other social benefits and the level of the benefits has gone up. As a 
result people became more critical in accepting jobs; 
discrimination by employers on racial and cultural grounds has increased. 
The share of ethnic minorities in the labour force is considerably higher now 
than, say, twenty years ago, and the attitude of employers towards 
minorities has probably not improved. 
Hysteresis 
Unemployment is partly caused by unemployment. This may look strange at 
first sight. However, there is strong evidence that once a person has become 
unemployed, this fact alone will lower his chances to get a job. The longer a person 
is already unemployed, the further his chances will be reduced. Very long-term 
unemployed people are hardly taking part in the labour-market process any more. 
This implies that wage formation is not affected any more by a large part of people 
who are formally unemployed and receive an unemployment or other social benefit. 
As a result wages cannot bring about equilibrium on the labour-market. 
This mechanism implies that if due to a slow-down in economic activity un-
employment increases strongly and many people become long-term unemployed, 
unemployment will stay high if the economy recovers. This is precisely what 
happened . 
However, the question still is why unemployed people and particularly long-term 
unemployed people have less chances to get a job. There are a number of reasons. 
First of all, employers are uncertain about the productivity of potential recruits. If 
someone has become unemployed, that might be due to a low performance. 
Therefore, employers prefer other job-seekers to unemployed job-seekers. The 
employers will be less inclined to hire an unemployed job-seeker the higher the 
wage costs he has to pay. As was mentioned in a previous section the employer has 
to pay at least the legal minimum wage3 and in many sectors he has to pay 
considerably more because minimum contract wages are set higher than minimum 
wages. 
However, also factors related to the unemployed individual and his or her 
environment may be relevant. Unemployment is concentrated in the big cities and 
even in particular parts of the big cities. In some quarters being unemployed is the 
rule rather than the exception. When most people in your family and among your 
friends are unemployed, you will be inclined to adjust to your environment and not 
to be 'exceptional'. The relatively high unemployment and social benefits imply that 
34 Not only the incentive for unemployed persons to accept jobs has diminished as a result, but also the 
rising volume of beneficiaries and the increasing benefits induced higher social premiums and therefore 
higher wage costs. This had a negative effect on employment, causing more unemployed and higher 
expenditure on social security which implied higher wage costs, and so on. 
35 Graafland, 1990. 
36 There is an experiment going which implies that employers are temporary exempted from paying the 
minimum wage if they hire a long-term unemployed person. 
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there is not a strong incentive to accept low-paid jobs, particularly if the benefit can 
be supplemented by income from informal labour. When people are out of work for 
a long time they tend to adjust to that situation. They are reluctant to change their 
way of life for a paid job if there is no long-term perspective. This is one of the 
major bottlenecks in the implementation of job creation schemes for (very) long-term 
unemployment persons. It is difficult to find long-term unemployed persons that are 
acceptable for employers and are willing to do temporary work which gives some 
hope (but not more) for a steady well-paid job in the future. 
Evaluation 
There is no easy explanation of the rise and subsequent fall in unemployed. Most 
factors explaining unemployment are strongly interwoven. A lesson we have learned 
from recent years is that extremely high unemployment levels are not an inevitable 
feature of highly developed economies as some people claimed in the 'eighties'. 
Wage moderation, reduction of the costs of (low-paid labour), part-time labour, 
adjusting the social security system and active labour-market policy have all 
contributed to the fall in unemployment, although it is very difficult to say precisely 
how much each factor contributed. A further decrease in unemployment seems 
possible. However, it is not very likely that we can bring unemployment down to 
levels experienced in the 'sixties. Technological change and globalisation will 
inevitably continue to throw out low-skilled labour and not everyone has the talents 
to follow higher education. Even if benefits and minimum wages are cut further, 
some people will not get a regular job. Long-term scenario's by the Central Planning 
Bureau in which social security is set on a minimum level, illustrate this point. Even 
then unemployment will remain considerable. Therefore realistically, unemployment 
cannot be solved completely. However, what we can do is reduce long-term 
unemployment further. Even if by doing so total unemployment stays on the same 
level this is worthwhile. A situation in which many people are unemployed for a 
short period is much better than a situation in which some people are unemployed 
for a very long time. 
Low-paid jobs are needed for the long-term unemployed, most of them being 
unskilled. However, that does not imply that we simply need to create more low-
skilled jobs. At least partly the problem is that simple jobs are occupied by skilled 
workers. Therefore, in the future more attention should be paid to the creation of 
skilled jobs. That may imply more wage dispersion. In the knowledge intensive 
industries wage growth may be even useful to attract high productivity workers, 
while in other sectors wage costs and wage growth have to be low in order to 
maintain employment. On the other hand, there will be limits to the degree of 
income inequality acceptable to society, as we are already experiencing what is 
called 'the new poverty'. 
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1.6 Macroeconomic policies and forecasts 
1.6.1 Introduction 
A sound macroeconomic environment is the basis for growth and job-creation. The 
main objective of Dutch macroeconomic policy is the stimulation of employment in 
the private sector through reducing the budget-deficit, reducing the burden of taxes 
and social premiums, by promotion of a moderate wage growth and by improving 
the general conditions for the private sector. The main aspects of this policy will be 
discussed in section 1.6.2. A sound macroeconomic climate also is a necessary 
precondition for entering the third phase of the EMU. In paragraph 1.6.3 we will pay 
attention to the EMU criteria. We conclude this chapter with a discussion of medium 
and long-term macroeconomic forecasts, with an emphasis on employment and 
unemployment. 
1.6.2 Highlights of the Dutch macroeconomic policy 
Reducing the collective burden on labour income is one of the most important 
elements in macroeconomic policy. The objective is to stimulate employment growth 
and to improve the labour market process. To reduce the burden of taxes and social 
contributions it is necessary to cut back on government expenditure at the same 
time. 
The Dutch guilder has been able to maintain it's exchange rate with the German 
mark. The external stability of the guilder has been realised by pegging the Dutch 
guilder to the German mark. This is a central element of the monetary policy to 
realise price stability. The inflation level is one of the lowest in Europe, which 
enhances a moderate wage growth. A stable exchange rate is important as the 
European economies are slowly melting together, eventually to (at least) a monetary 
union. The strong guilder has even made possible larger decreases of the interest 
rate than in Germany. Low interest rates mean a stimulance for investment and 
economic growth but also a cost advantage for private enterprises. 
Social partners are urged to stimulate job creation in the lower wage segment 
(between the lowest CAO-wage and minimum wage). This is currently monitored. If 
actions remain insufficient then no longer declaration of general binding will be 
considered. Furthermore will it made possible for a number of sectors to hire 
employees beneath the minimum wage, at least temporary. 
Also other measures are used to improve the functioning of the labour market. 
Regulations and rules will be altered or even abolished. The social security system 
will be further rearranged. Financial incentives will be enhanced. Tightening of the 
inflow will go together with stimulating the outflow. This is to reduce the 
Inactive /Active ratio. In a recent study De Voogd et al 91996) computed 
inactivity/activity ratios for a number of EU-countries. The results indicate that 
contrary to common belief the Netherlands have an average score on this ratio. 
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1.6.3 EMU criteria 
The EMU criteria do have a substantial effect on macroeconomic policy and 
government expenditure. In table 1.38 the Dutch performance as regards the EMU 
criteria is shown. At the moment only one of the four criteria, namely the criterium 
in respect of the gross governmental debt, is not met. The Dutch gross debt level -
expressed as percentage of GDP - was 78 percent in 1994. In 1995 this was 79 
percent. This figure is also expected for 1996. The required level of 60 percent is 
substantially less. A lowering trend of the gross government debt is not yet 
expected, though this has high priority in policy. Inflation and the long interest rate 
stay well below the required EMU level. This has been so for the last few years. The 
governmental budget balance has been decreasing steadily. In 1996 this deficit will 
be slightly less than the criterion of - 3 percent. 
Table 1.38 Dutch performance as regards the EMU criteria (1994 - 1996)a) 
Price index of family consumption (annual change in %) 
Long interest rate (%) 
Government budget balance (% GDP) 
Gross governmental debt quote (% GDP) 
1994 
2.7 (3.1) 
6.9 (9.9) 
- 3.2 (-3.0) 
78 (60) 
1995 
2.0 (3.25) 
7.0 (9.75) 
- 3.0 (-3.0) 
79 (60) 
1996 
2.5 (3.75) 
7.0 (9.25) 
-2.75 (-3.0) 
79 (60) 
a) Between () the EMU criteria for the year concerned. 
Source: CPB, 1995. 
1.6.4 Forecasts of employment and unemployment 
In 1995 the Central Planning Bureau expected an economic growth rate of 2.25 
percent in 1996 (CPB, 1995). This forecast has been revised to 2 percent (CPB, 1996), 
which is somewhat less than the 2.5 percent of last year. Labour-market indicators 
indicate that the upward trend in employment will continue. Although the job-
creation rate (about 100,000 jobs a year) is rather high in international terms, it is 
barely sufficient to absorb the relatively large number of people entering the labour 
market. So, unemployment will hardly diminish; a decrease of 10,000 persons is 
expected. The unemployment rate will diminish with 0.15 percentage points. The 
strongest employment growth still takes place in the sheltered sector, mainly in the 
tertiary service industries. Employment growth in the open sector is low, although a 
recovery is expected. The labour income quote is expected to rise slightly this year. 
The recovery of profits has came to a halt. The labour productivity for 1996 is 
expected to be almost 1 percent higher than in 1995. 
Forecasts of the CPB for the period 1997 - 2000 are available on the basis of two 
scenarios ("cautious" and "favourable"). The differences between the two scenarios 
arise primarily from different assumptions on international economic developments. 
Economic growth will be between 2 and 3 percent per year. Over the next years the 
labour force will continue to grow at a faster rate (with 70,000 to 80,000 persons per 
year; a growth rate of 1.0 to 1.25 percent per year) than the labour force in the other 
European Countries. In the cautious scenario employment growth will not be 
57 
sufficient to absorb the growth of the labour force; the unemployment rate will go 
up to 9 percent. The favourable scenario predicts that unemployment will fall to 7 
percent. 
The CPB (1992) also has made long term forecasts for the Dutch economy. Even in 
the optimistic (Balanced Growth) scenario - with serious reforms in social security 
and a very positive international economic development - the transformation-process 
to labour market equilibrium will last several decades. 
ERECO (1995) has made medium-term employment forecasts for the EU. The trends 
for the Dutch labour market presented in this study are a sufficient labour supply in 
quantity (though not in quality), a rising female participation rate and an ageing 
labour force. The decreasing number of young workers and increasing training cost 
will affect productivity negatively. Other highlights are an expected high level of 
long-term unemployment, in particular among foreigners, and a limited success of 
re-integration programmes. A significant number of vacancies will be hard-to-fill. 
The forecasts indicate a declining ratio of full-time to part-time workers by 0.5 
percent per year. Employment is expected to grow 0.8 percent per year in the period 
1991 - 1997. 
The largest employment growth takes place in the service industries, as we have 
already seen in previous sections. A sharp decline of employment is visible for 
agriculture, forestry and fishery products. The employment in industry has a mixed 
character. Some sectors are expected to expand (agricultural and industrial 
machinery) while others are expected to shrink (textiles and clothing, leather and 
footwear). 
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II Labour market institutions 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the role and function of the most important 
labour market institutions. In the Netherlands, labour market policy is mainly 
conducted by three types of institutions: 
the central government; 
the regional and local governments; 
the social partners. 
In practice, the situation is not that simple. There are various so-called tri-partite 
labour market bodies with a specific policy or advisory task, which are managed by 
(central or local) government, employers' organisations and unions together. These 
bodies perform public tasks, therefore they can be seen as semi public. A well 
known example is the Public Employment Service (PES) which in 1991, both at 
central and regional level, was placed under the responsibility of a tri-partite Board 
and is no longer part of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. More 
generally, the tendency towards decentralisation and privatization and towards a 
more important role of the market (deregulation) is rather strong. 
In section II. 1 public and semi-public institutions will be discussed on a national, 
regional and local level. Furthermore, the role of private services, like temporary 
work agencies and private employment services will be looked at. The introduction 
of the Employment Service Act of 1991 has created conditions for a more important 
role by private services. However, the question is whether major changes actually 
occurred. Section II.2 deals with the role of the social partners in the field of labour 
market policy and contains a description of industrial relations. The emphasis will be 
on collective agreements in general and collective wage negotiations in particular. 
ILI Public institutions 
II.l.l The national level 
Tlte Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW) 
The Ministry of SZW is the most important public labour market institution at the 
national level. It is responsible for the vast majority of the labour market policies and 
has representatives in various tripartite labour market bodies. The structure of policy 
directorates of SZW gives an insight into the main policy fields. The following 
directorates can be distinguished: 
the Directorate for the Labour Market (e.g. general labour market policy, 
policies with respect to target groups, Employment Service policy and the 
regulation of additional employment); 
the Directorate for Labour Relations; 
the Directorate for Labour Conditions; 
the Directorate for National Assistance; 
the Directorate for Social Insurance; 
the Directorate for General Social-Economic Affairs; 
the Directorate for Supervision. 
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The Directorate for Supervision has the task of supervising governing bodies and 
private organisations performing public tasks, such as the PES and the Board for the 
Supervision of Social Insurance. 
General economic policy is primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance, 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ) and SZW. General economic policy is 
characterised by a strong emphasis on the recovery of employment in the market 
sector. Amongst others through reducing the budget deficit, reducing the burden of 
taxes and social premiums, through promoting a moderate wage growth and 
through creating good general conditions for the market sector. In the context of 
general economic policy, the influence of SZW is mainly in the field of wage 
development, social security (national assistance and social insurance) and more in 
general the efficiency of the labour market. 
Other Ministries 
Besides the Ministry of SZW, at central level the Ministry of Education, Culture and 
Science (OCW) and the Ministry of EZ are directly involved with the labour market. 
The policy of the Ministry of EZ is mainly directed at the demand side of the labour 
market (stimulating exports, infrastructural investments and innovation, etcetera). 
The educational and vocational training policy of the Ministry of OCW is mainly 
focused on the qualifications of the (future) labour force. OCW is responsible both 
for initial education and for "second chance" education for adults (targeted at 
disadvantaged groups like women, migrants and low educated). Although the 
unemployed may participate in "second chance" education, (vocational) training for 
the unemployed is mainly the responsibility of the PES. OCW also is responsible for 
the theoretical part (off-the-job, in school) of the apprenticeship system. 
Furthermore, some ministries can be seen (directly or more indirectly) as really "big 
employers". For example, the Ministry of Health, Well-Being and Sport (VWS) is 
responsible for the policy in the field of health care and social care. The share of 
health care and social care services in total employment is more than 10 percent. The 
same applies to the Ministry of OCW as regards the educational sector. 
Tlie Central Board for the Employment Service 
A main semi-public institution at national level is the Central Board for the 
Employment Service ("Centraal Bestuur voor de Arbeidsvoorziening (CBA)"). The CBA 
has a tri-partite structure, each of the three parties, i.e. central government, 
employers' organisations and unions, being represented by three voting board 
members. The chairman is independent and has no voting rights. One non-voting 
member represents the Association of Dutch Municipalities ("Vereniging van 
Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG)"). Until 1995 the central government was represented 
by high-level civil servants from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the 
Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The 
amended Employment Service Act may change this. So-called crown members will 
represent the central government in the future37. The CBA is supported by staff 
working at the National Bureau for the Employment Service ("Landelijk Bureau voor 
de Arbeidsvoorziening (LBA)"). The LBA also provides central services (for example 
37 Although the amended act has been ready for several months now, it still has to be approved by 
Parliament. 
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legal affairs, information technology, personnel and salary administration) for the 
regional bodies. 
Although the CBA formulates the main lines and the main scopes of policy38, the 
decision­making structure is strongly decentralised. There are also 18 tri­partite 
Regional Boards for the Employment Service ("Regionale Besturen voor de 
Arbeidsvoorziening (RBA's)") which have a high degree of autonomy as long as they 
stay within the guidelines of the CBA . In this way, the RBA's are able to tune 
their policy to the regional labour market situation. The RBA's will be further 
discussed in section II.1.2. 
Although the PES is tri­partite, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment has a 
dominant position. First of all, the activities of the PES are constrained by the level 
of financial resources provided by the Ministry, after voting in Parliament. Secondly, 
up to 1995 the vote of the Ministry was required for a qualified majority in the CBA. 
Thirdly, the Ministry is able to adjust the relevant legislation, that is the 
Employment Service Act which contains regulations on the task, the structure and 
the financing of the PES. This actually happened in 1995, when the Act was 
amended on the basis of a thorough evaluation of the first four years of the tri­
partite PES40. 
Employee Insurance Institutions 
The social partners administer a large part of the social security arrangements. They 
implement, through bi­partite Industrial Insurance Boards ("Bedrijfsverenigingen 
(BV-en)"), the Employee Insurance Schemes: unemployment insurance (WW), 
sickness insurance (ZW) and disability insurance (WAO) . They also execute the 
general disability insurance (AAW, a general insurance) and the Supplementary 
Benefit Act (TW, a social arrangement) . 
The IIB's have some discretion to develop benefit award and related management 
policies, to the extent that social security legislation is open to interpretation. One 
has to think of policies with respect to sanctions and with respect to possibilities to 
attend training with continuation of benefit. Up to 1995, the IIB's prepared collective 
policies through the Federation of Industrial Insurance Boards ("Federatie van 
Bedrijfsverenigingen (FBV)"), which could issue directives. In 1995, the FBV was 
replaced by the Temporary Institute for Co­ordination and Tuning ("Tijdelijk Instituut 
voor Coördinatie en Afstemming (TICA)"). The TICA and the reasons for this change 
will be discussed later on. 
Until 1995, the IIB's may run its own administration, but if it did not, the 
administration had to be run by an approved administrative office. These were the 
Joint Administrative Office ("Gemeenschappelijk Administratie Kantoor (GAK)") and the 
Joint Implementation Organisation ("Gemeenschappelijk Uitvoerings Orgaan (GUO)"). 
The Joint Medical Service ("Gemeenschappelijke Medische Dienst (GMD)") was a body 
38 In the National Policy Framework ("Landelijk Meerjarenbeleiàskaàer (LMBK)") and the National Policy Plan 
("Landelijk Meeηarenbeleidsp¡an (ΙΜΒΡΓ). 
39 Up to 1996 there were 28 RBA's. After the recent reform 18 RBA's remained. 
40 De Koning et al, 1995. 
41 The ZW was abolished in March 1996. 
42 Most of the insurances and arrangements are discussed in more detail in section IV.1. 
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closely related to the GAK. The task of the GMD was to advise the IIB's on all social 
medical aspects arising from the implementation of the two disability acts43. The 
GMD as an independent organisation was abolished in 1995. The personnel has been 
spread over the different administrative offices. 
Recently, major reforms have taken place as regards supervision and implementation 
of the social insurances. In the eighties central government policy was aiming to 
create a payable social security system, also in the future, through changes in 
legislation, rules and the level of benefits. During the late eighties and the early 
nineties the attention shifted more and more to the management of the system, 
though the reduction in expenditure on social insurance remained a major policy 
issue. The reforms in the early nineties were focused on the management of the 
system. They have led to a more stringent division between supervision, policy and 
implementation. 
In 1994 the new Organisational Act for Social Insurances ("Organisatiewet Sociale 
Verzekeringen (OSV)") was approved by Parliament. The new Act tries to stimulate a 
movement to regional instead of sectoral implementation of the Social Insurances. 
The previously mentioned TICA, which replaced the FBV, has to start this process. 
The board of the TICA consists of representatives of employers' organisations and 
unions and has an independent chairman. So, the social partners still have an 
important role to play in this respect. The TICA has also taken over the advisory 
tasks of the Social Insurance Council ("Sociale Verzekeringsraad (SVR)"). 
A more radical reform took place in supervision. Till 1995, the social partners also 
had supervisory and advisory tasks within the tri-partite SVR. Each party - central 
government, employers' organisations and unions - had eight members in the SVR. 
In 1995 the supervisory tasks of the SVR were taken over by the independent Board 
for Supervision Social Insurances ("College van Toezicht Sociale Verzekeringen (CTSV)"). 
The CTSV has a board consisting of three independent members, who are appointed 
by the Minister of SZW. So, supervision has been taken away from the social 
partners. The direct cause of this change was a study of the General Audit-Office, 
which concluded that the supervision by the SVR could have been better. Later on, a 
Parliamentary Study into the institutions implementing social insurances concluded 
that the SVR had failed completely in her supervisory tasks. 
The new OSV of 1994 did not change directly the position of the IIB's and the 
administrative offices, but the act stated that IIB's were not allowed to run their own 
administration. The IIB's had to abolish their links with the administrative offices 
before 1996. The objective was to separate policy making and implementation. So, 
the social partners no longer have influence on the implementation of the social 
insurance schemes. 
Except for the general disability insurance (AAW), most of the other general social 
insurances are administered by the Social Insurance Bank ("Sociale Verzekeringsbank 
(SVB)"). Like the former SVR, the SVB has a tri-partite Board. The Ministry of SZW 
appoints five board members and the chairman. The employers' organisations and 
the unions each appoint five members. The SVB implements the General Retirement 
43 The staff of GMD consisted of doctors and labour specialists ("Arbeidsdeskundigen"). 
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Pensions ("Algemene Ouderdoms Wet (AOW)"), the General Survivors' Pension 
("Algemene Weduwen- en Wezenwet (AWW)") and child benefit ("Algemene 
Kinderbijslagwet (AKW)"). These insurances are less directly linked with the labour 
market than the Employee Insurance Schemes. The above mentioned general 
insurance schemes have been changed recently in order to cut back on the 
expenditures, or otherwise changes are in preparation. 
The social arrangements are implemented by the municipalities (see section 
II.1.2)44. 
Advisory institutions 
The Social Economic Council (SER) is an advisory tripartite body. The Council 
consists of 11 crown members (generally experts), 11 employer and 11 union 
members. All the major unions and employer-organisations are represented in the 
Council. The main task of the Council is to advise the government. Up to 1995, the 
government was obliged legally to ask the SER for advice on all important social and 
economic affairs including major labour market issues. Since 1995, this obligation no 
longer exists. 
The Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) is another advisory body. The 
main task of this Council is to provide government policy with scientifically found 
information on developments which could influence society in the long run and to 
point out potential contradictions and expected bottlenecks. 
In the Foundation of Labour, the central organisations for employers and employees 
(i.e. the unions) discuss social-economic issues. The foundation, dating back to 1945, 
consists of representatives of all acknowledged central organisations for employers 
and employees. From the employers' side, seven organisations take part in the 
Foundation. The four most important are VNO (Federation of Dutch Industry), NCW 
(Dutch Christian Federation of Employers), the Royal Dutch Industry Federation 
(KNOV) and the Dutch Christian Industry Federation (NCOV)A5. For the rest, three 
agricultural employers' organisations are represented. From the side of the 
employees, three organisations are active in the Foundation. The largest is the 
Federation of Dutch Trade Unions (FNV), followed by the Christian National Trade 
Union Federation (CNV). The list is completed by the Trade Union Federation for 
Middle and Higher Personnel (MHP). The foundation expresses the opinions of the 
organised business community. The government is obliged to consult the Foundation 
concerning important socio-economic questions before implementing regulations in 
this field (based on the Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen oí 1945). 
Finally, there is the Central Economic Committee (CEC). The CEC consists of a 
number of highly placed civil servants and advises the government regarding 
general and social economic affairs. 
44 To be complete: compulsory insurances for medical costs are implemented by the National Health 
Insurance and partly by private Health Insurances. 
45 The KNOV and NCOV went together in Medium and Small Enterprises Netherlands ("MKB-Nederland") 
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II.1.2 The regional and local level 
The Regional Boards for the Employment Service (RBA's) 
At regional level the tri-partite RBA's are the most important labour market 
institutions. In the RBA's employees are represented by local union officials and 
employers by local employers, personnel managers of major employers and/or 
officials from employers' organisations. The local government is usually represented 
by an alderman. Each of the three parties in the RBA has three voting members. 
There is also one non-voting member representing the provincial government. The 
chairmen of the RBA's are independent and have no voting rights. The RBA's 
supervise the regional organisations of the Public Employment Service (PES), mainly 
consisting of a Regional Office (with policy makers, labour market researchers, 
financial and clerical personnel, etcetera), the Employment Offices ("arbeidsbureaus") 
and Vocational Training Centres ("Centra Vakopleiding (CVs)"). The operational 
management is in the hands of a regional director for the Employment Service, who 
is the link between the RBA and the regional organisation. 
Until recently the RBA's were responsible for all elements of active labour market 
policy, that is: 
registration of job seekers and vacancies; 
active matching of job seekers and vacancies; 
training measures for the unemployed; 
training subsidies for employees and apprentices; 
wage subsidy measures; 
job creation measures. 
Subsidised labour for disabled and handicapped people traditionally is not covered 
by the PES. Recently, a number of changes occurred. First of all, job creation 
measures are now almost completely the responsibility of the local authorities (under 
supervision of the Ministry of SZW). Secondly, placement activities are increasingly 
implemented by other organisations such as IIB's and municipalities. Furthermore, 
commercial agencies for temporary work play an increasing important role. Active 
labour market policies are treated more extensively in section IV.2. 
Municipalities 
The Netherlands has over 600 municipalities. At the national level, they co-ordinate 
their policies and are represented by the VNG. As regards the labour market the 
local authorities have three main tasks: the implementation of Social Assistance, to 
stimulate benefit claimants to (re)enter the labour market and the implementation of 
job creation schemes. They implement the Labour Pools ("Banenpool (BP)"), the 
Guaranteed-Jobs-for-the-Young Act ("Jeugdwerkgarantiewet (JWG)") and the recently 
introduced Job-Schemes46. 
Most of the guaranteed minimum income arrangements are executed by the local 
authorities. The Social Assistance Act is the most important one among them. The 
main provision is the National Assistance Act ("Algemene Bijstandswet (ABW)"). This 
act can be seen as the "safety-net" in the Dutch social security system. The main 
group of users of the ABW are single-parent families and part-time employees 
46 These Job-Schemes are called after the present Dutch Minister of SZW, Melkert (see section Γν\2). 
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without sufficient means of income, unemployed without the basic right to 
Unemployment Benefit ("Werkloosheidswet (WW)") and unemployed who have used 
up all their rights to the WW. Up to and inclusive 1995, there were also some special 
provisions which were derived from the National Assistance Act: the 
"Rijhgroepregeling Werkloze Werknemers (RWW)" and the "Bijstandsbesluit Zelfstandigen 
(BZ) ". The RWW was meant for the unemployed and the BZ for self-employed with 
insufficient income. With the introduction of the New National Assistance Act 
(NABW) in 1996, the RWW and BZ are no longer operational. According to the 
NABW municipalities are obliged to activate benefit-claimants in order to let them 
(re)enter the labour market. The former difference between the RWW (claimants 
have to search for a job) and the ABW (claimants do not have to search for a job) 
has disappeared. Each benefit claimant, except single parents with children up to 5 
years, has to accept paid work now. Almost all municipality have a Municipal Social 
Welfare Office ("Gemeentelijke Sociale Dienst (GSD)") which implements the Social 
Assistance arrangements. Their main function is to pay assistance benefit. The local 
management of benefits is supervised by the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment (State Consultants for Social Security ("Rijhconsulenten Sociale 
Zekerheid")); the benefits are namely 90 percent financed by central government with 
public means. Social Assistance will be discussed further in section IV.l, passive 
labour market measures. 
The BP and the JWG are generally implemented by municipal organisations, which 
are related to the GSD. In a number of cases these organisations 
("Banenpoolorganisaties (BPO's)" and "Jeugdwerkgarantieorganisaties (jWGO's)") 
implement the schemes for a number of municipalities at the same time. Since 1995 
the municipalities also are involved in the implementation of the new Job-Schemes. 
Both the BP, the JWG and the Job-Schemes can be seen as job-creation measures; 
these schemes create additional jobs for specific target groups (see also section IV.2 
on active measures). 
Some municipalities still manage the Centres for Vocational Orientation and 
Preparation ("Centra voor Beroepsoriëntatie en Beroepsoefening (CBB's)") which are 
meant for poorly educated unemployed (mainly persons belonging to ethnic 
minority groups). Until recently, all the CBB's were managed by municipalities and 
mainly financed by the Regional Employment Service. Some RBA's have taken over 
the CBB/the CBB's in the region and joined them with the CV's. In other regions the 
CBB's don't exist anymore because of the cut backs in the budget of the PES and the 
resulting policy choices by RBA's47. 
Most of the above tasks concern the supply side of the labour market. Local 
authorities also have some instruments to foster local economic development and the 
demand side of the local labour market, for example through creating good 
conditions for the settlement of businesses. The overall impact at national level 
seems to be small, municipalities often compete with each other for one and the 
same business. 
47 Most of the RBA's have mainly cut back in the budgets for vocational training, placement subsidies, 
Labour Pools and job creation schemes (and not direct placement). 
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Regional Offices for Education (RBO's) and Regional Service Offices for Education 
and Occupation (RDC's) 
The Regional Offices for Education ("Regionale Bureaus Onderwijs (RBO's)") have 
arisen from the co-ordination points for Primary Vocational Adult Education 
("Primaire Beroepsgerichte Volwasseneneducatie (PBVE)"). The RBO's have to act as a 
broker between the demanders of education and training (such as the RBA and 
private firms) and the suppliers of education and training. The RBO's act on behalf 
of the regular system of educational facilities (schools). One objective is to obtain 
more income for the schools through the organisation of education on contract. 
In the PBVE-programme the RBA and the educational organisations did co-operate 
in order to provide courses relevant to the labour market. The RBA's financed 
elementary training for certain disadvantaged groups of unemployed, mainly 
migrants and low educated. The courses were mainly organised in the regular 
system of initial education (schools). Up to 1993, a national covenant between the 
Ministry of OCW and the PES existed in respect of the PBVE. Since 1994 the RBA's 
could decide whether to continue with the PBVE programme or not, or at a lower 
level. 
The Regional Service Offices for Education and Occupation ("Regionale Dienstencentra 
(RDC's)") perform tasks in the field of occupational and vocational guidance, both in 
charge of the PES and in charge of schools. 
Other regional and local institutions 
At regional level bi-partite councils (with representatives of employers en 
employees) exist which advise the PES on authorisation for dismissals. There are also 
tripartite committees which have to test whether subsidised jobs for specific target 
groups will compete with or substitute existing regular jobs. 
II.1.3 Recent reforms, the role of private agencies48 
The Employment Service Act of 1991 authorises the establishment of private 
employment agencies offering a full range of services, acting as intermediaries 
between job-seekers and employers. Agencies must obtain a licence before starting 
operations. The Act states that their activities must not be detrimental to workers' 
interest or to good relations between labour market parties. These general 
requirements may be supplemented by instructions from the CBA. In fact, the 
monopoly of the PES in the field of placement has been abolished. The effect could 
be that an increase in the activities of other intermediaries would contribute to the 
objective of the Employment Service Act, namely to stimulate the efficiency of the 
labour market process and to increase the labour market chances of disadvantaged 
groups. A similar licence system already existed for Temporary Work Agencies 
(TWA's). 
In many cases employers with vacancies and job-seekers are able to find each other 
relatively easily. In certain cases a third party - an intermediate organisation - is 
used in the search process. Then there is a demand for employment services (with 
48 This section is primarily based on De Koning et al, 1995, chapter 5. 
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employers and /or job-searchers) and a supply of employment services (through the 
intermediate organisations). This section highlights the role of private services in the 
market for employment services. In this market a number of submarkets can be 
distinguished, which are directly related to the existing market imperfections. The 
most important submarkets are: 
1. The market for information, guidance and advice. This market for example 
contains occupational and vocational guidance. 
2. The market for brokering and placement activities. 
3. The market for temporary work agencies. 
Training and education can be seen as needs derived from the intermediate services, 
in case employers cannot find workers with the required qualifications. We will 
discuss the role of private agencies in each of the three submarkets distinguished. 
Because of the historical links of the PES with training (mainly for the unemployed), 
the market for training will be discussed too. 
The market for information, guidance and advice 
The boundary between general information about the labour market situation on the 
one hand and guidance and advice related to placement and training on the other, is 
rather vague. General information about (the possibilities) on the labour market and 
the market for education and training is given by many organisations which are 
active in this field. This concerns, apart from the PES, other organisations which 
have contact with job- searchers, such as the municipal Social Welfare Offices (GSD), 
the administrative offices implementing the Employee Insurances (GAK, etcetera) 
and TWA's. Information on the (future) possibilities in occupations and economic 
activities is also given by special officers at schools and universities, private training 
services, the Regional Offices for Education (RBO's) and the Regional Service Offices 
for Education and Occupations (RDC's). Employers' branch organisations, the 
organisations for apprenticeships and other sectoral organisations inform school-
leavers about the possibilities in their own branch. One specific product on this 
market, the individual occupational and vocational guidance, is provided by the PES 
and a limited number of private agencies. The private sector is also contracted by the 
PES, for a part direct and for a part by means of the RDC's. The RDC's also have 
their own professional staff. All these forms of information provision are personal 
and formal. 
Newspapers and periodicals are the most important impersonal information 
channels. In 1992, about 2.5 million help-wanted ads were placed. The number of 
ads varies strongly with the economic situation. In times of strong economic growth 
3.5 million ads per year are placed. In recession years (for example 1983) the number 
of ads was less than a million. Besides the information on vacancies and job-
searchers, the media play a role in the provision of background information. A 
substantial number of the labour contracts are brought about through other informal 
search channels, like searching by means of own personnel, of family and other 
relations. 
Although studies into this submarket are very rare, there are no indications that the 
role of private agencies has become more important in the last few years. 
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The market f or brokering and placement activities 
Activities in the field of employment services are a crucial factor for the functioning 
of the labour market. Nothing is known about many of the organisations which have 
received a placement licence in the last few years. That is why we only can give 
some indications about the activities of private employment services. In the 
Netherlands, about one third of the vacancies for regular jobs (excluding temporary 
jobs) are filled through the use of an intermediate organisation. The PES is the most 
frequently used intermediate organisation, followed by the TWA's and other 
employment services (including GSD and GAK). Through help-wanted ads about 
one third to half of the vacancies are filled. The remaining vacancies are filled 
without the use of intermediate organisations. 
Between 1988 en 1993 the relative position of the various recruitment channels did 
not change much. This applies both to the market reach and to the market share . 
Developments in market reach and market share of the various channels can almost 
entirely be explained by conjunctival movements in the economy. A break in the 
trend cannot be observed in the available figures, neither in the development of the 
number of hours worked through TWA's. This means that the relative importance of 
private employment agencies did not change structurally in the period 1988 - 1993. 
But in section 1.2.1 we have seen that this may have been the case for TWA's in 1994 
and 1995. 
The activities of private employment services are for the major part complementary 
to those of the PES. In general, the private services provide for those segments of the 
labour market which are not provided for by the PES, namely the higher income 
segments (above Dfl 60,000 gross wage per year). PES' activities in the higher 
segments are almost exclusively targeted at long-term unemployed and persons with 
limited work experience. Private placement activities are still rare in the lower labour 
market segments. In these segments sufficient cheap alternatives are available, like 
help-wanted ads, relations and also the PES. So, for the private services few 
opportunities exist to ask a cost-effective tariff of employers. There is some overlap 
between the activities of the PES and the activities of private services in the field of 
collective outplacement in the lower segments. 
The activities of the GSD and the GAK on the labour market partly overlap the 
activities of the PES. The activities of the GSD in the so called first phase (before 
vocational training or placement) are for the major part complementary to the 
activities of the PES. This also applies to the recruitment of additional jobs. In the 
field of elementary training there are overlaps however, and tuning the activities of 
the PES and the GSD seems to be difficult in practice. The (former) GMD had 
specific expertise as regards the (re)integration of the partially disabled. Strong forms 
of co-operation between the PES on the one hand and the GSD and the GAK/GMD 
on the other seem no more than logical, because they have to do with the same 
groups of jobseekers. If the GSD and the GAK/GMD are going to extend their 
placement activities, the chance of overlap with activities of the PES is very high. 
49 The market reach of a search channel is equal to the number of vacancies for which the channel is used 
as recruitment device divided by the total number of vacancies. The market share is equal to the number 
of vacancies filled by means of the specific channel divided by the total number of filled vacancies. 
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The market f or Temporary Work Agencies 
In the market for flexible workers TWA's play an important role. These agencies 
fulfil about a quarter of total flexible employment. Because of the relatively short 
duration of the placements, the number of transactions is much higher than on the 
market for regular personnel. In the period 1988 - 1993, the development in the 
number of hours worked by temporary workers is parallel to the conjunctural 
development and the development in the number of vacancies. Since 1993, there are 
indications that the importance of temporary work has grown fast. 
In first instance, the TWA's were introduced to provide for temporary shortages of 
personnel, because of sickness or leave of permanent employees, and to meet 
production peaks. But nowadays, employers also use TWA's to recruit personnel for 
permanent jobs. In this way, the statutory probation period is extended. Jobseekers 
also see temporary work as a possibility to find a permanent job. Many of the 
temporary workers (about 60 percent) are actually searching for a permanent job. 
If we look at the character of the services, the PES and the TWA complement each 
other. An important function of the TWA is to fill the need for flexible workers. The 
PES has an important function in the provision of information. Furthermore, the PES 
has a relatively large number of instruments (guidance, training, placement 
subsidies), which could support the placement activities in case of labour market 
bottlenecks50. 
The activities of both intermediate organisations complement each other. Although 
they partly reach the same persons on the supply side (the same job searchers), on 
the demand side they do business with different individual employers. Persons who 
search via one of the two channels in many cases also search via the other channel. 
About a quarter of the unemployed job seekers make use of both the PES and the 
TWA. The characteristics of the jobseekers reached by the PES and the TWA differ in 
a number of important aspects however. Low educated and elderly search more 
often by means of the PES, whereas youngsters and migrants more often search by 
means of the TWA. The PES and TWA on the demand side serve different 
individual employers. Apparently, employers do know when to use the PES and 
when to use the TWA. This is probably related to the specific "product" each of the 
two organisations is offering. 
Besides the private TWA's, there is a temporary work agency, START, which is 
closely related to the PES. Start has a tri-partite structure too and its objective is to 
provide temporary work for job seekers who are difficult to place. 
The market for (vocational) training 
In the field of training and education the various organisations play a 
complementary role to each other. Private and public adult education is mainly 
focused on the training of employees. The broad supply in terms of levels and types 
of education, the possibilities for qualification and the positive effects on the 
placement chance explain why these organisations are set in for the training of the 
50 Through the cut backs in the government budget for the PES, the budgets available for these instruments 
have diminished. At first, the PES chose not to cut back on the personnel and material costs (housing). 
This caused a reduction in budgets for supporting instruments. 
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unemployed. The value added of the training centres of the PES differs. The 
technical Vocational Training Centres have a specific position, mainly due to the 
character of the training (individual, short and practical). The reach of target groups 
is small however. The Centre for Vocational Orientation and Preparation (CBB) and 
the Women's Vocational School ('''Vrouwenvakscholen (VVS)") differ from comparable 
institutes because they have a high reach of unemployed belonging to target groups. 
In that sense, the CBB and the W S play a complementary role on the market for 
training. With regard to the training of unemployed, there is overlap in the clerical 
segment, where the PES' own centres (the administrative Vocational Training 
Centres and partly the WS) supply training comparable with the training supplied 
by regular and private education. This comparability also applies to the 
characteristics of the participants. 
II.2 The system of industrial relations 
11.2.1 Introduction 
In the previous section the role of the social partners in various governing bodies 
and tripartite institutions has already been stressed. This section will further deal 
with the role of the social partners in respect of the labour market and labour market 
policy. We will begin our discussion of the industrial relations' system with a sketch 
of the legal framework in paragraph Π.2.2. Paragraph II.2.3 deals with the wage 
negotiations. In Π.2.4 we pay attention to the declaration of general binding 
("Algemeen verbindend verklaring (AW)") oí collective agreements. In paragraph II.2.5 
union membership will be discussed. We conclude this section with an outline of the 
changes in the system (Π.2.6). 
11.2.2 Sketch of the legal framework 
As was mentioned in chapter 1, collective agreements ("Collectieve 
Arbeidsovereenkomsten (CAO's)") play an important role with regard to wages, 
worktime and other terms of employment. About 75 percent of the labour force is 
dependent on a collective labour agreement (Schutte, 1995). Since almost three 
decades the Netherlands have free determination of wages, based on the 
Determination of Wages Act ("Wet op de loonvorming") oí 1968. The CAO-parties 
have the responsibility for the determination of wages and other terms of 
employment. However, the Minister of SZW can issue a temporary wage regulation 
when the interest of the national economy so demands. This regulation must be 
accompanied by other regulations, for example price regulations. The temporary 
wage regulation may freeze the current terms of unemployment (including wages) 
or impose a maximum allowed increase and can be in effect for a maximum of 
eighteen months. The wage regulation has the same effect for all workers, regardless 
of whether they fall under the scope of a CAO. 
The existence of CAO's does not mean that certain aspects of labour relations are no 
longer determined by law. We mention for example the Working Conditions Act 
("Arbeidsomstandighedenwet"), the Working Time Act ("Arbeidstijdenwet"), the Equal 
Pay Act ("Wet Gelijk Loon") and the Minimum Wage and Minimum Holiday 
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Allowance Act ("Wet Minimumloon en minimumvakantietoeslag"). The basic assumption 
is that in CAO's the legal regulations regarding labour relations and terms of 
employment must be taken into account. 
CAO's do have some limitations (Schutte, 1995). The maximum duration of a CAO is 
five years. Durations of 1 to 2 years are the most common. Secondly, CAO's are not 
binding for every single employer and employee. In essence only the contracting 
parties and their members have rights on the basis of the CAO. The impact of CAO's 
is larger due to the declarations of general binding. These limitations of CAO's mean 
that supplementary legislation remains necessary (Schutte, 1995). 
II.2.3 Wage negotiations 
The Dutch wage negotiation process normally has a yearly cycle, although cycli of 
two years also occur. In the autumn central consultation starts in the Foundation of 
Labour. An important source of information is formed by the Governmental 
Memorandum in which the socio-economic policy is reflected (Miljoenennota in 
September) and the Macroeconomic Exploration by the CPB. These documents form 
the basis for the employers and employees organisations to determine their position. 
These points of view are laid down in two separate Central Terms of Employment 
Memoranda (Centrale arbeidsvoorwaardennota's). One for the employers' side and one 
for the side of the employees. Then representatives of employers' organisations and 
unions try to reach agreement on wage increases and other terms of employment for 
the coming year. If successful, the results are laid down in a Central Agreement 
("Centraal Akkoord") which then forms the framework for the actual negotiations at 
branch and company level. The Central Agreement usually contains 
recommendations covering a whole range of subjects, including recommendations on 
(re)integrating long-term unemployed and ethnic minorities. However, the effects of 
these latter agreements are not clear. 
Although primarily the responsibility of the central employers' organisations and 
unions, the government does play a role too. There is coordination, consultation and 
concertation between the central social partners and the government. Furthermore, if 
no Central Agreement is established the government can interfere in the wage 
determination (on basis of the Wage Act). Otherwise, the negotiations proceed at 
branch and company level without the restraints of a Central Agreement. 
Government interference was rather common in the seventies and early eighties. 
From the mid-eighties on, the government has only interfered occasionally. This 
change was partly due to protests from the side of the social partners (the economic 
recovery in the late eighties and early nineties has also played an important role). 
They argued that they had the primary responsibility for wage determination, in line 
with the treaties of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). They argued that 
government interference in wage negotiations could only be justified in 
extraordinary situations, for example external shocks which hit the entire economy 
(van Drimmelen, 1987). 
Although the CAO negotiations at branch and company level are based on the 
results of the central consultations in the Foundation of Labour, this does not imply 
that the CAO-parties at branch and company level wait and see. They prepare 
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themselves for the decentral negotiations and try to influence the consultations at 
central level. But the actual negotiations at branch and company level only start 
when the central consultations have been rounded off. Normally the negotiations at 
branch and company level start with a set of demands from the labour unions. These 
demands should take the results of the central consultations into account, but this is 
not always the case. Employers determine their point of view in reaction to these 
union demands and then the actual negotiation process can begin. Delegations from 
both parties negotiate and try to reach agreement on the various points. The first 
round of negotiation has an exploratory character, followed usually by a dispute 
about the various demands. The expected costs of the demands are normally the 
central theme. In the decisive stage, the employers determine which demands they 
are willing to grant and which they will refuse. At this point, it is still possible for 
the viewpoints to be far apart. The union then usually threatens employers with 
strikes and other actions. In the Dutch case, the vast majority of CAO's can normally 
be agreed upon without strikes. When employers and labour unions have reached 
agreement then an agreement in principle is established. In this phase the CAO is 
not yet in effect. The agreement has first to be approved by the members of the 
contracting parties. Rejection of an agreement is very rare however. 
In some sectors (for example the printing industry) CAO's at branch level are the 
most important, whereas in other sectors (for example the chemical industry) CAO's 
at company level are. Some of the CAO's at company level are particularly 
important, such as those of Philips and AKZO. Not only do they concern a great 
number of employees, they also have a radiating effect on other CAO's. We can 
distinguish therefore between nucleus-CAO's and satellite-CAO's. The companies 
involved in nucleus-CAO's are considered to be wage leaders. These CAO's are 
expected to influence the negotiations of the satellite-CAO's. 
Strikes are rare in the Netherlands. Compared to other EU countries the Netherlands 
lose few working days due to strikes. In the period 1985 - 1994, the average number 
of disputes has been 28 per year. On average 23,500 employees per year were 
involved and 70,000 working days per year were lost. This last number is equal to 
300 labour years. So, the relation between employers' organisations and labour 
unions is normally stable. The Dutch labour unions use strikes only as a last resort. 
II.2.4 General binding declaration (AW) 
The legal basis for the A W of CAO's is formed by the Wet op het algemeen verbindend 
en het onverbindend verklaren van bepalingen van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten oí 1937. 
The Minister of SZW plays an important role, he or she can refuse A W of a CAO 
when: 
the CAO-parties concerned do not represent an important majority (about 50 
to 60 percent) of the people working in the branch concerned; 
in his or her opinion certain CAO stipulations conflict with the general 
interest the minister may withhold A W of these CAO stipulations (not used 
since 1970); 
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the CAO stipulations disproportionately harm the rightful interests of third 
parties. Third parties involved can submit a notice of objection. But the 
minister may also refuse A W without the submission of a notice of 
objection when he or she feels that this would disproportionately harm a 
third party. In practice notices of objection are honoured. 
The government has an even stronger potential influence on CAO's through the 
authority to declare CAO-stipulations not binding. In this way the government 
interferes in the (harsh) negotiations between employers' and employees 
organisations by eliminating the result. In practice however, the government seldom 
uses this means of pressure but it does have a precautionary effect. 
The purpose of A W is to protect the institution of the CAO and to stimulate the 
creation of CAO's at sector or industry level. The legislator apparently values CAO's 
highly. They preserve order and peace in the field of labour relations and they 
ensure employers a stable production environment. Conflicts with employees 
organisations are reduced to a minimum. Furthermore the employer can be sure that 
his competitor has to meet the same social standards. Employees also benefit. CAO's 
have created better working conditions and have strengthened the legal position of 
workers51. Another goal of the government in installing the A W was to withdraw 
itself (partially) from the field of labour relations and to give employers and 
employees more responsibility. They were intended to have a great self-regulating 
power. 
The above seems to suggest that the A W of CAO's only has positive effects for all 
parties concerned. However, negative side-effects of the A W of CAO's must be 
mentioned as well. The function of A W of CAO's will be examined in three 
respects: the economic perspective, developments in the social area and the 
determination of terms of employment and industrial relations. This division in three 
areas is derived from a SER (Social Economic Council) advice concerning the A W 
(SER, 1992). 
Within the economic context is it mentioned that A W leads to a diminished 
competition in terms of employment. There is no consensus as to whether this 
should be encouraged or not. Proponents mention that a somewhat diminished 
competition in terms of employment creates an environment for long term co-
operation, which could have a positive impact on labour productivity. The reasoning 
behind this is that when there is no longer competition in terms of employment, 
companies will put more effort into quality and productivity. Opponents blame the 
A W for the high level of labour costs. They acknowledge the risk of a wage-price 
spiral at the expense of the consumer. This is mainly valid for the sheltered sector. In 
the open sector this is hardly possible, due to international competition. 
Furthermore, the A W makes it impossible for unorganised employers to hire 
employees below the minimum CAO-wage. This is mainly a problem for companies 
which have a below average productivity, like for example starting or small 
companies. The high inactivity rate as discussed in the previous chapter raises the 
51 The points mentioned can be derived from the explanatory memorandum accompanying the A W Act of 
1937. 
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question whether the A W forms a floor in the wage structure which is too high to 
create jobs in the lower segment. 
When we look at the A W in a social perspective, it may have contributed to 
improvements in the field of working conditions. The A W determines a minimum 
level of working conditions for all employers. In recent years, extensive legislation 
has been created in the field of dismissal, minimum income, participation of 
employees and social security system. Some think that this legislation takes the legal 
justification of the A W away. Others oppose that the legislation has only changed 
the content of the CAO. They see the CAO as a supplement with other, no less 
important, elements than those covered by law. Besides, they say that CAO's and 
legislation influence each other (SER, 1992). Sometimes legislation is effected in 
response to CAO's en vice versa. The A W of CAO's reinforces this relation. 
In the past years CAO's have received a broader scope. Not only wage level and 
working time is agreed upon, but also numerous other things have been determined 
in CAO's such as reimbursement of expenses, supplementary benefits concerning 
Sickness Insurance and Disability Insurance, day care, agreements on education and 
employment of minorities. Whether this extension of the content of CAO's could 
have been possible without the A W Act is hard to estimate. It is however, plausible 
that the A W of CAO's has made it easier and certainly has meant a stimulation for 
agreements on immaterial things. The A W has eliminated the free-riders problem. 
Some are afraid that abolition of the A W would lead to a large reduction of 
collective negotiations and in more limited CAO's. It will be harder to reach 
agreement on immaterial things. And there is the risk of more volatile labour 
relations in general and an increased number of strikes in particular. 
The A W has certainly contributed to the low organisation rate of employees. 
Through the A W employees who are not organised receive (some exceptions 
excluded) the same rights from CAO's as organised employees. So, union 
membership is not necessary to gain from the CAO-results obtained by the unions. 
II.2.5 Union membership 
One element which determines the strength of labour unions is the degree of 
organisation of employees in unions. This degree of organisation is defined as the 
proportion of union members in the total number of employees. Table II. 1 shows the 
union membership for 1992 and 1993 according to gender, age and ethnic 
background. 
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Table ILI Percentage of union members (employees) in total number of employees (1992 and 1993) 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Age 
15 - 24 years 
2 5 - 4 4 years 
45 - 64 years 
Ethnic background 
Natives 
Non-natives 
Total 
1992 
33% 
18% 
15% 
27% 
37% 
28% 
20% 
27% 
1993 
34% 
19% 
16% 
27% 
39% 
29% 
21% 
28% 
Source: CBS. 
In 1993 the total number of union members rose slightly. The degree of organisation 
differs according to gender, age group and ethnic background. Men participate more 
than women and the degree of organisation is highest for older employees. Natives 
have a higher degree of organisation than non-natives. 
Labour-union membership can also be connected with other characteristics (not 
shown in the table). Employees who work in shifts have a substantially higher 
organisational degree (44 percent). Part-time workers are less organised than persons 
with a full-time job. A strong correlation exists between the company size and the 
organisational degree. The larger the company, the higher the organisational degree. 
To conclude we mention the relation between sector of industry and labour-union 
membership. Sectors with a high organisational degree are public services, 
transportation and construction. Low organisational degrees are found in the trade 
sector and the hotel and catering sector . 
II.2.6 Developments in the system 
The international environment is becoming more and more competitive and there is 
a trend of individualization. This raises the question whether negotiations at branch 
level are the most appropriate alternative for the nineties. Negotiations at branch 
level cannot fully incorporate all individualistic needs, both for the employee and for 
the employer. This implies that the terms of employment and working conditions 
should be negotiated at a more decentral level. 
52 CBS, Sociaal-Economische Maandstatistiek, September 1995. 
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The employers' organisations VNO and NCW have stipulated some points for the 
future (VNO /NCW 1994). They prefer a more market oriented wage determination 
which makes more differentiation possible. Firstly, they have the opinion that a 
moderate wage development has positive employment effects. Therefore wage 
determination should be more in line with the needs of the individual firm and 
branches which should lead to a more differentiated wage increase. Implementation 
of profit-sharing arrangements make the labour cost dependent on the results of the 
firm. This means that part of the income increase of employees is not for granted but 
must be "earned". This would also lead to more dynamics on the labour market. 
Secondly, they strive after an enlarged differentiation and choice as regards the 
terms of employment. This also asks for more decentralized negotiations. 
Furthermore, it should be possible to adjust working time to the preferences of the 
individualistic employee and employer. More flexibility is needed as regards the 
working hours and working patterns. Employers should be able to change the 
production swift and efficient to meet the demand on highly competitive markets. 
On the other hand, there are the changes needs of employees. Paid work is 
increasingly combined with other activities. This may result in changes of the 
preferred working time. For employees the classical 9 - 5 job is also no longer 
automatically the most favourable. So, both sides should be enabled to make 
agreements concerning flexible labour relations. 
But not every worker will have the need for more flexible working relations . The 
social position of current workers who are completely satisfied must be taken into 
account. They do not have the need to change their working hours. When the 
concept of normal working hours is enhanced then part of the overtime hours may 
no longer be extra paid. There is a task for the future to find a balance between the 
needed flexibility and compliance to individualistic needs on the one hand and the 
(social) position of workers and their families on the other. 
53 Van Nes, Donker van Heel and Nijhuis, 1996. 
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III Labour market legislation 
ULI Employment protection schemes 
High costs of dismissal are seen as one of the causes for unemployment. Most 
workers still have a permanent job and dismissal is restricted by law, making 
employers risk-averse in hiring new employees. It also suggests that employment 
cannot be adjusted easily to changes in demand and output. The fast growing 
number of fixed-term workers could be seen as a response to the employment 
protection system. This section deals with these topics. Section III.l.l pays attention 
to the existing legislation on dismissal in the Netherlands. Also, a short comparison 
with other countries will be made. In section ΓΠ.2 we turn to the rules governing 
fixed-term contracts and temporary work through the TWA. 
III.l.l Redundancy rules and regulations 
The content of the current legislation on individual and collective dismissal is based 
primarily on the Special Decision on Labour Relations ("Buitengewoon Besluit 
Arbeidsverhoudingen (BBA)") oí 1944. The most controversial point in the Dutch 
system is that employers first have to obtain permission for dismissal from the PES 
or the district court. The Ministry of SZW has delegated the administrative 
authorisation of dismissals to the regional directors of the PES. The PES has to 
allocate resources to this task but doesn't have influence on the policy in this field. 
The PES only implements the legislation. The PES officers who perform this task are 
supported by a bi-parrite regional dismissal committee (see section Π.1.2). 
Authorisation of dismissal can be given on: 
economic grounds, when jobs are reduced because of the economic situation 
of the company. Within this category there is a distinction between collective 
(20 or more employees) and individual redundancy (up to 20 employees); 
medical grounds, when the employee has been sick for at least two years or 
has become disabled; 
other non-economic personal grounds, for example in the case of 
misbehaviour, malfunctioning or troubled work relationships. 
Table ULI shows the number of applications for permits to dismiss workers and the 
number of applications dealt with in the period 1986 - 1994. 
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Table ffi.l Number of applications to dismiss workers and number of applications dealt with (in thousands, 1986 
1994) 
Year3' 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994b» 
Number of 
applications 
80 
83 
84 
66 
62 
76 
86 
114 
101 
Applications dealt with 
Total 
80 
83 
84 
67 
62 
73 
81 
108 
106 
of which 
permitted 
78% 
76% 
78% 
75% 
75% 
77% 
77% 
77% 
76% 
of which 
refused 
6% 
6% 
6% 
6% 
6% 
6% 
6% 
7% 
10% 
of which 
cancelled 
16% 
18% 
17% 
19% 
18% 
18% 
17% 
15% 
15% 
a) Since 1989 dismissals which result from bankruptcy of companies no longer need authorisation by the 
PES. 
b) The figures for 1994 are derived from information about the first six months. 
Source: Statistics on Dismissals, Ministry of SZW. 
In the case of collective dismissals on economic grounds, the PES investigates 
whether the distribution of proposed dismissals is biased against older workers. This 
in order to prevent a more than proportionate forward shift of costs onto social 
security benefits. The last-in-first-out principle or an even distribution across age 
groups should be adopted. 
The PES dismissal procedure is related to unemployment insurance benefits. Persons 
have to be unemployed involuntarily to be entitled to an unemployment benefit. 
This criterion is evaluated by the IBB's. Approval by the PES does not automatically 
lead to a benefit allowance, but it is taken into account. Even when employees in fact 
agree with their dismissal, they may object to it because otherwise they would not 
be entitled to a benefit. 
In the case of mass-dismissals, legislation requires employers to give advance 
warning to unions. Bargaining between employers and unions often resulted in an 
agreement to dismiss only workers aged 57,5 year and over (Trommel and De 
Vroom, 1991). These workers qualify for unemployment benefit at 70 percent of their 
former wage until retirement. According to some specific case studies mass 
dismissals apparently were in fact "social plans"; under these plans older workers 
were dismissed on an individual basis over many years. Collective dismissals have 
to be approved by the PES which checks if economic conditions still make the 
dismissals necessary, but companies could validly suppress some posts (from which 
older workers were dismissed) while creating other posts into which new staff were 
hired. Thus such dismissals under social plans run counter to the principle that 
dismissals should not be disproportionately among older or less productive workers 
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and legitimate allowances of unemployment benefit for employees who have 
voluntarily left work, and do not expect to seek another job. 
A main issue of debate in the Netherlands is whether the dismissal system is too 
restrictive and hence hindering the Dutch economy's international competitive 
position (Mayes and Soteri, 1994). There is no simple answer to this question. One of 
the reasons is that employment protection is in itself a complex phenomenon 
because of the fact that employers' freedom to dismiss one or more employees may 
be restricted by a number of factors (OECD, 1994): 
1. A requirement for prior warning or written justification to the person to be 
dismissed and notification to third parties like unions, work councils, the 
PES or the labour inspectorate. 
2. A requirement for authorisation from a third party before dismissal can take 
place or a requirement that rehabilitative measures be attempted before a 
worker is dismissed. 
3. A requirement to give a certain period of notice to the worker before 
dismissal becomes effective, and/or to provide severance payments upon 
dismissal (except in the case of worker fault). 
4. Provisions for appeal against unfair dismissal, such that a finding of 
unjustified dismissal will result in exceptional compensation or 
reinstatement of the dismissed worker. 
Seen in an international context, the Netherlands have an intermediate level of 
employment protection (Mayes and Soteri, 1994; OECD, 1994). The Dutch dismissal 
system is more restrictive on certain points than in other countries but less restrictive 
on other points. In most other countries employers don't have to obtain permission 
for dismissal from the PES or the court. On the other hand in the Netherlands: 
employers have to consult with work councils and unions in the case of 
collective redundancy (20 or more redundancies within any three month 
period), whereas in some other countries this is a legal obligation in all 
cases; 
the notice periods (the statutory period between issuing a dismissal notice 
and the effective cessation of employment) are not exceptionally long; 
unlike some other countries no legal provisions on severance pay exist. In 
case termination of the contract is by court ruling, the average severance pay 
is one month's pay per year of service. Provisions on severance pay can be 
covered by collective agreements; the amount then normally depends on age 
and/or length of service; 
there are no legal provisions on penalties for unfair dismissals. In the case of 
unfair dismissal the authorisation for dismissal will be refused by the PES or 
the court. 
So, the uncertainty regarding the possibility of appeal and penalties that exists in 
some other countries does not exist in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands there is 
uncertainty as regards obtaining permission for dismissal. The Dutch level of 
employment protection is not exceptionally high and so the effects on the 
international competitive position of the economy may not be having as negative an 
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impact as some individuals and firms believe. However, the government intends to 
shorten the authorisation procedure or even to abolish it. 
III.1.2 Probational period, fixed-term and temporary contracts 
The statutory probational period is maximum 2 months for newly hired permanent 
and fixed-term workers. Employers in many cases extend the statutory probational 
period using fixed-term contracts as a recruitment device for permanent jobs. 
The use of fixed-term contracts is restricted by law, however. The main restriction is 
that renewal of a fixed-term contract at the end of the contract period gives the 
employee the same rights as a permanent employee. This means that the employer 
has to obtain authorisation for dismissal from the PES at the end of the second 
contract period. However, this rule is not applicable when the period between the 
end of the first and the beginning of the second contract is more than 31 days. 
Further, the use of fixed-term contracts is not restricted. These contracts may be used 
in all branches of industry and to fulfil all possible needs. There is no statutory 
maximum duration for fixed-term contracts and they may be open-ended (a contract 
for the time the work or the project lasts). Furthermore, fixed-term employees don't 
have the right to an allowance (from the employer) at the end of the contract period. 
Hiring employees through a TWA (temporary work) is permitted, except in the 
building sector in which TWA's are forbidden. Temporary work may be used to 
fulfil all possible needs. The maximum duration of temporary work with the same 
hiring employer has been extended to one year in 1995. Before that time the 
maximum duration was six months. 
III.2 Regulation of working time 
ΠΙ.2.1 Legislation and contractual working time 
The Netherlands, like Belgium, Germany and Sweden, has a separate working time 
legislation. The amended new Working Time Act (Arbeidstijdenwet) became 
operational in 1996. This new act has to be placed in the trend towards more flexible 
arrangements and deregulation. In table III.2 the major changes in the rules are 
summarized. 
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Table ΠΙ.2 Changes in the rules regarding working times since the introduction of the new Working Time Act 
Rule 
Maximum working time per day 
Maximum working time per week 
Average working time per week 
Average working time per 13 weeks 
Minimum resting time per day 
Minimum successive resting hours per 7 days 
Maximum duration of night work per 24 hours 
Minimum leave per year 
Minimum hours of work requiring a break 
"Old" situation (hours) 
8.5 
48 
36 
Night work forbidden 
between 18.00 and 7.00 hour 
"New" situation (hours) 
9 
45 
40 
520 
11 
36 (or 60 in a period of 9 
days) 
8 
4 weeks 
5.5 hours 
In the new situation average working time is restricted to 40 hours per week or 520 
hours per 13 weeks, and the maximum to 9 hours per day and 45 hours per week. 
As can be seen in the table, the maximum per day has been increased by half a hour 
and the maximum per week has been decreased by 3 hours. 
Apart from the statutory rules being amended, the new act partly shifted the 
responsibility for working time to the social partners. This is the major form of 
deregulation. Before 1995, the structure of the Working Time Act already provided 
different rules for some sectors or branches of industry by means of so-called 
statutory orders (Algemem Maatregelen van Bestuur). The amended act offers more 
scope for agreement-based working time arrangements however. Deviations from the 
statutory rules are possible through collective agreements or written agreements 
between employer and works council (overlegregeling)5*. The sectoral or company 
agreements can be up to a maximum of 10 working hours per day, maximum 200 
hours per 4 weeks or maximum 585 hours per quarter. The compulsory resting time 
is 11 hours a day. 
The Dutch Working Time Act does not define the concept of overtime. However, 
overtime is only permitted in circumstances stated in the law. Overtime (as night 
work) requires an official permit or a General Measure of Government and the total 
working time, overtime included, is bound to maximum standards. There are no 
central statutory rules for wage supplements in the case of overtime. Usually, wage 
supplements are incorporated in collective agreements. 
The normal working times, according to collective agreements, vary between 36 and 
40 hours per week for a full-time employee. The contractual number of working 
hours_ for an adult full-time employee has not changed much in the period 1990 -
1995 . At the moment however, unions are fighting for the introduction of a 
54 
55 
However, this means that the Act does not take much account of sectors in which employees are not 
organised (in unions), or are organised only to a low degree (Sloot et al, 1994). 
Statistics Netherlands, Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek. 
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working week of 36 hours in those sectors which still have a longer working week. 
In some branches employers are willing to agree on the condition that possibilities 
are created for more flexible working hours (for fixed-term and permanent 
employees). In other sectors the employers have not agreed (yet) and the 
negotiations are still going on. Leave is normally 5 weeks by collective agreement. 
III.2.2 Working time and part-time work 
In the preceding section the working time legislation and the contractual working 
time have been discussed. In this section we pay some attention to developments in 
the actual and usual working time and the incidence of part-time work. Collective 
work time reduction and particularly part-time work are the most common models 
of work sharing in the Netherlands. In many sectors the normal working time has 
been reduced from 40 to 38 (in the eighties) or even to 36 hours (early nineties) per 
week by collective agreements. In the government sector new employees are hired 
for maximum 32 hours per week. The effects on employment, calculated in number 
of employed persons, of collective work time reduction are not clear however. The 
main difficulty in determining the effects is that work time reduction may have led 
to the maintenance of jobs that otherwise would have been redundant. Policies 
aimed at increasing part-time working may be used as an instrument to redistribute 
the available employment. Recently, a statutory ban on discrimination based on the 
length of working time has been imposed by the government. Full-time and part-
time workers should be equally treated. 
For the years 1983, 1988 en 1993, table III.3 shows the average usual working time 
and the proportion of part-time workers according to gender. The average number of 
hours per week has not changed much since 1988, which supports the observation 
that contractual working time has been rather stable since 1990. There is no legal 
definition of part-time work. A part-time worker generally speaking is any employee 
who works less than the normal collectively agreed working time. According to this 
description, the proportion of part-time workers is very high: about 35 percent in 
total and 65 percent of the employed women. As can be seen from the table, the 
increase in the share of part-time workers is slowing down. Between 1983 and 1988 
this share increased with 9.2 percentage points, whereas between 1988 and 1993 the 
increase was 4.5 percentage points. The diminishing growth rate is due to the fact 
that the proportion of part-time working men hardly increased between 1988 and 
1993. 
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Table III.3 Average usual working time per week and percentage of part-time workers in total 
number of workers 
Usual number of hours per week 
Total 
Men 
Women 
Share of part-time workers 
Total 
Men 
Women 
1983 
37,7 
41,9 
29,1 
21,2 
6,8 
50,2 
1988 
33,6 
38,0 
26,0 
30,4 
14,5 
57,7 
1993 
33,1 
38,1 
25,5 
35,0 
15,3 
64,5 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey on basis of Ministry of SZW, 1995. 
The above table indicates that a further growth in part-time work can be mainly 
realised amongst man. Firstly, the percentage of men working part-time hardly 
increased since 1988. Secondly, the percentage of women working part-time is 
already high. Therefore job-sharing policies through stimulating part-time work 
should mainly be focused on men. 
The decline in the actual number of working hours was also slower during the 
beginning of the nineties (table III.4). In the seventies and eighties reductions in the 
average actual work time were realised through both collective reductions and a 
strong increase in part-time work. Because the contractual number of working hours 
did not change much on average between 1990 and 1995, reductions in average work 
time in the early nineties are largely or wholly caused by the (diminishing) growth 
of part-time work. 
Table III.4 Average actual working hours per year per employee (full- and part-time employees) 
Year 
1970 
1980 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Actual working hours per year 
1860 
1606 
1433 
1423 
1413 
1404 
1392 
(Average) annual change (%) 
-
-1 .5 
-1.1 
-0 .7 
-0 .7 
-0.6 
-0.9 
Source: CBS on basis of Ministry of SZW, 1995. 
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III.2.3 Trends towards more flexible hours 
Recently in the Netherlands, the attention seems to be moving somewhat from 
external flexibility (flexibility through the hiring of temporary employees) to internal 
flexibility, through for example introducing flexible working hours for permanent 
employees . Flexibility measures include the extension of shop opening times. 
Legal restraints, for instance rigid opening hours of shops, are steadily disappearing. 
III.3 Minimum wage regulation 
The minimum wage regulation in the Netherlands is rather simple. There is one 
standard statutory minimum wage for persons of 23 years or older. An age related 
youth minimum wage exists for workers under 23. The minimum wages (and also 
benefits that are linked to the minimum wage) are indexed on the basis of average 
trend in the collectively agreed wages in the public and private sectors. The principle 
ground behind this indexing is that, when possible, workers with a minimum wage 
and benefit claimants also have to share in the general growth of prosperity. The 
"when possible" makes clear that indexing is not automatic. When the ratio between 
non-active and active persons (the I/A-ratio) comes above 82.6, the government may 
decide not to apply the indexing of minimum wages and benefits. The indexing and 
the possibility not to apply the indexing in economic hard times are regulated in a 
separate Act which was introduced in 1992 ("De Wet Koppeling met 
Afwijkingsmogelijkheden (WKA)"). In 1993, 1994 and 1995, indexing did not take place 
on the basis of this Act. 
Table III.5 shows the development of the nominal contractual wage in the private 
sector and the development of gross minimum wage in the period 1986 - 1995. In all 
the observed years, the growth of the minimum wage has been lower than the 
growth in average contractual wages. The gross minimum wage only grew 
substantially in 1991 and 1992. This means that the ratio between the average wage 
level and the minimum wage level increased. 
56 The NEI has recently completed a study into the possibilities for more flexible working hours in the 
wood-trade sector. 
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Table III.5 Development of the nominal contractual wage (private sector) and gross minimum wage 
Year 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Change in nominal contractual wage (%) 
1.2 
0.8 
0.8 
1.4 
2.9 
3.5 
4.3 
3.1 
1.8 
1.3 
Change in statutory minimum wage (%) 
0.0 
0.3 
0.2 
0.0 
1.8 
3.1 
3.1 
0.7 
0.0 
0.0 
Source: Ministry of SZW, 1995. 
The minimum wage for persons of 23 years or older is relatively high in the 
Netherlands. In 1990, the ratio between the average wage and the minimum wage 
(for adults) was low compared to other EC-countries and the USA (Van der Heuvel, 
1992). Recently, a number of measures have been taken to decrease the (now wage) 
labour costs for workers at or just above the minimum wage level. 
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IV Labour market policies 
This chapter deals with labour market policies in the Netherlands. Both passive 
measures (section IV.l) and active measures (section IV.2) will be considered. Passive 
measures are those measures which provide workers with work-related benefits 
which replace wages in case of unemployment. These measures can be seen as 
income support measures. In section IV.2 we will discuss unemployment benefits in 
the Netherlands. Furthermore, we pay some attention to the unemployment 
component in the disability and sickness insurance benefits. Early retirement 
schemes, usually provided for through collective agreements, also are a form of 
passive policy and will also be considered. 
Active policy consists of activities which have the objective to place the unemployed 
in a (regular or additionally created) job. One can think for example of placement 
activities, training measures and job creation schemes. Active policy is used as a 
steering device to promote an efficient matching of demand and supply on the 
labour market and to improve the qualifications of job seekers. Usually, the 
improvement of the labour market chances of disadvantaged groups (like the lower 
educated and the long-term unemployed) is also an objective of active policy. Till 
recently, the PES was responsible for the major part of the active measures. 
IV.l Passive measures 
Passive measures originate both from social security and from collective agreements 
in branches (such as early retirement arrangements). The Netherlands has an 
extensive social security programme. Some of the social security regulations are 
General Insurance Schemes ("volksverzekeringen") and cover all residents, whereas 
others are Employee Insurance Schemes (''werknemersverzekeringen"). Both types of 
insurances are financed through premiums. A third branch of the social security 
system consists of Social Provision Arrangements which are financed by public 
means. The broad aim of social security is to maintain income at a certain level in 
case of specific "social damage" (such as sickness, disability, unemployment) and old 
age. Within the social security a distinction is made between the wage-loss function 
(benefits are related to the wage previously earned) and the subsistence function (in 
that case benefits are on "the" minimum subsistence level). Table IV.l contains a brief 
outline of the most important social security schemes. Only those schemes which are 
directly or indirectly related to unemployment will be discussed in this section. 
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Table IV.l Brief outline of the most important social security schemes (situation 1993) 
Social risk 
Old-age 
Survivors 
Maternity 
Sickness/ 
invalidity 
Unemployment 
Child benefits 
Guaranteeing 
sufficient resources 
Legislation 
Algemene ouderdomswet (AOW) 
Algemene Weduwen- en Wezenwet (AWW) 
Ziektewet (ZW) 
Ziektewet (ZW) 
Algemene Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet (AAW) 
Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering (WAO) 
Toeslagenwet (TW) 
Wet Inkomensvoorziening Oudere en Gedeeltelijk 
Arbeidsongeschikte Werkloze Werknemers (IOAW) 
Wet Inkomensvoorziening Oudere en Gedeeltelijk 
Arbeidsongeschikte Gewezen Zelfstandigen (IOAZ) 
Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten (AWBZ) 
Ziekenfondswet (ZFW) 
Werkloosheidswet (WW) 
Wet Inkomensvoorziening Oudere en Gedeeltelijk 
Arbeidsongeschikte Werkloze Werknemers (IOAW) 
Wet Inkomensvoorziening Oudere en Gedeeltelijk 
Arbeidsongeschikte Gewezen Zelfstandigen (IOAZ) 
Toeslagenwet (TW) 
Algemene Kinderbijslagwet (AKW) 
Algemene bijstandswet (ABW) 
Bijstandsbesluit Zelfstandigen (BZ) 
Rijksgroepsregeling Werkloze Werknemers (RWW) 
Wet op de Studiefinanciering (WSF) 
Wet Individuele Huursubsidie (ÜHS) 
Insurance/arrangement 
General Insurance 
General Insurance 
Employee Insurance 
Employee 
Insurance 
General Insurance 
Employee Insurance 
Social Arrangement 
Social Arrangement 
Social Arrangement 
General Insurance 
Employee Insurance 
Employee Insurance 
Social Arrangement 
Social Arrangement 
Social Arrangement 
General Insurance 
Social Arrangement 
Social Arrangement 
Social Arrangement 
Social Arrangement 
Social Arrangement 
Source: Based on J. de Voogd et al, 1994. 
In section IV. 1.1 attention will be paid to unemployment benefits. Section IV.1.2 
briefly deals with the unemployment component in the sickness and disability 
insurance. Finally, in section IV. 1.3 we will discuss early retirement schemes, mostly 
agreed upon in collective agreements. 
IV.1.1 Description of unemployment benefits 
In this section we discuss unemployment benefits. Unemployment is compensated 
by both insurance benefits and assistance benefits. Insurance benefits are granted 
under the Unemployment Act ("Werkloosheidswet (WW)"). Assistance benefits are 
provided by means of the State Group Regulation for Unemployed Workers 
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("Rfägroepsregeling Werkloze Werknemers (RWW)"), the Law on Income Supply to 
Elderly and Partially Disabled Unemployed Workers ("Wef Inkomensvoorziening 
Oudere en gedeeltelijk Arbeidsongeschikte Werkloze Werknemers (IOAW)") and the Law on 
Income Supply for Elderly and Partially Disabled former Self-Employed ("Wei 
Inkomensvoorziening Oudere en gedeeltelijk Arbeidsongeschikte gewezen Zelfstandigen 
(IOAZ)"). These regulations all are part of National Assistance but since they are 
especially meant for the unemployed they are included here. Civil servants have 
their own benefit scheme: the waiting allowance/reduced pay scheme ("Wachtgeld"). 
Around 95 percent of civil servants are insured by the General Civil Pension fund 
("Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds (ABP)"). 
The WW 
Almost all employees up to 65 years old, except civil servants, are compulsory 
insured for involuntary unemployment by means of the WW. Some minor categories 
of employees which are not compulsory insured, can insure themselves voluntary. In 
1987, the new WW was introduced in the major system reform and replaced both 
the old WW and the Extended Unemployment Act ("Wet Werkloosheidsvoorziening 
(WWV)"). Before 1987, WWV-benefit could be granted to persons insured for the 
WW but who had no more rights to WW-benefit and to persons who were not 
insured by means of the WW. In the period 1965 - 1986 the duration of WW-benefit 
was limited to six months. The WW was followed by a wage-related WWV benefit 
for two years. From 1975 onwards, the duration of the WWV-benefit was related 
increasingly to age. From 1975, employees over 58 years remained eligible for WWV 
until age 65 and in 1983 WWV was limited to 6 months for those under 23 years. In 
1985, benefit duration was limited to 1 year for 23 - 30 years old and 1.5 years for 30 
- 35 years old (Aarts and De Jong, 1992). The WWV was implemented by the 
municipalities. In 1987 the WWV was integrated into the new WW of 1987 and the 
Social Assistance Schemes. 
The right to WW-benefit arises when an insured person becomes unemployed, the 
person meets certain requirements regarding the length of preceding participation in 
the labour market (the week requirement and the work experience requirement) and when 
no grounds for disqualification exist. In the WW of 1987 unemployment is defined 
by means of the following elements: 
the employee must have lost five or half of his work hours; 
the employee must have lost the right to unreduced salary for those hours; 
the employee must be available to accept (other) work. 
The week requirement states that the employee must have worked in at least 26 of 
the 39 weeks before unemployment. Furthermore, the employee must have received 
salary for at least 52 days in at least four of the five calendar years before he or she 
became unemployed (work experience requirement). An exception is made for 
persons who meet the first but not the second requirement (see below). 
A second requirement is that unemployment is involuntary, the employee has to 
ensure that: 
he or she is not to blame for becoming unemployed; 
he or she is not to blame for unemployment or the continuation of 
unemployment. 
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Thirdly, there are some more formal and procedural requirements for getting a WW 
benefit. When one of the conditions is not met, the IBB may decide to reduce the 
benefit by a certain percentage or to refuse the benefit (permanently or temporarily). 
Since 1995, four kinds of WW benefits exist: 
the general benefit, which is 70 percent of previously earned wages; 
the extended benefit, also 70 percent of previously earned wages; 
the follow-up benefit, 70 percent of the minimum wage; 
the short benefit, 70 percent of the minimum wage. 
The short benefit was introduced in March 1995 and is meant for persons who do 
not meet the more strict work experience requirements which have become 
operational at the same time. Persons who do meet the week requirement (26 out of 
39 weeks) but do not meet the work experience requirement (four out of five years) are 
entitled to the short benefit (with a duration of six months). Before March 1995 
everybody who was employed in at least 26 weeks out of the last 52 weeks 
preceding unemployment was entitled to the general benefit. Table IV.2 summarizes 
the changes in the requirements regarding work experience which were introduced 
in March 1995. Firstly, the requirements are more strict. Secondly, the requirements 
for entitlement to the general benefit are the same as the requirements for the 
extended benefit since that time. Before that time the work experience requirement 
was not applicable for entitlement to the general benefit. 
Table IV.2 Changes in requirements in respect of work experience for entitlement to the various benefits 
General benefit 
Extended benefit 
Follow-up benefit 
Short benefit 
Before March 1995 
at least 26 weeks out of the last 52 weeks 
at least 26 weeks out of the last 52 weeks 
at least 3 years out of the last 5 years 
at least 26 weeks out of the last 52 weeks 
at least 3 years out of last 5 years 
Short benefit did not exist 
From March 1995 onwards 
at least 26 weeks out of the last 39 weeks 
at least 4 years out of the last 5 years 
at least 26 weeks out of the last 39 weeks 
at least 4 years out of the last 5 years 
at least 26 weeks out of the last 39 weeks 
at least 4 years out of last 5 years 
26 weeks out of the last 39 weeks 
The duration of the general benefit is six months. The benefit can be extended when 
the former employee has an employment record of at least five years. If that is not 
the case, no rights to extended benefit exist. The period of extended wage-related 
benefit is dependent on the length of the work experience, which is calculated as: 
the number of calendar years in which the employee received a salary for at 
least 52 days during the five calendar years before entering unemployment 
(which has to be at least four years), plus 
the number of calendar years between the year in which the former 
employee reached the age of 18 (including that calendar year) and the 
beginning of the above mentioned period of five calendar years. 
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Table Γν\3 shows the duration of extended unemployment benefit according to the 
length of calculated work experience. 
Table IV.3 Work experience and the continued duration of the wage-related benefit WW 
Work experience 
Less than 5 years 
5 - 9 years 
10 - 14 years 
15 - 19 years 
20 - 24 years 
25 - 29 years 
30 - 34 years 
35 - 39 years 
40 years and more 
Duration extended wage-related WW benefit 
0 
3 months 
6 months 
1 year 
1.5 year 
2 years 
2.5 years 
3.5 years 
4.5 years 
Source: College van Toezicht Sociale Verzekeringen (1995). 
When the period of extended wage-related benefit ends, the unemployed person 
receives a follow-up benefit. This is also applicable to those unemployed who meet 
the "four out of the last five years" requirement, but whose work experience is less 
than five years and therefore have no right to the extended wage-related benefit. The 
duration of the follow-up benefit is now two years (before March 1995: one year). If 
the former employee is at least 57.5 years old on the first day of unemployment the 
duration of the follow-up benefit is 3.5 years. The actual duration is limited to the 
first day of the month in which the benefit claimant reaches the age of 65. 
Prior to 1987, the benefit rate was already cut back from 80 to 70 percent of earlier 
gross wage (up to a certain maximum) . This applies to the wage-related benefit, 
which has a duration between six months and 5 years (see above). The follow-up 
benefit rate is 70 percent of the legal minimum wage or if this is less, 70 percent of 
the previous gross wage. This also applies to the shortened benefit. Before 1987, 
unemployed who accepted a job with a lower wage than the wage in the last job 
before unemployment could get a supplement (loonsuppletie) to their new wage. This 
possibility was abolished in 1987 when the new WW came into existence. 
57 The maximum is related to the so called maximum day-wage which since July 1992 is set at / 286,84. 
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Until 1995, the WW was implemented through the IBB's and the General 
Unemployment Fund ("Algemeen Werkloosheidsfond (AWf)")58. Since 1995, the AWf 
has lost its corporate rights and the fund is administered by the Temporary Institute 
for Co-ordination and Tuning ("Tijdelijk Instituut voor Coördinatie en Afstemming 
(TICA)"), which replaced the Foundation of IBB's. The implementation of the WW is 
the responsibility of the IBB's and the TICA. 
WW benefit can also be granted in the case of short-time working and in the event 
of bad weather ("natural disasters"). Companies which for reasons other than the 
normal risks of business, are confronted with a temporary reduction in activity may, 
subject to certain conditions, apply for dispensation from the ban on reducing the 
working time of employees. Workers then receive WW of up to 70 percent of their 
last earned wage for the hours not worked. In the event of bad weather, workers 
(mainly workers in the construction and road-construction sector) receive WW. WW 
is supplemented by employers up to 100 percent of last earned wages. This 
supplement is financed through a wage-related contribution by employers and 
employees . 
In 1987, the Supplementary Benefit Act ("Toeslagenwet (TW)") was introduced, with 
which it was intended to make a clear division between the loss of wages function 
(by means of the Employee Insurance Schemes) and the subsistence function (by 
means of Social Assistance and some of the General Insurance Schemes) in the 
system of social security. This act can be seen as a preceding provision for Social 
Assistance. Claimant is entitled to a TW-benefit if his amount of benefit on basis of 
the Employee Insurance Schemes (WW, ZW, WAO, AAW and WAMIL) is below the 
relevant social minimum level60. Before 1987, each individual Employee Insurance 
Scheme provided for supplements to the wage-related benefits. So, the TW is 
connected with the Employee Insurance Schemes and also implemented by the IBB's, 
but it is financed by public means. The TW contains, contrary to the Assistance 
Schemes no test of assets. 
The conditions for claiming benefits are: 
claimant is married or living together and receives an income in the form of 
benefits from employee insurance lower than the minimum wage. The 
supplementary TW-benefit is the difference between the minimum wage and 
the income, but no more than 30 percent of minimum wage; 
claimant is unmarried and supports a child younger than 18 years of age 
(entitled to Kinderbijslag) and receives an income under 90 percent of the 
minimum wage. The TW-benefit is equal to the difference between 90 
percent of minimum wage and the income, up to a maximum of 27 percent 
of the minimum wage; 
58 In the financing of the WW a distinction is still made between the first eight weeks (thirteen weeks from 
January 1st 1996) of unemployment (the waiting allowance funds) and the period thereafter (AWf). The 
premium contributions for the waiting allowance funds are set by the IBB's, and those for the AWf by 
the TICA. The premium for the waiting allowance funds differs per sector, whereas the premium for the 
AWf is the same for all sectors and branches. 
59 In the construction sector this is called the Frost Leave (Vorstverlet). 
60 To provide for the relevant social minimum not only the TW but also the IOAW and the IOAZ are 
introduced. 
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claimant is single and receives an income under 70 percent of the minimum 
wage. The TW-allowance is equal to 70 percent of minimum wage minus the 
income, with a maximum of 21 percent of the minimum wage. 
In all three cases the TW-benefit cannot be more than the difference between the 
employee benefit and the former earned wage. The income is calculated by adding 
the total amount of family income out of labour and/or business. A relatively low 
income out of labour (maximum 15 percent of the minimum wage) does not count in 
the calculation for a period of two years. If the benefit on basis of the Employee 
Insurance Schemes has been granted with a sanction, the applicable amount of 
benefit based on the TW will be calculated as if there has been no sanction. 
Furthermore, some negative conditions exist which we will not discuss here. 
The (N)ABW, IOAW and IOAZ 
When an unemployed person (no longer) has a right to WW-benefit he or she is 
entitled to benefit based on the New Social Assistance Act (NABW). Up to 1995, a 
difference was made between RWW and ABW benefits (see also section II. 1.2, 
municipalities). RWW was meant for those who were dependent on a job in the 
labour market. Especially school-leavers and those not or no longer entitled to WW 
benefit belonged to this category. RWW claimants were obliged to search for a job, 
ABW claimants were not. ABW benefits were mainly paid to single-parent families, 
elderly without a full General Retirement Benefit (AOW) and disabled without 
claims on the General Disablement Benefits Act (AAW). Γη 1996 there is no longer a 
difference between RWW and ABW: all assistance benefit claimants, except single-
parents with children up to 5 years, have to accept paid work when offered. RWW 
no longer exists. As said in an earlier section, municipalities implement the NABW. 
The NABW has the same principle grounds as the "old" ABW. First of all, the 
provision of a minimum subsistence level is maintained. Secondly, the 
complementary character with respect to preceding provisions (like the Employees 
Insurance Schemes and the General Insurance Schemes) is also maintained. Finally, 
the NABW like the ABW is based on the responsibility of the claimants and the 
possibility to take account of the individual circumstances of claimants (Van 
Woerden^ 1995). 
However, there are some main differences between the ABW and the NABW. Firstly, 
the ABW focused on the provision of an income at minimum subsistence level to 
persons without sufficient means of income. In the NABW the central attention is 
shifted to the outflow of benefit claimants to (regular) jobs. The abolition of the 
RWW must be seen in this context. Municipalities have to play an active role in 
promoting the outflow of benefit claimants. The municipalities have to make 
individual "route-plans" in order to support the possibilities for integration in the 
labour process. Municipalities are obliged to work together with the PES in this 
respect. The concept of "suitable labour" will be adjusted. 
Secondly, the system of basic standards (normen) is much simpler in the NABW than 
in the ABW. Γη the ABW there were a large number of basic standards. The NABW 
has three basic standards for persons which are 21 or older. The national basic 
standard for married couples and couples living together remains at 100 percent of 
the net minimum wage. The standard for singles is 50 percent and for single-parent 
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families 70 percent of the basic standard for couples. In case the last two standards 
are not sufficient, the municipalities may grant supplementary benefits to a 
maximum of 20 percent. Table IV.4 shows the differences in national standards 
between the old ABW and the NABW. 
Table IV.4 Differences between the ABW and the NABW in national basic standards for people who are 23 years 
and older 
Type of Household 
(Un)married couple 
Single-parent family 
Single, sharing a house with others 
>= 23 years 
22 years 
21 years 
Single, not sharing a house with others 
>= 23 years 
22 years 
21 years 
National basic 
standard ABWa' 
100% 
90% 
60% 
50% 
50% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
National basic 
standard NABWa) 
100% 
70% 
50% 
50% 
50% 
50% 
50% 
50% 
Maximum with 
supplement3 ' 
100% 
90% 
70% 
70% 
70% 
70% 
70% 
70% 
a) As percentage of the net minimum wage. 
The specific basic standards for people sharing a house with others, for 21 and 22 
years old, for school-leavers up to 27 years and for those living at home or living 
away from home are no longer valid in the NABW. But municipalities have to 
incorporate the possibilities for sharing the necessary subsistence costs (mainly the 
costs for housing) in their decisions on the hight of the supplementary benefits. For 
youngsters up to 20 there are lower standards which are no longer linked with the 
youth minimum wage but with the level of the Children's Allowance ("Kinderbijslag 
via de Algemene Kinderbijslag Wet (AKW)"). With this change a relation is made with 
the parental duty of maintenance. Exceptions are made for persons up to 20 years 
old, who are single-parents or married and have one or more children. A higher 
basic standard is applicable to these persons. The reason is that parental duty of 
maintenance does not extend to grandchildren. 
Thirdly, the NABW has broadened the possibilities for checking the applicant's 
rights to benefit and fighting benefit fraud. A central theme is a more thorough 
selection at the application stage. But also re-investigations have to be directed more 
at verification and validation through seeking and checking information, if possible 
through the exchange of information with other institutions. 
So far, we discussed some major changes in the National Assistance Act (the former 
ABW and NABW) including (the standards which determine) the level of benefit. 
But how is entitlement and duration of the benefit regulated? These points will be 
treated now. All Dutch residents, including foreigners with a valid residence permit 
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and "tolerated" foreigners ("gedoogden"), and who do not have sufficient means of 
income to support themselves, have the right to social assistance provided by the 
government on the basis of the NABW. Some additional conditions for self-
employed are incorporated in the Social Assistance Act. Persons are entitled to 
general assistance benefits when the income is below the standard basic norm and 
the property to be considered is zero. So, the level of (non-assistance) income and 
assets affects the applicable amount of benefit. Until a few years ago, income out of 
labour was partially (25 percent of the net amount of labour income) exempted from 
means-testing. This was seen as a stimulus for claimants to accept work. However, 
claimants could use this rule only for a period of two years; under special 
circumstances this period could be extended. Secondly, the exempted amount could 
never exceed 15 percent of the applicable amount of benefit. The partial exemption 
of labour income was rejected some years ago, which means that since that time the 
full amount of labour income is deducted from the applicable amount of benefit. For 
couples, either married or unmarried and for single-parent families an amount of 
Dfl 17,200 is free of means-testing. For singles the amount is Dfl 8,600. If the means 
exceed the threshold, they must be used to meet the cost of living. For means in the 
form of an own house there are some special conditions. Firstly, there is an extra 
threshold: Dfl 15,000 plus an amount of 50 percent of the rest of the means in the 
form of an own house. The total threshold can not be more than Dfl 77,200 for 
couples and single-parents and Dfl 68,600 for singles. The duration of ABW benefit is 
unlimited as long as the claimant has insufficient means to support himself. If 
claimant fails to meet some specific requirements the benefit can be granted with a 
sanction. 
As well as general assistance, there is also special social assistance ("Bijzondere 
Bijstand"). This assistance is meant for special subsistence costs not covered by the 
general benefit (including the eventual supplement). Not only general benefit 
claimants are entitled to special social assistance but also other persons with low 
income. In principle, a claimant has to pay an own contribution, with a maximum of 
Dfl 183 per year. 
The IOAW and IOAZ are both introduced after the system revision of 1987. The idea 
was that it is not reasonable to confront elderly unemployed or former self-employed 
with the strict regulations involved in means-testing for the ABW. The IOAW and 
IOAZ do not have a means-test and their income limit is smaller than the ABW's. In 
that respect the IOAW and IOAZ are more favourable than the ABW and otherwise 
they are almost similar to the ABW. The IOAW is granted, under certain conditions, 
to unemployed persons who have used up their rights to WW benefit, namely: 
Unemployed who were at least 50 and not older than 57.5 years of age at 
the start of their unemployment. Unemployed who were older than 57.5 at 
the beginning of unemployment are entitled to the special follow-up WW 
benefit (flat rate, 70 percent of the minimum wage). 
Persons who became unemployed after the age of 57.5 but who are not 
entitled to the special follow-up WW benefit; 
Partially disabled (less than 80 percent) with an AAW/WAO benefit who 
cannot claim WW benefit (for the part they are able to work). 
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To qualify for IOAZ benefit a claimant must have ended a concern, business, trade 
or profession and must have reached a certain age or must be partially disabled. The 
conditions are: 
Previously self-employed; aged between 55 and 65 years; and total annual 
income less than Dfl 37,900. There are some extra conditions, for example 
that there must have been earned an income under the subsistence level in 
the former three years and that claimant must have worked as an employee 
or a self-employed person in the former 7 years. 
Partially disabled (less than 80 percent); younger than 65 years; business 
ended due to; a minimum period of three years self-employment in the 
Netherlands. 
Both the IOAW and the IOAZ are subject to a substraction of income out of labour 
or out of previous labour (pensions, early retirement pensions, disablement benefits, 
etc.). A certain percentage of the income out of labour is exempt from substraction. 
The most important difference between IOAW and IOAZ is that the IOAZ includes a 
means-test. If the property is more than Dfl 195,000, 5 percent of this amount will be 
considered as income that will be subtracted from the applicable amount of IOAZ 
benefit. Property is calculated according to the method of the Wealth Tax. 
Waiting allowance f or civil servants 
Civil servants and employees who are civil servants in the sense of the General Civil 
Pension Fund ("Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds (ABP)") are not insured against 
unemployment by the Unemployment Act, but have their own scheme. This scheme 
is called the waiting allowance ("Wachtgeld"). The waiting allowance is far more 
generous than WW benefits, as regards the duration of entitlement and the level of 
the allowance. However, the government has decided to subsume the civil servants 
under the Employee Insurance Schemes, in order to make the labour terms of civil 
servants more equal to those in the private sector. 
IV.1.2 Figures on unemployment benefits 
The number of benefit years for the various unemployment benefit schemes is 
shown in table IV.5. A number of remarks must be made: 
1. Up to and including 1995, ABW-benefit claimants did not have to search for 
a job. For this reason the ABW is excluded from the table. In contrast to the 
WW and RWW the development in the number of ABW-benefits hardly 
reflects the labour market situation. The number of benefit years for the 
ABW has been rather constant since 1985 (between 180,000 and 190,000 
benefit years). Both points indicate that ABW is not directly related to 
unemployment (which fluctuated in the period concerned). 
2. The number of TW-benefit years are excluded because TW-benefits are 
supplementary to AAW/WAO-, WW- and ZW-benefits. Including them 
would result in double counting. 
3. With respect to the waiting allowance for unemployed civil servants there 
are no consistent figures available on the number of benefit years. According 
to the CTSV (1995), in 1993 and 1994 about 45,000 unemployed former civil 
servants received a waiting allowance. 
97 
The influx in the WW has increased considerably since 1991 up to more than 600,000 
persons in 1994. The influx rate (the number of new claimants as percentage of the 
number of insured full-time working years) has not been so high since 1958, but this 
is at least partly caused by the growing number of part-time workers. But even 
when we look at the number of benefit years during the period 1992 - 1994, both 
absolutely and as a percentage of the number of insured years (the WW rate), we 
have to conclude that claims on WW have not previously been that high. Up to 1990, 
the WW rate was never higher than 4.4 percent (in 1988). However, WWV benefits 
should be added to WW benefits for a clear comparison in time. If we do this we see 
that the number of benefit years WW and WWV in 1982 and 1983 was higher (over 
350,000) than in 1994. The number of WW-benefit years because of short-time 
working and bad weather has been rather small since 1987 (between 2 and 6 
thousand benefit years). The number of benefit years RWW has declined between 
1986 and 1992. The number of IOAW- en IOAZ-benefits is negligible compared to 
the number of WW-, WWV- and RWW-benefits. The total number of unemployment 
benefit years rose strongly between 1980 and 1983. In 1985 a decrease set in, which 
lasted up to 1991. After 1992 the number of benefit years has increased rapidly. 
Table IV.5 Number of benefit years unemployment (in thousands, 1980 - 1994)a' 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Kind of benefit 
WW (because of dismissal) 
Number 
65 
101 
112 
112 
93 
77 
68 
129 
172 
173 
163 
175 
208 
269 
332 
WW- rate (%)b) 
1.8 
2.8 
3.3 
3.5 
2.9 
2.3 
1.9 
3.4 
4.4 
4.2 
3.8 
3.9 
4.6 
5.9 
7.2 
WW (short time 
working and bad 
weather) 
6 
11 
11 
9 
5 
6 
5 
15 
3 
2 
2 
6 
3 
3 
5 
wwv 
86 
139 
219 
245 
213 
174 
148 
64 
16 
RWW 
89 
118 
175 
260 
358 
397 
407 
399 
394 
386 
355 
325 
308 
308 
320 
IOAW 
13 
16 
18 
18 
17 
17 
18 
19 
IOAZ 
1 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
Total 
246 
369 
517 
626 
669 
654 
628 
620 
602 
581 
541 
526 
539 
601 
680 
a) Waiting allowance for unemployed civil servants not included. 
b) Percentage of the total number of insured full-time working years. 
Source: College van Toezicht Sociale Verzekeringen, 1995 and Ministry of SZW, 1995. 
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Table IV.6 shows the total amount of expenditure on unemployment benefits. TW-
benefits and waiting allowances for unemployed former civil servants are included 
in the table. Between 1980 and 1994 total expenditure rose by over 200 percent in 
total. The sharpest rise took place between 1980 and 1983, when expenditure rose 
from Dfl 6.5 billion to Dfl 16.5 billion. Between 1984 and 1990 the expenditure 
decreased slightly. After 1990 there has been strong growth. 
Table IV.6 Expenditures on unemployment benefits (in million Dutch guilders, 1980 - 1995)a) 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Kind of benefit 
WWb l 
2,347 
3,782 
4,273 
3,976 
3,205 
2,897 
2,830 
4,484 
4,593 
4,534 
4,708 
5,734 
6,701 
8,708 
10,955 
TW 
434 
553 
555 
563 
566 
602 
610 
664 
wwv 
2,116 
3,329 
5,843 
7,231 
6,263 
4,713 
3,957 
1,669 
363 
74 
105 
RWW 
1,240 
1,668 
2,592 
4,334 
6,128 
7,036 
7,319 
7,261 
7,657 
7,201 
6,895 
6,573 
6,576 
6,542 
6,886 
IOAW 
24 
312 
325 
381 
381 
385 
385 
410 
425 
IOAZ 
21 
48 
63 
76 
92 
98 
101 
Waiting 
allowance civil 
servants0 ' 
850 
870 
840 
920 
922 
923 
971 
1,285 
1,454 
1,905 
2,026 
2,033 
2,172 
2,376 
2,287 
Total 
Amount 
6,553 
9,649 
13,548 
16,461 
16,518 
15,569 
15,101 
15,445 
14,966 
14,698 
14,741 
15,367 
16,528 
18,744 
21,318 
% GDP0 ' 
1.92 
2.69 
3.63 
4.25 
4.07 
3.66 
3.45 
3.50 
3.27 
3.03 
2.85 
2.83 
2.92 
3.24 
3.50 
a) Including costs for administration, social insurance premiums and wage taxes. 
b) Including WW benefits because of bad weather and WW benefits because of short-time working. 
c) Including expenditures on early retirement of civil servants. 
d) Gross domestic product, market prices (in current prices). 
Source: CBS, National Accounts (Ministry of SZW, Sociale Nota 1996). 
IV.1.3 Unemployment component in the sickness and disability insurances 
Until 1996, three "work incapacity" insurance schemes existed. The Sickness 
Insurance Act ("Ziektewet (ZW)") was abolished in March 1996. The ZW was a 
compulsorily insurance for employees against temporary work incapacity because of 
sickness, ailment or disability. The maximum duration of the benefit was one year. 
From 1994 on, no sickness benefit was paid during the first six weeks of illness. The 
employer was obliged to pay the sick employee 70 percent of the wage during the 
first six weeks (two weeks for small firms). Now that the ZW has been abolished, 
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the employers can take the risk of sickness or insure against sickness of employees 
through private insurances. 
Two insurances against long-term incapacity still exist. The first is the General 
Disability Insurance Act ("Algemene Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet (AAW)") introduced in 
1976. The AAW is a compulsory General Insurance Scheme and insures persons 
younger than 65 years who live in the Netherlands against the financial 
consequences of long-term disability. The amount of AAW benefit is related to the 
degree of incapacity to work and is based on a fixed amount, namely the for the 
beneficiary applicable minimum wage. The benefit ends when claimant is no longer 
(at least 25 percent) incapacitated or reaches the age of 65 years. For employees a 
supplementary arrangement exists as well, namely the Disability Insurance Act ("Wet 
op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering (WAO)"). The benefit is calculated on the basis 
of a percentage of the claimant's last earnings, with a ceiling. The percentage 
depends on the degree of incapacity. A number of reforms have been introduced in 
the AAW and WAO. We only mention four major changes which were made to 
reduce the number of benefits: 
1. Till 1993, persons unable to earn the same as a comparable healthy person 
(in terms of education and work experience) due to illness or incapacity 
were said to be partially or fully disabled. The definition of disability 
changed in 1993. From then on, it must first of all be possible to show that 
the cause for disability is on medical grounds. Disability has to be a direct 
cause of illness or incapacity. Secondly, in determining the degree of 
disability the former education and the former occupation of the person 
involved is no longer relevant. In practice this results in more cases of 
partial disability than in the old situation and even in a total loss of benefit. 
Persons receiving a disability benefit before August 1993 and younger than 
50 years of age, are to be re-examined on the basis of the new criterion in 
the period 1994 - 1997. 
2. The benefit rates, which are linked to the degree of incapacity, were reduced 
in 1985 (WAO) and 1987 (WAO and AAW). Persons who are fully disabled 
(at least 80 percent) now receive a benefit of 70 percent of minimum wage 
(AAW) or last earned income (WAO). These rates were 80 percent before 
1985. The benefit rates for the partial disabled are reduced by the same 
fraction. 
3. For those who became (partially) disabled after January 1993 the duration of 
wage-related WAO benefit is calculated on the basis of age. After the first 
period of benefit, the claimant receives a follow-up benefit based on a 
percentage of the minimum wage plus a supplement, depending on age and 
former salary. These rules apply to persons of 33 years and older. Younger 
persons are not entitled to the wage-related benefit, they only receive the 
follow-up benefit. 
4. From August 1993 onwards benefits are granted for a maximum period of 
five years. After this period the IBB has to re-examine benefit entitlement on 
the basis of a new application. In the near future this period will be three 
years. 
We will now turn to a discussion of the unemployment component in the WAO and 
AAW. We know that in the past a substantial number of the WAO beneficiaries left 
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the labour process on economic grounds. In other words: their job became redundant 
or the employer wanted to replace them with younger workers. The WAO in that 
case was more attractive than the WW. Some studies have shown that 30 to 50 
percent of the disability benefits concern the financing of hidden unemployment. At 
the beginning of the eighties hidden unemployment was estimated at one third of 
the WAO benefits (Van den Bosch and Petersen, 1980). In the early nineties the level 
of hidden unemployment in the AAW/WAO was still high (Aarts and De Jong, 
1992). The reforms in 1993 as regards the definition of disability, the duration of 
wage-related benefit and the level of benefit (it became less easy to get a WAO-
benefit and the WAO-benefit became less attractive) will most probably have led to a 
reduction of hidden unemployment. This will especially be true for the re-examined 
groups and the new inflow into the AAW/WAO. 
IV.1.4 Early retirement 
The statutory retirement age in the Netherlands is 65. The retirement state pension 
via the AOW is mostly supplemented by sectoral or company pensions (provided in 
sectoral or company collective agreements). This may, dependent on the number of 
years of service, bring the total pension up to maximum 70 percent of earnings 
during the year preceding retirement. 
Early retirement may be provided in sectoral or company collective agreements. 
There are provisions for both full-time and part-time early retirement. The financing 
of the early retirement schemes is shared by employers and employees. They pay a 
certain percentage of wages each month or each year. 
IV.2 Active measures 
IV.2.1 Introduction 
We have discussed passive measures in the previous section. In this section we will 
give an outline of (the wide range of) active labour market measures61. In section 
IV.2.3 we will describe the active measures in general terms and give an indication 
of their scope. Furthermore, we will take a look at the effectiveness of the various 
active measures. Both the gross and the net effectiveness of the measures will, as far 
as possible, be taken into account. This section is primarily concerned with those 
active measures for which the Public Employment Service (PES) is responsible. In 
section IV.2.4 we will pay some attention to recent developments, which 
demonstrate that the responsibility for active measures is shifting to other 
organisations, such as the municipalities/councils. But first we will make some 
general remarks about the PES (IV.2.2). 
61 This overview is primarily based on the evaluation of the Employment Service Act (de Koning et al, 
1995), unless otherwise mentioned. 
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IV.2.2 The role of the PES 
The objectives and tasks of the PES are described in the Employment Service Act 
("Arbeidsvoorzieningswet") oí 1990. The main objective of the PES is to promote an 
efficient and even balance in the supply and demand of workers on the labour 
market. In order to achieve this objective, the following tasks must be performed: 
the registration of job-seekers and vacancies notified by employers; 
the collection and provision of labour-market information; 
the provision of information or advice, such as professional guidance; 
the placement of job-seekers; 
the provision of (vocational) training and the encouragement of other 
organisations' activities in this field; 
contributing to the development of policy regarding the apprenticeship-
system. 
The structure of the PES (with CBA and RBA's) was already discussed in chapter 
two. The reforms of 1990, i.e. the new legal structure, had three central themes: tri-
partition, decentralization and demonopolisation62. Apart from that, the PES was 
attributed a coordinating and stimulating role concerning labour market policy as 
well as the implementation of active labour market measures. The coordination and 
stimulation of the activities of organisations (including the PES itself) on the 
(regional) labour market was seen as an important part of its task. The evaluation of 
the Employment Service Act in 1995 led to a proposed revision of the act, in order to 
improve the workings of the PES63. Most important changes are: 
the new act explicitly states that the PES has to concentrate on the hard-to-
place unemployed; 
the cooperation between the PES, the municipal social services and the 
industrial insurance boards is to be increasingly stimulated; 
changes in the administrative and financial structure; 
a reduction of the number of regions (from 28 to 18). 
One could question whether the PES has the ability to improve the functioning of 
the labour market. The actual labour market situation is characterised by enormous 
unemployment and a low number of vacancies. This implies that the powers of the 
PES are limited since their measures can only influence employment to a small 
extent. What the PES can do in the short-term is to fill the existing vacancies to the 
best of their ability and equalize the chances for different groups on the labour 
market as far as possible. As regards the first point, little can be achieved at the 
moment: vacancies which are difficult to fill are a marginal phenomenon. But there 
are no equal chances on the labour market. It is composed mainly of disadvantaged, 
weak groups (non-natives, lower-educated, older people and partially disabled) who 
have difficulty finding a job. Not only do these groups exhibit high and persistent 
unemployment rates (relatively high percentage of long-term unemployed) but also a 
low participation rate, which can be seen as an indication of hidden unemployment. 
So, policy has apparently had insufficient effect on the equalization of chances thus 
far. 
62 The permit policy regarding placement activities and temporary work activities by third parries is also 
covered by the act. 
63 The amended Act is expected to be adopted in 1996. 
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The most significant labour market problem is the shortage of jobs and the PES is 
not equipped to tackle this problem. The PES does not have the instruments to 
create sufficient jobs for the unemployed. Job growth (in the private sector) is 
primarily stimulated by general economic policy. But job growth, even on a large 
scale, will still leave a number of people unemployed. Furthermore, unemployment 
remains unequally distributed over the various groups, so the redistribution of 
chances is still extremely relevant. Therefore, the PES should help disadvantaged 
groups to find (regular) employment through the use of a range of measures. If one 
can reduce long-term unemployment through a redistribution of chances and 
improve the chances of disadvantaged groups, then the problem of unemployment 
can be diminished significantly. That still leaves the question whether equalization of 
chances can be achieved through the instruments of the PES. These instruments will 
be discussed in the following section. 
IV.2.3 Measures of the PES 
We can distinguish five types of active measures: 
information and advice; 
placement; 
training; 
placement subsidies; 
work experience. 
Within each category a number of different measures exist. Appendix Β gives an 
extensive outline of the measures. The list is limited to measures which were in 
effect in 1995 . We will first make some general remarks. 
Some measures are only aimed to a small extent at the primary function of the PES. 
They are of a somewhat varying character. For example, the information and advice 
function of the PES is not primarily aimed at the placement of job seekers and the 
filling of vacancies but also concerns questions regarding social security and social 
legislation. The treatment of applications for dismissals and the granting of work 
permits to foreign workers - both legal tasks of the PES - are also of a different 
character. The implementation of the aid programme of the European Social Fund 
(ESF) also occupies a special place. The ESF means are partly used for activities 
implemented by the PES. Generally, existing measures are (partly) financed through 
the ESF, that is to say measures mentioned elsewhere in the schedule. 
Within the range of measures, three developments have taken place in the early 
nineties. First, a shift took place from curative to preventive policy. The policy with 
respect to youngsters (Active Labour Market Policy for the Young) is almost entirely 
aimed at prevention. Furthermore, the placement subsidies are increasingly 
channelled towards the prevention of long-term unemployment. The second 
64 Some measures still exist, though the corresponding financial means have diminished (General Training 
Scheme, General Employment Scheme). The Contribution Scheme for the Apprenticeships System (BVL) 
and the Contribution Scheme for Sectoral Training (BBS) were in 1995 combined in the General Scheme 
for Sectoral Training (KBS). Since 1996 the scheme for the apprenticeships system does not exist any 
more. Employers can get a reduction of taxes for apprentices. 
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development is the régionalisation of the measures. The RBA's can give their own 
interpretation to national measures; RBA's may, with regard to certain measures and 
within certain boundaries, decide on the target groups and the level of subsidies. 
Apart from that, RBA's have used the (legal) possibility to develop their own 
regional measures. One of the reasons is that the national measures offered 
insufficient possibilities to tackle the specific regional labour market problems. Some 
regional measures replace national placement subsidies, which generally led to a 
further relaxation of the criteria for application. Thirdly, RBA's seem to be 
increasingly interested in job creation. Some RBA's developed regional measures 
aimed at job creation but little is known about the results. The third development is 
the shift from specific policy (training, placement subsidies, work experience) 
towards (direct) placement. The decrease in the role of specific policy in the total 
expenditure of the PES and the increase in the number of advisors both point in that 
direction. 
IV.2.3.1 Reach 
In this section we will discuss the reach of the five types of active measures. The 
reach gives the number and the composition of the applications of instruments. To 
get an idea, appendix C presents the number of applications for training, placement 
and work experience measures^ for the period 1985 - 1993/1994. More recent reliable 
information is not available6D.Reach can be related both to job-seekers and to 
vacancies. Some preliminary remarks have to be made: 
some measures, such as placement subsidies and work experience measures, 
are primarily concerned with the supply side and will be related only to job-
seekers; 
as regards legal measures, we will also pay attention to the representation of 
groups like women, elderly, lower educated, ethnic minorities and long-term 
unemployed. Only women, ethnic minorities and long-term unemployed are 
official target groups of the PES. We added lower educated and elderly 
because of their weak labour market position (see chapter 1); 
one has to distinguish between the formal target group of a specific measure 
and the group of people actually requiring application of the measure. 
Training measures especially, have a broad target group. Each unemployed 
person may follow training at the Vocational Training Centres for example, 
which does not always mean that this is automatically useful in each case. 
Measures to deal with long-term unemployment had a limited target group 
at first, but even these target groups have been extended now it is also 
possible to apply these measures to persons threatened with long-term 
unemployment. 
General 
We will first give an indication of the use of the PES by employers and job-seekers 
in general (see table IV.7). In 1994 about 422 thousand job-seekers used the PES, 
which is almost half of the total number of job-seekers (scope of the PES on the 
65 Since 1991, the providence of information by the PES on the number of applications has worsened. Most 
RBA's only can give an incomplete picture. So for the most recent years there is no complete (reliable) 
overview of the number of applications of instruments. 
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supply side). Since 1992, job-seekers' use of the PES has increased significantly. 
Employers use the PES as a recruitment channel for about 20 percent of all 
vacancies. This percentage is more or less stable. The service to employers is much 
broader, but information on other aspects is not available. 
Table IV.7 Total service to job-seekers and employers 
Year 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Job seekers 
Number of users 
(thousands) 
291 
362 
422 
use of PES 
In % of all job-
seekers 
33 
41 
46 
Employers' use of PES as a 
Number of vacancies for 
which the PES is used as a 
recruitment channel 
(thousands) 
140 
163 
190 
155 
141 
121 
115 
recruitment channel 
In % of all 
vacancies 
19 
21 
21 
19 
18 
20 
22 
Sources: 
LBA, Hoe zoeken werkzoekenden, several years. 
LBA, Hoe werven bedrijven, several years. 
Information and advice 
According to LBA research ("Hoe zoeken werkzoekenden"), 78,000 job- seekers received 
professional or educational advice from the PES in 1994. The numbers were 
somewhat lower in previous years (1992: 74,000; 1993: 68,000). The small percentage 
of ethnic minorities is remarkable; 5 percent of advice was given to ethnic minorities 
whilst they make up more than 20 percent of the jobless. 
Placement 
Recent information about placement is scarce. Some figures are available for direct 
placement and route-placement (aimed at specific target groups). For other 
placement measures, like job papers, vacancy banks and application banks 
information is very rare. Direct placement means referring registered job seekers to 
registered vacancies. The number of registered vacancies to which at least one job 
seeker is referred, gives an indication of the effectiveness on the demand side of 
direct placement. According to information from the RBA's this number increased 
from about 70 percent in 1991 to over 80 percent in 1994. The number of registered 
job seekers referred to a vacancy at least once is unknown; only the total number of 
references is available. The average number of references per registered job seeker 
was 0.4 to 0.5 in the period 1992 - 1994. "Hoe Werven Bedrijven" supplies information 
on the number of applications to companies through the placement activities of the 
PES. This number was estimated at 323,000 in 1988, diminished to 181,000 in 1991 
and went up again to 341,000 in 1993. 
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Route-placement, often a cooperation between the PES and the municipal social 
service, is the intensive guidance of unemployed job-seekers with a "long distance to 
the labour market". The ultimate aim is to place these unemployed in a job through 
a combination of activities (which are usually documented in an action plan). The 
reorientation interviews (HOG) were the most well known form of route-placement. 
Evaluation studies (Hoffius, 1989; Hoffius and Langeveld, 1990; Schoorl et al, 1992) 
show that 30 thousand reorientation interviews were held with long-term 
unemployed in 1988 (that is equal to 80 percent of those called up). The interviews 
led to action plans for 24 thousand long-term unemployed, which equals 80 percent 
of the interviewed. For elderly and very long-term unemployed (five years or longer 
unemployed) this percentage was somewhat lower. According to the Rapportage 
Arbeidsmarkt 1991 in 1990 around 42 thousand interviews were held, which resulted 
in 28 thousand action plans. The reorientation interviews continued until the end of 
1991. 
After that, forms of route-placement still existed (several initiatives were developed 
at regional level) but a systematic approach to the group of very long-term 
unemployed no longer took place. Moreover, there seems to have been a shift from 
the very long-term unemployed (the HOG concerned those who were unemployed 
three years or longer) to lesser long-term unemployed and persons who are expected 
to become long-term unemployed without intensive guidance. The Active Labour 
Market Policy for the Young (AAJ) belongs to this development. This scheme was 
started in 1992 to prevent long-term youth unemployment. The PES was to give 
intensive guidance to young people who were unable to enter a job or education on 
their own (first phase). The activities of the PES should lead to placement (in a job or 
education) within six months or ultimately within one year of being registered. 
Should this not succeed, the young unemployed is referred to JWG (Guaranteed-Jobs-
for-the-Youth-scheme) to gain work experience. When the youngsters have gained 
sufficient experience, the PES has to try to place them in a regular job. 
The most recent evaluation of the AAJ (De Koning et al, 1994) indicates that only 23 
percent of the AAJ target group claims to have received information from the PES 
about vacancies, and 22 percent explicitly claims to have received no help from the 
PES. But we have to keep in mind that job-seekers are inclined to underestimate the 
role of the PES as regards job-searching. A recent evaluation of the JWG also looked 
at the first phase of the AAJ (Olieman et al, 1996). The AAJ target group was offered 
0.7 jobs by the PES on average (in the first phase). A quarter of the target group 
finds that the help of the PES was insufficient and nearly 40 percent gives the 
qualification "moderate". So, nearly two-thirds of the target group is not satisfied 
with the role of the PES. 
Training 
The schedule in appendix Β presents a great variety of training instruments. Most of 
these measures are exclusively or mainly aimed at the unemployed. Only the General 
Training Scheme (KRS) has a variation for employed. In 1990 one out of five KRS-
applicants was employed (de Koning en van Nes, 1990). The other measure for 
employed, the Contribution Scheme Apprenticeship System (BVL), a subsidy scheme for 
the practical component of the apprenticeship system, is implemented outside the 
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PES66. The Primary Vocational Adult Education (PBVE) was a cooperation between 
the PES and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. This training instrument 
was abandoned at national level, but some RBA's have continued the measure, 
sometimes in a changed form. 
The number of applications for training measures increased considerably in the 
period 1985 - 1991 (from almost 80,000 in 1985 to nearly 170,000 in 1991). After 1991, 
a stabilisation set in and in 1993 the number of applications diminished to 160,000. 
In 1994 and 1995 the effectiveness of training measures decreased further, at least 
partly as a consequence of the significant cuts in the PES' budget. We estimate the 
total number of applications in 1994 at about 130,000 and in 1995 at 120,000. The 
number of KRS-applications in particular, decreased in 1994 and 1995. Up to 1993 
the rate of orientation and primary vocational training in the total number of 
applications increased. 
The percentage of groups represented varies significantly according to the training 
measures (see table IV.8). Women are well represented except in the technical CV. 
Immigrants are over-represented in the CBB (which was actually set up for 
immigrants); their representation in clerical CV is very low. The poorly educated 
generally have a low representation in all training programmes. Long-term 
unemployed are represented in proportion. 
Table IV.8 Relative representation of target groups in training measures (share in training divided by the share in 
unemployment (* 100)) 
Women 
Migrants 
Elderly 
Low educated 
Long-term 
unemployed (> 1 
year) 
CVa> 
Technical 
34 
117 
81 
116 
95 
cva' 
Clerical 
142 
41 
109 
19 
112 
CBBb) 
97 
236 
81 
95 
117 
W S C ) 
239 
82 
231 
32 
117 
PBVEd) 
159 
137 
106 
61 
90 
KRSe) 
133 
89 
163 
21 
92 
Other0 
134 
235 
132 
54 
76 
a) Vocational Training Centre. 
b) Centre for vocational orientation and preparation. 
c) Women's vocational school. 
d) Primary Vocational Adult Education. 
e) General Training Scheme. 
f) Other training instruments. 
Source: Nederlands Economic Institute, secondary analysis of evaluation of training measures. 
66 In 1996 this subsidy scheme is taken away from the PES. Employers now can get a reduction in wage 
taxes for apprenticeships. 
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Placement subsidies 
The General Employment Scheme regular jobs (KRA-RAP) offers employers a one-time 
subsidy when they hire a long-term unemployed person. Under certain conditions 
the employer can be temporarily exempted from part of the social contributions . 
The involvement of the PES goes no further than some administrative actions. The 
exemption from social contributions is not funded out of PES-budget. Besides the 
KRA-RAP, there is a work experience variant of the KRA, the KRA-WEP (see 
appendix Β under work experience). The one-time subsidy for the KRA-WEP is 
much higher than for the KRA-RAP, but the job has to be additional for the period 
of one year. The reason we mention this work experience measure now is that the 
differences between the two measures are marginal; the two have much in common. 
The KRA was introduced in 1990, although its predecessor (MLW) had been active 
since 1986. In the period 1986 - 1990 the number of applications of the KRA (MLW) 
increased. In 1990 a total of almost 19,000 applications were realised. From 1991 on 
the trend is lower. From that time the PES gives the KRA less priority because of it's 
high labour intensity. According to the PES the use of other instruments (direct 
placement) leads to a greater number of placements with the same manpower. So, 
the number of applications was just over 10,000 in 1994, which may be partly the 
result of the cuts on the PES' budget. The decline in the number of applications in 
combination with the broadening of the target group (see below) has resulted in a 
sharp decline in the percentage of the target group that is reached, from 12 percent 
in 1990 to 5 percent in 1993. 
With regard to the share of the different target groups, we can mention the 
following. The ratio of women has increased strongly, from 25 percent in 1987 to 50 
percent in 1993. The opposite happened for the lower educated. Their number has 
decreased between 1987 and 1991 from 23 to 11 percent. The number of short-term 
unemployed has expanded. This can largely be attributed to the broadening of the 
target group. At first persons had to be unemployed for at least 3 years to qualify. 
Later this was brought back to 2 years, for migrants even to 1 year. The 
flexibilisation of the KRA in 1993 resulted in a minimum unemployment duration of 
a half year to qualify; RBA's may determine that a higher minimum duration is 
required in their region. In 1988 about 17 percent of applications concerned persons 
unemployed for less than 2 years; in 1993, 15 percent had been unemployed for less 
than one year. The proportion of ethnic minorities is increasing (8 percent in 1989 
and 13 percent in 1993). We must note however that the concept of "ethnic 
minorities" has been widened a few years ago. 
Subsidised temporary work (KRU, previous VU and JOB) has been decreasing since the 
late eighties. We can mention some possible reasons. Many RBA's ascribe a low 
effectivity to subsidised temporary work. This is partially due to low confidence in 
placement subsidies. The implementation of subsidised temporary work is done by 
temporary work agencies. Some RBA's see them as competitors. The proportion of 
the target group reached is only marginal for the VU (less than 1 percent), for the 
JOB-measure which was targeted at long-term unemployed young people (a much 
67 This exempt from employers' contributions is replaced by the part "Reduction long-term unemployed" of the 
Act reduction wage taxes and contribution general insurances ("Wet Vermindering Afdracht loonbelasting en 
premie voor de volksverzekering"). 
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smaller target group) the reach was relatively high. The difference in target group 
between JOB and the VU has also led to a sharp decline in the number of young 
people in the total number of applications. The decreasing amount of long-term 
unemployed (almost 100 percent for JOB and 59 percent for the KRU) and low-
educated (39 percent for JOB and 14 percent for the KRU) are striking however. On 
the other hand: the number of women increased and the number of people of 40 
years and older is relatively high for the KRU (roughly one third). 
Summarizing: there was an increase in the total number of placement subsidies up 
to 1991. Afterwards the use of placement subsidies diminished. The representation of 
target groups is diminishing, which we find rather questionable. An exception is the 
increasing number of women. 
Work experience 
The number of applications of the KRA-WEP, already mentioned above under 
placement subsidies, has been decreasing for some years now. One reason is that 
KRA-WEP applications are even more labour-intensive than KRA-RAP applications. 
RBA's think that in the time spent on one KRA-WEP application a higher number of 
regular placements can be realised, as already mentioned. As regards the 
representation of target groups the picture for the KRA-WEP is the same as for the 
KRA-RAP, whereas the KRA-WEP was meant for the weakest groups in the KRA 
target group. 
Under the JWG the municipal organisation hires young people who are threatened 
with long-term unemployment and places them in temporary jobs. Explicit purpose 
of the JWG is the placement of young unemployed in regular jobs when they have 
gained sufficient work experience. The JWG is part of the AAJ, which is aimed at the 
prevention of long-term unemployment among young people. The group that 
qualifies for the JWG is being expanded gradually. At first only the youngest groups 
qualified. But eventually the age-limit will be 27 years. The JWG is not 
comprehensive. Young people over 20 years old who become unemployed after 
having a job do not qualify for the JWG. This implies that youth unemployment will 
not completely be solved by JWG. Even then, the JWG does not reach the whole 
target group. In 1992 over two thirds of the target group was reached. The reach 
increased to 77 percent at the end of 1993 and 82 percent at the end of 1994 
(Olieman et al, 1996). This high reach includes persons with a JWG agreement but 
not having a JWG-job (this is called underutilisation). The for underutilisation 
adjusted reach is much lower. In 1994, the underutilisation was about 38 percent on 
average and the adjusted reach 51 percent. The composition of the JWG-group by 
gender and ethnic origin is the same as the target group of the JWG. With regard to 
education no figures for the target group are available; almost half of the JWG-group 
has not completed secondary education. 
Labour pools are aimed at long-term unemployed who have no chance of a regular 
job. The idea is to let these unemployed perform beneficial work for society. Outflow 
from labour pools to regular jobs is not expected but not excluded either. The 
number of people in labour pools grew steadily in the first years after its 
introduction in 1990 (Research voor Beleid, 1994). Mid 1993 over 16,000 people were 
working in labour pools, about 17 percent of the target group (unemployed for 3 
years or more). There is set a limit to the number of people in labour pools, in the 
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beginning of 1995 there was a waiting-list. With the introduction of the 40,000 jobs 
plan in 1995, it was intended to place a number of the labour pool participants in 
those (regular) jobs in order to create possibilities for people waiting for entrance to 
the labour pool. The unemployed group in labour pools does not differ from the 
composition of the target group; women and lower educated are somewhat under-
represented. According to the labour pool monitor about one-sixth of the persons in 
labour pools have been unemployed for less than three years, which is remarkable. 
Some differences exist between the labour pools and the JWG which imply that the 
problem of under-utilization is significantly less for labour pools than it is for the 
JWG. First, persons are only hired by the labour pool when there are jobs for them. 
Secondly, the labour pool jobs are permanent which is not true for the JWG. A JWG-
participant can have the same job for a maximum of one year, after which job-
switching has to take place, which may result in frictional under-utilization. Finally, 
in contrast with the JWG the labour pools are not intended to be comprehensive (to 
reach the whole target group) which implies that labour pools can be more selective 
in their hiring policy. 
The number of unemployed reached by work experience measures has been growing 
since 1988. The same cannot be said of training measures and placement subsidies. 
Another difference is that lower educated are represented well in the case of work 
experience measures (with the exception of the KRA-WEP). 
ESF 
The ESF facilitates the co-financing of training or work experience projects. Since 
1991 the RBA's implement the ESF ("old objectives" 3 and 4). The number of 
participants in ESF-projects increased strongly in the early nineties, from just 29,000 
in 1990 to almost 97,000 in 1992. So the reach of ESF is broad. The degree in which 
this reach is additional is unknown, but there are indications for the substitution of 
regular means through ESF-means. Firstly, the RBA's spent a large part (40 percent 
in 1994) of the ESF-budget to finance their own measures. Over a third of the RBA's 
say that these ESF-means flow into the total RBA-budget and are not or just partially 
related to specific projects or instruments. Secondly, the ESF is partially used for the 
funding of regular activities such as the JWG, labour pools, KRA, CBB and CV. The 
applications for ESF were largely for already existing projects. Target groups are well 
reached by ESF, partially because a large part of the ESF work experience projects 
concern the labour pools and the JWG68. 
Combined application of measures 
Sometimes measures are applied in combination to one person, either at the same 
time or consecutively. If this is a conscious policy then we can call this placement- or 
training-routes. Otherwise combined application is an inefficient use of funding. 
There is no (reliable) overall information about this subject. On the basis of regional 
studies (de Koning et al, 1993; de Koning et al, 1993) we estimate that only a small 
percentage is involved in more than one training measure. Other combinations of 
measures probably occur on a larger scale. According to "Hoe zoeken werkzoekenden 
1994" 15 thousand persons received "other help" besides training from the PES. This 
68 For a more detailed picture of ESF results we refer to Gravesteijn et al, 1995. 
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help includes for example direct placement. One other instrument was also applied 
to 56 thousand persons who received vocational guidance. 
Conclusions 
We conclude that there has been a shift from on the one hand training and 
placement subsidies to on the other hand (direct) placement and work experience. In 
1994 and 1995 this development further continued under influence of the reduced 
budget of the PES (the JWG and labour pools are mainly financed through other 
means). This could lead to a segregation into two groups. One chanceful group on 
which (direct) placement can be applied and a group with little or no chances on the 
labour market for which additional jobs are seen as the only possibility. This relates 
to the fact that target groups are well represented in work experience measures only. 
Other measures (training, placement subsidies) show a declining representation of 
target groups. We note that municipal organisations primarily implement the work 
experience measures. 
IV.2.3.2 Effectiveness 
In the previous section we have discussed active labour market measures and their 
reach. In this section we will treat their effectiveness. First, we will discuss the 
concepts of efficiency and justice (with regard to the functioning of the labour 
market), then gross and net effects, followed by a paragraph on the effectiveness of 
the PES in general. 
Efficiency and equity 
The labour market is functioning more efficiently if at a given number of job-seekers 
and vacancies more people find a job. The labour market functions completely 
efficiently if all vacancies are fulfilled immediately as long as there are sufficient job-
seekers and all job-seekers find a job as long as there are sufficient vacancies. In that 
case there is either unemployment or unfulfilled demand, but they do not exist 
together. An equitably functioning labour market cannot be defined very objectively. 
We assume that the labour market is functioning equitably if the difference in 
unemployment-rates and unemployment duration between groups is small. We 
realise that other definitions are possible and even better, but the most obvious 
alternatives are difficult to operate. 
It is very important to distinguish between gross and net effectiveness. The 
functioning of the labour market does not automatically improve if the PES "does 
more", for example places more unemployed into jobs. It is possible that without an 
increase in the number of placements the same number of people (perhaps from 
different groups) would have found a job through other channels (advertisements, 
etcetera). Therefore, it is not the level of activity of the PES as such, but the 
additional value of the PES which is important. We speak of gross effects if 
registered job-seekers find a job and if registered vacancies are filled after application 
of one or more PES measures . The net effects are the gross effects adjusted, 
because of the fact that a part of the registered job seekers would have found a job 
anyway and a part of the registered vacancies would have been filled anyway. One 
69 We mean registered with the PES. 
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of the main problems with the determination of net-effects is that many factors 
influence the outcome of the labour market process and the results of the PES. One 
important factor is the situation on the labour market. For example, if there is a large 
excess supply then vacancies will be filled relatively easily. 
The gross and net effects can be analysed at different levels: for the labour market as 
a whole, for individual groups and for individual instruments. The research into the 
effectiveness of measures can be divided into micro- en macro-research. The former 
is based on individual information. For example, do the individuals who follow 
training find a job afterwards (gross effects). For the determination of net effects a 
control-group approach is sometimes used. Macro-research includes research on an 
aggregated level, for example the effect of a particular instrument on the level of 
long-term unemployment. 
A complete picture of gross and net effects does not exist however. So, we will first 
give a general outline of job finding by registered job-seekers and the filling of 
registered vacancies. These figures overestimate the results of the PES because (an 
unknown) number of registered job-seekers find a job and (an also unknown) 
number of vacancies are filled without the application of an instrument or 
instruments by the PES. However, the PES does spend funds on these job-seekers 
and vacancies since they are also registered . 
Effectiveness in general 
In the period 1988 and 1992 the number of registered job-seekers finding a job 
increased. In 1993 the number slightly decreased. The number of unemployed job-
seekers finding a job did not increase structurally, but the number of registered 
employed job-seekers did. This is in line with PES-figures on placements . 
Table rv.9 The number of registered job-seekers who found a job (1988 - 1993, thousands) 
Year 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Registered unemployed 
number 
(thousands) 
187 
220 
233 
209 
228 
225 
% of total 
number of 
unemployed that 
finds a job 
41 
48 
48 
44 
49 
51 
Registered employed job-seekers 
number 
(thousands) 
78 
93 
99 
107 
117 
112 
% of total 
number of 
persons that finds 
another job 
28 
33 
31 
31 
35 
41 
Total registered job-seekers 
number 
(thousands) 
265 
313 
332 
316 
344 
336 
% of total 
number of 
persons that 
finds a job 
36 
42 
41 
39 
44 
47 
Source: Centraal Bureau Statistiek, de Koning et al, 1995. 
70 A substantial part of the available manpower of the PES is spend to the registration of job-seekers and 
vacancies. 
71 We do not discuss the PES' figures on placements because of the low degree of reliability and validity 
and because of the fact that the figures are not comparable between RBA's. 
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Table IV.IO gives an indication of the degree in which registered unemployed job-
seekers found a job and the degree in which registered vacancies were filled. After 
1990, the chance of registered vacancies being filled increased. One may assume that 
the new structure of the employment service had an effect on the filling of registered 
vacancies. But a growing number of these vacancies were probably filled by 
employed job-seekers. As long as the former jobs of these persons remain vacant this 
will not necessarily diminish the frictions on the labour market, because with the 
filling of one vacancy a new vacancy will come into existence. Secondly, the filling of 
vacancies greatly depends on the balance between total demand and total supply. 
The filling of vacancies becomes more easy if the excess supply increases. Job 
opportunities were practically stable between 1990 and 1992 and decreased strongly 
at the end of the period under consideration. Our analysis of the evaluation of the 
Employment Service Act did not provide evidence that the new act had an effect on 
the number of registered job-seekers successful in finding a job. 
Table IV.10 Number of registered vacancies filled, chance of filling, number of registered unemployed registered 
job-seekers finding a job and chance of finding a job (1989-1993) 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Number of registered 
vacancies filled 
(thousands) 
228 
246 
250 
258 
267 
Chance of filling 
for registered 
vacancies 
0,86 
0,87 
0,90 
0,94 
0,97 
Number of registered 
unemployed job-seekers 
that finds a job 
(thousands) 
220 
233 
209 
228 
225 
Chance of finding a job 
for registered 
unemployed job-seekers 
0,35 
0,39 
0,38 
0,40 
0,35 
Source: Centraal Bureau Statistiek, de Koning et al, 1995. 
The labour market functions more efficiently if with the same numbers of job-seekers 
and vacancies more people find a job and more vacancies are filled. This relationship 
can be specified in a matching-function. The matching-function does not show an 
upward tendency since 1989 and there is no evidence of a break in the trend in 1991, 
the year the new act became operational. So, an effect of the act on the efficiency of 
the labour market has not be found. This does not mean that the activities of the PES 
have no additional value; one can only conclude that the additional value did not 
change much. But cross-section analyses at RBA-level do not show a relationship 
between the efficiency of the regional labour market and the activities and results of 
RBA's either . Therefore, the additional value of the PES is at least questionable. 
With regard to the objective of equity, the PES distinguishes several target groups 
(long-term unemployed, ethnic minorities, women, young unemployed and partially 
disabled). In chapter 1 we have seen that unemployment among the target groups 
remains high; their unemployment rates remain well above the average level. Only 
72 This is also true if we take into account the possibility that the results of the PES are influenced by the 
functioning of the labour market (so they mutually influence each other). 
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the relative position of women has somewhat improved. The labour market position 
of ethnic minorities and long-term unemployed is the most worrying. As previously 
stated, poorly educated and elderly also have a weak labour market position, but are 
not official target groups of the PES. The percentage of a target group in the number 
of job-finders divided by the percentage of the group in the number of job-seekers is 
a method of measuring the relative chances of that group. The relative chances of 
young people, women and poorly educated did not change structurally between 
1988 and 1993. The situation for long-term unemployed, ethnic minorities and 
elderly improved (slightly). 
Many RBA's base their policy as regards target groups on the slipstream mechanism 
which incorporates the idea that the placement of privileged groups is necessary in 
order to place target groups. This mechanism may function in different ways and so 
there are several variations of the slipstream idea. In one variation, the PES first 
gains the confidence of employers through the placement of privileged job-seekers 
before trying to place members of target groups. According to another the market-
share of the PES is decisive: the more vacancies notified to and filled by the PES, the 
more members of target groups can be placed, because they have more opportunities 
to find a job through the PES than through other search channels. Target groups 
have less informal channels to find jobs than for example employed persons. In the 
evaluation of the Employment Service Act (de Koning et al, 1995) both variants were 
tested. The conclusion was that the slipstream-mechanism is only of limited 
significance in practice. Other factors play a more important role in explaining the 
chances of target groups. 
The degree of equity in the functioning of the labour market did not change much 
during the early nineties. The rate of long-term unemployment in total 
unemployment decreased between 1988 and 1993 (from 54 percent to 45 percent), 
but the relative position of the different target groups did not change much either in 
this respect. The same is true for the chances of leaving unemployment. It would be 
going too far to conclude that the policy of the PES did not effect the relative 
position of target groups. Without this policy the position of these groups might 
even have worsened. This fact is very hard to establish because the conjunctival 
dynamics also influence the position of target groups. Groups entering the labour 
market suffer most from a deterioration of the economic situation, which explains 
the high level of youth unemployment during recessions. Analyses adjusted in 
accordance with this effect on the economic situation indicate that policy has hardly 
affected the unemployment level among young people. 
Information and advice 
In 1992 and 1993 about 30 percent of unemployed job-seekers who received 
vocational or educational guidance found a job some time later ("Hoe zoeken 
werkzoekenden"). Γη 1994 this was somewhat less, namely 23 percent. In absolute 
numbers: 22,000 in 1992, 21,000 in 1993 and 18,000 in 1994. For the elderly, low 
educated and ethnic minorities the chances of getting a job were below average 
(there is no information according to unemployment duration available). Nothing is 
known about the net-effects of information and advice. 
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Placement 
The gross effects on the demand side of direct placement can be estimated through 
dividing the number of direct placements by the number of vacancies to which at 
least one registered job-seeker has been referred. This ratio did not change in the 
period 1991 - 199473. 
According to "Hoe werven bedrijven" the number of job-finders through PES' 
placement activities decreased from 87 thousand to 64 thousand over the period 1988 
- 1991 and increased again to 83 thousand in 1993. The number of direct placements 
as a percentage of the total number of applicants via the PES decreased slightly 
between 1988 and 1993. 
The evaluation of the AAJ-programme indicates that in 1992 over 70 per cent of the 
AAJ-target group found a regular job within a year. The majority of the other young 
people went to school which leaves only a small part to become unemployed or to 
be referred to the JWG. Although the economic situation worsened after 1991 the 
gross effectiveness of the AAJ decreased only slightly (Olieman et al, 1996). 
Studies concerning the net effectiveness of placement are scarce. The re-orientation 
interviews had a small net effect on the chances of long-term unemployed (Hoffius 
and Langeveld, 1990). The net effectiveness of the first phase of the AAJ is very 
small (de Koning et al, 1994; Olieman et al, 1996). In this first phase the young 
unemployed have to be helped to a regular job or education within six to twelve 
months. In 1992/1993 the net effect was about 7 percent and in 1994/1995 10 percent 
(persons saying that they would (probably) not have found a job or an education-
position without the help of the PES). 
The results of these studies are not valid for placement in general because of the 
specific character of the measures discussed. 
Training 
In the early nineties, the chance of finding a job after attending training diminished 
(see figure IV.l). Figures concerning 1992 indicate the highest chance of finding a job 
for the technical CV at (61 percent). For the clerical CV, the W S and the KRS the 
job-chance was about 55 percent. The CBB and the PBVE have smaller job-chances, 
34 and 37 percent respectively, but regarding these instruments we have to take into 
account the move to follow-up courses. This does not mean that these follow-up 
courses always lead to a regular position after completion. The job-chance of other 
training-measures is 43 percent. 
73 Based on information provided by the RBA's, which we find unreliable. But it probably gives an 
indication. 
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Figure IV.l Improvement in the chance of getting a job after attending 
training (1986 ­ 1994) 
75.0 
65.0 
55.0 
45.0 
35.0 
25.0 
'86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 
■*" Job-finders 
Source: De Koning et al, 1995; secondary analysis of evaluation­studies training measures 
So far we have discussed gross­effectiveness of training measures for the 
unemployed. Recent information on the effectiveness of training measures for the 
employed is not available. The evaluation of the KRS (de Koning and van Nes, 1990) 
showed that almost all persons kept their job. The apprenticeship system trains 
young people for a variety of professions. In that wray the demand for professional 
skilled workers is fulfilled and the young people are given a good labour market 
perspective. The number of the young persons remaining in employment after 
completing the training, is most probably high. 
Training measures have a positive net­effect on the job­chances of unemployed job­
seekers. This conclusion is primarily based on studies which involved a control­
group approach (two national and two regional studies). These studies compare 
unemployed job­seekers who have been trained by the PES with unemployed who 
have not received training. Table IV.13 below gives an outline of the studies 
concerned. 
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Table IV.11 Outline of Dutch evaluation studies in respect of training with a control-group approach 
Study and period 
De Koning et al. 
(1986-1987) 
De Koning en 
Van Nes (1988-1989) 
De Koning e.a. 
(1991-1993) 
Bavinck en Van der 
Burgh (1992-1994) 
Instrument 
CV 
CBB 
Almost all training 
instruments 
CV, KRS and application-
club 
Region 
National 
National 
RBA West Utrecht 
RBA Noord- en Midden-
Limburg 
Result 
Small effect (< 10%) on 
job-chance 
50% higher job-chance 
Job-chance almost twice 
as high 
Job-chance almost twice 
as high 
The effect of training varies between groups. From the studies of de Koning and van 
Nes (1990) and Bavinck and van den Burgh (1994), it can be concluded that training 
is most effective when applied to (relatively) underprivileged groups (lower 
educated, long-term unemployed and elderly). Both surveys find no large differences 
between men and women. The lower net-effectiveness in the CBB-study can be 
explained primarily by the high percentage of younger people in the group of 
participants, whereas the effect on job-chances is relatively small for this group. The 
low net-effectiveness of the "old" CV-study can also be explained partially by the 
composition of the participants (high shares of privileged groups such as young 
people and persons with a completed secondary education). Because of the small 
number of studies nothing reliable can be said about the developments of the net-
effectiveness in time. 
In many other studies, former participants are asked what they think the effect of 
the training was. To be more precise, the former participants who have found a job 
are asked whether they think that they would have found that job without the 
training too. The difference between the percentage that found a job and the 
percentage that thinks they would also have found the job without training, can be 
seen as an indication of net-effectiveness. This rather subjective indicator did not 
change much since 1991. On average about 60 percent of the job-finders claims that 
they would not have been able to get the job without training. The net-effectiveness 
is, according to this measure, relatively high among women, long-term unemployed 
and elderly and relatively low for non-natives. We note explicitly that the results 
must be handled very carefully because of the subjectivity of the measure concerned. 
Placement subsidies (KRA-WEP included) 
For the KRA-RAP, 'reach' and gross effects are identical because it concerns 
placement in regular jobs. In the case of the KRA-WEP this is not formally the case, 
but the difference between the KRA-RAP and KRA-WEP is very little in practice. 
The gross-effects of the KRA-WEP has to be measured formally according to the 
transfer from the additional "work experience" jobs to regular jobs. This is also true 
for the KRU (subsidised temporary work). Information on the effects is scarce 
however. Evidence for the KRA-WEP concerns the period around 1990. One year 
after the start of participation in the KRA-WEP the transfer percentage to regular 
jobs was 40 percent, which increased to 63 percent two years after the start of 
participation in the KRA-WEP. A more recent regional study confirms this picture 
(Bavinck and van der Burgh, 1994). For the KRU, a 70 percent transfer to regular 
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jobs has been found. For it's predecessors (JOB and VU) the transfer percentage was 
about 60 percent. 
Different studies (Gravesteijn-Ligthelm et al 1988, De Koning en Van Nes 1989, De 
Koning et al 1993) in the period 1987-1992 show that the KRA/MLW had a reducing 
effect on long-term unemployment. This has been established in several ways: 
1. By determining statistically the effect of the KRA/MLW on the development 
of long-term unemployment in time. This resulted in a net-effectiveness of 
70 percent: seventy out of every hundred placements led to a reduction of 
long-term unemployment. There are indications that the widening of the 
target group (in 1993) has had a negative influence on this trend (de Koning 
et all, 1995). 
2. By comparing the persons placed by the KRA/MLW with a control-group of 
persons who were not placed by the KRA/MLW. The net effects of the 
KRA-WEP are smaller than the net effects of the KRA-RAP. The increase in 
job-chances: 
- was larger the older the participants; 
- was smaller the lower the educational level; 
- was larger the longer the unemployment duration. 
The differences in net-effectiveness according to gender and ethnicity were 
less pronounced. 
3. By asking the participants their opinion about the effects. A large share (70 
percent) of them thought that they would have stayed unemployed without 
participation. Almost half of them did not apply any more in the period just 
before participation. 
The net-effects of subsidised temporary work (KRU, VU en JOB) depend on two 
main questions: 
to what extent does subsidised temporary work increase the chance of 
employment for the target group? 
to what extent does subsidised temporary work increase the flow of long-
term unemployed to regular jobs? 
Research by Zandvliet et al (1995) estimates a net effect of the KRU of approximately 
15 percent (based on the opinions of participants and hiring employers). In the past, 
there have been several studies into the JOB-measure. First, statistical analyses 
showed that temporary work through JOB resulted in half of the target group (long-
term unemployed young people) entering additional employment. The net-
effectiveness was estimated between 25 and 30 percent. This difference in net-
effectiveness between the KRU and JOB can be partially explained by differences in 
target groups. The JOB participants were, though younger than the KRU participants 
on average, lower educated and unemployed longer. 
Work experience 
The transfer-rate of the JWG (to regular jobs) is roughly 15 per cent per year. For 
labour pools this is substantially less, about 4 per cent. There are no indications that 
these chances changed much recently (see Olieman et al, 1996 for the JWG). 
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The net effectiveness of labour pools is hardly relevant. The flow to regular work is 
almost zero. The move to regular jobs is not the main purpose of labour pools, so 
this result is not surprising. We have already discussed the effectiveness of the KRA 
above. The effectiveness of KRA-WEP does not differ significantly from the 
effectiveness of the KRA as a whole. 
The JWG is net effective when young people enter the JWG "correctly" and find a 
regular job after some time. The inflow in the JWG is "correct" when there was no 
possibility to help the young person towards a regular job or education within a 
year after registration. For 70 percent of the young persons entering the JWG this is 
the case, which means that 30 percent could have been placed in regular jobs if they 
had received more help from the PES. About 30 percent of young persons entering 
the JWG transfers to regular work in two years. This amounts to a total net-
effectiveness of just over 20 percent. 
Combination of instruments 
There is an information shortage concerning the effectiveness of the combined 
application of instruments. De Koning (1993d) found that help from the PES to find 
a job after completion of training, had a positive effect on job-chances. 
Concluding remarks 
In the evaluation of the Employment Service Act, no evidence was found that the 
activities of the PES lead to a larger labour market efficiency. A relation between the 
activities and results of the PES and the efficiency of the labour market has not been 
established. The new act did not change this. That the PES has little or no additional 
value for labour market efficiency is related to the enormous excess supply. The 
majority of the vacancies are filled without any problem. There is very little room for 
improvement in this respect and if improvements are possible, the measures of the 
PES are not always the solution (e.g. as regards labour conditions, wage conditions, 
etc.). 
The labour market problems are concentrated primarily on the supply side. An 
increase in the number of jobs is needed most of all but the PES has little influence 
on employment. A relatively small number of jobs are created through work 
experience measures. These measures (JWG, labour pools) are implemented 
primarily by municipal organisations. The PES can only enhance the chances of 
underprivileged groups to gain as much as possible from a growth in employment 
and reduce as far as possible the differences in unemployment between groups. It is 
most probable that the activities of the PES contributed, though to a small degree, to 
more equal chances (especially through the use of training measures, placement 
subsidies and work experience instruments). 
Many RBA's base their target group policy on the slipstream-mechanism. Our 
conclusion is that this mechanism is only of limited significance in practice. Other 
factors play a more important role in explaining the chances of target groups. 
Existing research, both national and international, indicates that only a selective use 
of measures generates positive net-effects. The PES (but also other public 
organisations) is still inclined to look at gross-effects. For this reason the measures 
are applied, to a large extent, to relatively privileged groups of which a large part 
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would find a job anyway. A more selective use of measures improves the net-
effectiveness and also further contributes to the objective of equity. However, what 
we observe during the last years is a less selective use of measures (widening of 
target groups). 
IV.2.3.3 Examples of good practice 
Giving examples of good practice looks easy at first sight. One simply could 
compare the effectiveness of the different measures. But the effectiveness of 
measures not only depends on their character and shape but also on the way they 
are implemented, the target groups and the degree in which the measures are used 
selectively74. In our opinion most of the measures are essentially adequate to tackle 
particular labour market problems. We think mainly of the KRS, the CV, the CBB, 
the KRA and the JWG. But with respect to these measures a number of important 
aspects related to implementation, target groups and selective use must not be 
forgotten. 
First, (in case of the PES) quality is more important than quantity. The PES should 
not strive for a maximum market-share (often only related to direct placement), but 
should try to maximize net-effectiveness. Previously we have seen that the 
application of measures on privileged groups is less effective. The application of 
measures to prevent long-term unemployment is only desirable when it is clear that 
short-term unemployed have little chance of finding a job without the help of the 
PES. If this job-chance is relatively high, the application of measures could better be 
postponed. Firstly, the more privileged job-seekers should try to find a job 
themselves, maybe with a little help from the PES in the form of information about 
vacancies or referral to vacancies. Should this not succeed within a reasonable period 
of time, the application of more intensive measures may be considered. Existing 
information already indicates for which groups preventive policy should be 
considered. Furthermore, there is already some information as to which measure is 
the best for which group. 
Application of training measures, placement subsidies and work experience 
measures to long-term unemployed, elderly and lower educated is expected to result 
in a high net-effectiveness. 
Secondly, the method of implementation can be most important. In the case of 
training for example, a permanent flow of information between the organisations 
involved and coordination between the different activities (recruitment of trainees, 
the actual training and placement after completion of training) are most important. A 
permanent flow of information contributes to an effective management of the 
training and may serve as a basis for future programmes. A good coordination may 
lead to a higher net-effectiveness, for example through the placement of participants 
who do not immediately find a job after completion of the framing. A monitoring 
system with regard to participants is needed to determine the results and to 
74 The target group and selective use of instruments are related with each other but not the same. A person 
may belong to the target group of an instrument, but this does not imply that application of the 
instrument is necessary to let him/her find a job. 
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optimize the implementation (this applies to all instruments). For the KRA/MLW the 
implementation practice has been studied twice (in 1989 and 1992). De Koning and 
van Nes (1990) established that the reach of the MLW was relatively large when: 
the PES cooperated intensively with the municipal social service; 
specialized teams within the PES were set up for the implementation; 
there was an active recruitment of vacancies which were suited to the target 
group ("target-group-approach"). 
More attention for the less privileged groups implies a larger necessity to cooperate 
with the municipal social service and the GAK. Γη fact an operational integration, 
especially with the social service, may be the best solution. In most other European 
countries the PES is also responsible for unemployment benefits. De Koning 
(forthcoming) gives a summary of existing studies about implementation and co­
operation in Dutch active labour-market policy for underprivileged groups. 
Thirdly, we conclude that target groups must be defined more strictly. Only a part 
of the current target groups (young people, women and ethnic minorities) should 
qualify for the application of measures. Which subgroups exactly should qualify, has 
to be determined on the basis of the labour market position (unemployment rate and 
unemployment duration). The complete group of long-term unemployed probably 
has to be seen as target groups. The same is true for the partially disabled. The 
elderly and the lower educated should be target groups in our opinion. 
Most of the measures may fulfil a useful function. But improvements regarding the 
effectiveness of the measures are possible. More attention should be given to the 
implementation practice, the target groups should be defined more narrowly and the 
application of measures should be constrained to these unemployed who really need 
this help to find a job. Furthermore, the information flows should be improved. 
Otherwise, the results cannot be determined with a reasonable degree of reliability 
and the implementation practice cannot be optimized. In the past, measures have 
been abolished or replaced by other measures because of small (gross-) effects, 
without determining the reasons (implementation, targeting) for this ineffectiveness. 
IV.2.4 Recent developments in active labour market policy 
Recently, two developments took place in the field of active labour market policy. 
The first development is the growing involvement of municipal organisations with 
the implementation of programmes for long-term unemployed (receiving social 
assistance benefits). A discussion of Job-Schemes introduced recently will illustrate 
this development (IV.2.4.1). Furthermore, part of the former PES-budget has been 
shifted to the municipalities (IV.2.4.2). Secondly, we see a tendency to implement 
active labour market policy through using the wage-tax system (IV.2.4.3). 
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IV.2.4.1 Job-Schemes 
The recently introduced Job-schemes (which are called after the present Dutch 
Minister of SZW, Melkert) are divided into three categories: 
1. 40,000 regular jobs in the public sector; 
2. 20,000 jobs with the use of social assistance benefits; 
3. experiments with new ways of encouraging the participation of the long-
term unemployed recipients of social assistance benefits. 
40,000 regular jobs 
Up to and including 1998, 40,000 regular jobs will be created in the public sector for 
long-term unemployed which serves a twofold purpose. It should reduce long-term 
unemployment and simultaneously increase public safety, care and education. The 
emphasis is on the four main cities. The target group consists of persons who have 
been unemployed for one year and receive an NABW, IOAW or IOAZ benefit75. 
Labour pool participants and JWG-participants (who are at least 27 years old) also 
qualify. The number of labour pool positions must stay the same however (which 
means possibilities for those on the waiting list). 
In 1995 the first 5,000 jobs became available. In 1996 another 10,000 jobs must be 
created. In both years half of the jobs will be in the public health and care sector and 
the other half at municipalities. The former will be financed by the Ministry of 
Health, Welfare and Sports while the latter will be financed by the Ministry of the 
Interior. Seventy percent of the latter will be located in the four main cities. In the 
public health and care sector, jobs will consist of care of the elderly and disabled, 
hospital work, assistance to the youth and homeless and medical day care. The 
municipal jobs concern areas such as public safety, supervision and day care. In 1996 
this has been extended to the management of public spaces (e.g. environmental 
supervision and management of public monuments) and the educational sector. All 
persons will be selected by the municipalities. 
Wages for these jobs are bound to strict rules. The wage is not allowed to be higher 
than the minimum wage in the first year and 120 percent of the minimum wage in 
later years. The idea is to stimulate employment on this wage-level, because the 
lowest wage-scales have become obsolete. The jobs are for maximum 32 hours per 
week. For former labour pool participants labour time can be extended to 38 hours 
per week to prevent a decline in income. This is also true for persons who qualify 
for additional social assistance benefits, for instance bread-winners and single 
parents. Shortening of working time is possible for disabled persons. 
Very little is known about the result of this 40,000 jobs-scheme up to now. However, 
there are indications that the results are rather disappointing. The new jobs are not 
as easily found as was expected and it seems that a large part of the target group is 
not completely suited for the jobs. 
75 Persons who have not worked more than 50 days or 400 hours in the previous year are also marked as 
unemployed for one year. 
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20,000 jobs with the use of social assistance benefits 
The idea of job creation with the use of social security funds has often been put 
forward by municipalities. Recently, the central government has actually introduced 
this possibility. From 1996 on, it will be possible to transfer social assistance benefits 
into a fixed amount of subsidy (Dfl 18,000 per job). The target group consists of 
NABW-, IOAW- or JOAZ-beneficiaries who are unemployed for at least one year. The 
participants must be offered a job for at least six months with an average working 
week of 32 hours. They receive at least the minimum hourly wage and at the most 
120 per cent of the minimum hourly wage. Supplementary social assistance should 
not be necessary. Some groups like bread-winners qualify for larger jobs. The job-
subsidy is granted for no more than two years. At the end of 1996 an interim-
evaluation report of this Job-scheme is expected. 
The organisations involved differ greatly between the various projects. 
Municipalities, the PES and other organisations (like employers' organisations and 
unions) were (in 1995) invited to make plans and to send them to the Ministry of 
SZW. Municipalities have to be involved in the plans because of the target group 
(social assistance beneficiaries). The Ministry made a selection of the most promising 
plans. So, the projects are not uniform; they can differ from each other in various 
ways. For example, the employment project in Rotterdam has a 'pool-system'. All 
participants (former beneficiaries) flow into this pool from which they are hired by 
employers. The employer pays a fee which increases during the two years. The 
subsidy element decreases each year. This should eventually lead to a permanent 
job. Some implementing organisations demand a guarantee of a permanent position 
after the subsidized period. This diminishes insecurity and excludes employers 
whose only intention is to use cheap labour for as long as it lasts. In the ΡΓΜ-project 
(Professional Inflow Method) this is institutionalised. The PIM-project is a 
collaboration of PES, social partners and various municipalities and companies. An 
initiative in Leeuwarden offers qualifying beneficiaries a cheque of Dfl 18,000,-
which employers can cash at the municipality when they have hired one of these 
long-term unemployed. 
Experiments while retaining benefit 
A large share of the beneficiaries depend on social assistance for several years. 
Almost half of them have received social assistance for more than three years, and 
one-third for more than five years. This means that regular measures - and new 
measures as described before - are not sufficient to let these people (re-) enter the 
labour market. A substantial part of them have lost touch with the labour market. 
Central government has decided to allow municipalities to deviate from the NABW 
for certain (described) areas, which should enable municipal social services to 
experiment with projects to activate social assistance recipients by letting them 
perform activities while retaining benefit. This is made possible by article 144 of the 
NABW (the legal framework), in effect since January 1st 1996 (see also section IV.2). 
From this date the municipal experiments can be implemented. Main purpose is the 
social activation of the target group. The local authorities decide upon the nature 
and the content of projects. The activities are unpaid, for example activities in the 
own neighbourhood. The purpose is twofold: to enhance the labour market chances 
of long-term benefit recipients and to help them out of social isolation. 
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IV.2.4.2 Redistribution of means 
From 1995 on, the central government has greatly reduced the PES-budget (several 
hundred million Dutch guilders). A part of this amount has been shifted to 
municipalities. The municipalities have to use this budget to "purchase" PES-
activities for social assistance beneficiaries. Though the purchase of PES-activities is 
obligatory, the responsibility for a part of the active labour market policy is actually 
shifted to the municipalities. They can determine which measures have to be used 
and which persons have to be reached. 
IV.2.4.3 Active policy by using the wage-tax system 
We see a tendency to implement active labour market policy through the wage-tax 
system. In the past, under the Vermeend-Moor Act the employer could temporarily 
be exempted from part of the employers' social contributions when hiring a long-
term unemployed . On January 1st 1996 the Act reduction wage-tax and social 
security contributions, part "reduction long-term unemployed" replaced this act. 
Some conditions and rules were changed. 
More important is that the new Act has two other parts: "reduction apprenticeship 
system" and "reduction low wages". The reduction apprenticeship system replaces 
the BVL-subsidy (which was implemented by the LBA) and is meant to stimulate 
employers to hire apprentices. The reduction low wTages is more or less new . The 
employers can get a reduction of Dfl 1,185,- for each of their employees who has a 
wage up to 115 percent of minimum wage. In this way the government tries to 
stimulate the creation of low paid jobs. 
76 In the early nineties the Vermeend-Moor Act was replaced by the Act for the promotion of labour-
integration ("Wet Bevordering Arbeidsinpassing"). 
77 In the early nineties the Act labour-cost reduction on minimum wage level ("Wet loonkostenreductie op 
minimumloonniveau") existed. 
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V Other policies having an impact on the labour 
market 
V.l Education and vocational training 
Education and training are very important for the economy; modern economies 
require a well educated labour force to function properly. Education is generally 
expected to have a stimulating effect on prosperity and growth. In this section we 
will examine the Dutch educational system. We will start with an overview of the 
structure of this system in paragraph V.l.l. This is followed a section (V.1.2) about 
the transition from school to work. We especially pay attention to possible frictions 
with respect to this transition. In particular disadvantaged groups will have our 
attention. In paragraph V.1.3 we will examine the productivity effects of courses for 
individuals, companies, branches of industries and on macro-level. 
V.l.l Outline of the Dutch educational system 
V.l.2.2 Regular education 
In this section we will describe the main structure of the current Dutch educational 
system. To get insight into the rather complex system we will start by discussing 
regular full-time education only. In a later stage, other types of education will be 
presented as well. These latter include business training, basic instruction, etcetera. 
Because of limited space, we cannot be exhaustive. 
The basic structure of the Dutch educational system is given by figure V.l on the 
next page. The educational foundation is laid by eight years of primary education. 
The first two years can be seen as kindergarten. The latter six years include primary 
education. For children who are not doing well in the regular education, special 
primary education ("speciaal onderwijs) is available. The primary education phase is 
followed by basic secondary education of one year for every school-going person, 
except for young people who attend special education. After this general year, 
school-going young people disperse over four types of secondary education: three 
levels of general secondary education and lower vocational secondary education 
(VBO). The three general levels are - from low to high successively - lower general 
secondary education (MAVO), higher general secondary education (HAVO) and pre-
university education (VWO). 
The vast majority of the pupils who leave the common basic year enters general 
secondary education. In the transition of school-year '92/93 to '93/94, 176,000 
youngsters moved up from the common year to higher years of secondary 
education. From the persons 75 percent moved up to general secondary education 
and only 25 percent moved up to lower vocational education. In previous years a 
larger proportion of primary education graduates chose for VBO (at that time LBO). 
Figure V.l Flows and stocks in full­time education 
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In 1977 about 38 percent of the primary education graduates chose for a VBO-
education. in 1989 this had decreased to 34 per cent . There have not been large 
shifts between the three types of general secondary education (MAVO, HAVO, 
VWO). So we can conclude that the share of general secondary education is 
expanding at the expense of lower secondary vocational education. 
Higher secondary vocational education (MBO) can be accessed either by 
MAVO/HAVO/VWO graduates or by VBO graduates. The former flow is somewhat 
bigger than the latter. In the transition of school-year '93/'94 to school-year 93/94 44 
thousand students moved up from general secondary education to MBO. The inflow 
to MBO from VBO graduates amounted 32 thousand. An MBO education, just like 
HAVO/VWO, gives access to higher vocational education (HBO). Pre-university 
education (VWO) gives access to university (WO). Whether a university entrance 
examination should be installed is a topical matter. Minor flows between the 
different types and levels of education are shown in the graph as well, but will not 
be discussed in this rough sketch of the educational system. 
The schedule also reflects the number of students who leave school without a 
diploma (the dotted lines, the first number is the number of pupils who leave school 
with a diploma, the latter number is the number of pupils without diploma). In 
particular the high outflow of students without diploma at MBO-level is striking. 
People who leave the educational system without diploma have less opportunities 
on the labour market. This is especially true for those without a completed general 
secondary education or lower vocational secondary education (VBO). They have a 
bigger chance of being unemployed as we have seen in chapter 1. 
Table V.l shows the number of persons who attend(ed) full-time education. 
Participation decreased until school-year 1992/1993. Since that year, the trend is 
slightly positive in nominal terms. Γη school-year 2000/2001 participation will be 
100,000 persons higher than in 1994/1995. 
There are no large shifts between the various types of education. 
78 CBS, Kwartaalschrift Onderwijsstatistieken 1994-11, page 11. 
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Table V.l Full-time education, number of pupils/students (1985/86 - 1994/1995 and forecasts 2000/2001, 
thousands) 
Primary education 
(Continued) Special education 
General secondary education 
Lower vocational secondary education 
Higher vocational secondary education 
Higher vocational education 
University0' 
Total 
85/86 
1,469 
100 
804 
359 
276 
149 
169 
3,326 
90/91 
1,443 
109 
684 
233 
289 
194 
181 
3,133 
92/93 
1,451 
111 
668 
217 
283 
214 
188 
3,096 
93/94 
1,472 
114 
668 
214 
285 
222 
188 
3,118 
94/95 a ' 
1,451 
117 
666 
210 
290 
228 
185 
3,147 
2000/01 
1350 
128 
889b) 
295 
240 
149 
3,251 
a) Preliminary figures. 
b) Including lower vocational secondary education. 
c) 1985/86 - 1994/95 full-time and part-time education (number on December 1). 
Source: CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek 1996 (1985/86 - 1994/95). 
Ministry of OCW, Reference estimate 1995 (2000/01). 
The educational participation rate expresses the proportion of people who are in 
education as a percentage of the total population. Persons are counted as 
pupil/student when they follow a course for at least six months at a Dutch teaching 
institute during the year considered. Table V.2 shows this participation rate 
according to age for the previous five school-years. We see a slowly reducing rate of 
participation in education. The share of people over 25 years old who attend 
education is becoming smaller . This trend is also visible for the youngest age 
group (under 15), although more moderate. The participation rate of the middle age 
group (15 - 24) is increasing. This is probably due to prolonging of the educational 
period. 
Table V.2 Participation rate (in % of population) according to age (1990/1991 - 1994/1995) 
Total 
90/91 
29.3 
91/92 
29.2 
92/93 
28.7 
93/94 
28.1 
94/95 
27.7 
Age 
<= 14 
15-24 
>= 25 
72.1 
63.6 
9.5 
71.5 
64.2 
9.7 
71.2 
64.7 
9.3 
71.2 
65.2 
8.8 
71.7 
66.1 
8.4 
Source: CBS, Kwartaalschrift Onderwijsstatistieken 1995/IV. 
79 This is probably the result of policy as regards university education (shorter courses) and student 
grant(s). 
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V.1.1.2 Other forms of education and training 
Besides regular full-time education there are various other types of education. In the 
scope of this text we cannot deal with all of them extensively. Most of the other 
types of education are part of the broad concept of adult education. An overview of 
participants in the various types of adult education is given in table V.3. Our 
discussion is restricted to three types of (adult) education: part-time education, basic 
education and business training. Other types of adult education are for example 
acknowledged written education, extracurricular oral education and television 
courses (teleac). 
Table V.3 Participation in adult education (1985, 1990 and 1994, thousands) 
Type of education 
Basic instruction 
Lower general secondary education 
Higher general secondary education and pre-university 
training 
Lower vocational secondary education (VBO) 
Higher vocational secondary education (MBO) 
Higher vocational education (HBO) 
University (WO) 
Open University 
Vocational guided education 
Cursorv entrepreneurial education 
Sociological training juveniles 
Health education (at branch level) 
Training measures 
Acknowledged written education 
Extracurricular oral education 
Courses in training centres 
Teleac (television courses) 
Company training (private sector)^ 
1985 
87.9 
64.2 
39.3 
14.2 
34.0 
61.7 
10.2 
14.5 
113.8 
33.8 
11.1 
45.4 
39.2 
179.3 
92.9 
107.7 
140.3 
70Ó.5S' 
1990 
115.1 
52.5 
35.3 
8.7 
55.1 
53.2 
14.7 
36.1 
157.2 
33.8 
8.0 
39.2 
110.7 
237.5 
168.0 
106.4 
140.1 
1,118.5 
1994 
142.0a) 
47.4b> 
31.5b> 
7.5b' 
49.8b' 
47.6C> 
115.9 
32.1c> 
165.6c'd' 
64.8e> 
19.1c>d> 
45.3C> 
85.5 
190.8 
177.3 
61.9C> 
120.5 
1,244.6C' 
a) Preliminary figure. 
b) Concerns the year 1992. 
c) Concerns the year 1993. 
d) Including part of the short higher vocational secondary education (KMBO). 
e) Data not comparable with the data of previous years because of changed questionnaire. 
f) Number of attended internal or external courses. 
g) Concerns the year 1986. 
Source: CBS. 
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Part-time education 
Roughly one million people attend part-time courses. These courses are mainly 
taught at teaching institutes who also offer regular full-time education (primary and 
secondary schools, higher vocational schools and universities). Part-time education is 
of a different character than regular full-time education. Regular education generally 
raises the educational level of students. For part-time education this is only true for 
a third of the students. The other students follow courses at a level they already 
attained. In particular mediate and high educated people follow part-time courses. A 
large share is taken by language courses . 
Basic education 
The second type of (non-regular) education we would like to discuss shortly is basic 
education, which is meant for adults who fell behind in regular education. Language 
skills, arithmetic and social skills are central in these courses. The participation 
expanded quickly in the early nineties (see table V.4). In 1990 about 115,000 persons 
attended basic education. In four years time participation has risen to 142,000 
persons (in 1994). This rise is caused by an increasing participation of immigrants. 
The participation of natives rose slightly in the early nineties but is now back on it's 
original level of nearly 60,000 persons. The number of immigrants rose from 57,000 
in 1990 to 85,000 in 1994. For this group basic education is appropriate to learn the 
Dutch language, which is seen as necessary to function properly in Dutch society 
and in the labour market. Immigrants who speak and write Dutch reasonably well 
have a better labour market prospect than those who do not. Basic education can be 
an instrument to raise the participation of immigrants. 
Table V.4 Participation in basic education, total and according to gender and ethnic origin (shares of total), 1990 
1994 
Total participation 
Shares: 
Men 
Women 
Natives 
Migrants'3' 
1990 
115,000 
36% 
64% 
50% 
50% 
1991 
121,000 
35% 
65% 
50% 
50% 
1992 
134,000 
35% 
65% 
49% 
51% 
1993 
145,500 
35% 
65% 
44% 
56% 
1994a' 
142,000 
38% 
62% 
40% 
60% 
a) Preliminary figures. 
b) Not from the Netherlands, naturalized foreigners and Dutchmen from overseas areas. 
Business training 
In 1993 about one quarter of all employees followed a business course (CBS, 1996). 
The vast majority of them are men. This difference between men and women 
diminishes when we express the number of employees who followed a business 
course as percentage of the total number of employees (men: 26 percent, women 22 
percent). The share of the cost in respect of business training in total labour costs is 
80 CBS, Kwartaalschrift Onderwijsstatistiekm, 1995. 
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steady at 1.7 percent. In nominal terms the expenditure on business training rose 
from nearly 3 billion guilders in 1990 to 3.5 billion guilders in 1993. On average this 
is almost Dfl 1,000.- per employee. The cost involved in business training consist of 
the wage cost of employees who attend courses during working time, the cost of 
personnel who are involved in organizing business training and other cost (for 
example travel and accommodation expenses). 
The NEI has done research in the field of business training recently (de Koning et al, 
1991). Business courses are courses with a distinct link with the company involved. 
At least part of the cost involved must be brought up by the company. The courses 
can be either internal or external . Internal business courses are only open for 
employees of the company involved. External courses are also open for employees of 
other companies. The study indicates that companies attribute high value to business 
courses. They expect these courses to fit in more closely to the needs of the company 
than regular education. For this reason they expect business courses to have a high 
economic return due to an increased corporate performance. 
The importance of business courses differs by sector. For example, in the insurance 
sector business courses are more prominent than in the metal and construction 
industry. The evidence suggests furthermore a connection between company size 
and business courses. The proportion of employees who are involved in business 
courses is larger the company is . 
An interesting question is whether companies invest enough in business courses. 
There are a number of causes for under-investment in education and training. 
Firstly, there is the free-rider problem. Companies face the risk of losing employees 
who have followed business courses. Other companies can buy out employees with 
a high human capital due to business training. This results in economically not-
optimal level of investment of companies in business training. This does not explain 
why employees do not invest in business training themselves. Under-investment in 
education by individuals can be explained by the uncertainty as regards the benefits 
of education. This risk is not insurable. The results of the NEI-study indicate that 
companies would like to invest more in education of personnel but face some 
bottlenecks. The character of the obstructions differs by sector. In the construction 
and transportation industry the unwillingness of personnel to attend courses is the 
most important hindrance. In the insurance and chemical industry, the main 
problem is the lack of clarity about the possibilities and quality of the various 
courses. In the chemical industry the working pressure is so high that a higher 
participation in courses is not possible without endangering production. Extension of 
courses in the machine industry is hindered by financial limitations. 
81 On the job training is excluded. 
82 This is confirmed by figures of the CBS about the year 1993 (CBS, 1996). 
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V.1.2 The transition from school to work 
V.l.2.1 Some evidence 
In this section we will analyse the problems with the transition from school to work 
in general and the problems of allochthonous juveniles in particular. Does the 
educational system provide persons who enter the labour market with the required 
skills? In other words, how is the connection between education and work? It is hard 
to determine whether the educational system provides the skills required in the 
labour market. The match between labour supply and labour demand is difficult to 
quantify. We will have to restrict ourselves to indirect measures like the job-finding-
duration and unemployment rates. 
We can get an idea of the transition from school to work in terms of job-finding-
duration. The concept of "job-finding-duration" can be defined as the time which 
elapses between the date on which people start searching and the date they find 
their first "relevant job". The concept of "relevant job" does not include temporary 
work, holiday jobs, home work, seasonal work etcetera. Job-finding-durations are 
calculated by SEO based on figures of the CBS. The average job-finding-duration 
amounted 9 months on average in 1995. For university graduates this was no less 
than 20 months. This is a gloomy prospect for university graduates. The average 
duration is high, even in the light of the bad labour market situation. Borghans and 
Willems (1995) question these very high job-finding-durations. They have made 
alternative calculations and found considerably shorter job-finding-durations. Their 
main criticism is that the CBS-data inhibit a bias . 
Over the years 1992 and 1993 the job-finding-durations increased considerably. In 
particular for graduates of VBO and MAVO. For graduates of MBO and HBO the 
increase was somewhat less. Graduates of technical courses have the best start 
position. This is valid for every educational level. The start position of school-leavers 
with a socio-cultural or pedagogical education is less prosperous. Another group of 
graduates who search (much) longer than average for their first job is formed by 
academic graduates in the languages and in history. An overview of the effect of the 
kind of education (on each level of education) on job-search-duration is presented in 
appendix D. 
The job-search-duration is not only influenced by the kind and level of education, 
but also other factors like ethnic origin, region and age play a role. There is a clear 
link between job-finding-duration and ethnic origin. The average job-finding-
duration of Turks and Moroccons is over twice the time it takes for comparable 
autochthonous graduates to find their first job. For Surinamese and Antilleans this is 
no less than 2.7 times the job-finding-duration of natives. The older the graduate, the 
longer the job-finding-duration. A 24 year old needs about one and a half as much 
time as a sixteen year old to find the first job. School-leavers in the three northern 
regions do have more trouble finding a job than school-leavers in the western region. 
This may be related to the larger labour-surplus in the north compared to western 
83 This is caused by a different kind of operation of the concept of relevant job, the way in which holiday 
immediately after graduating is handled with and the exclusion of a job-finding-duration of zero in the 
SEO-research. 
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regions. We have mentioned some factors which influence the job-finding-duration. 
These factors reinforce each other when they are present simultaneously. 
Appendix E contains the unemployment rates according to level and field of 
education for the year 1994. This also gives some insight into the relative position of 
graduates. What we see is relatively high unemployment rates for persons with a 
general education (primary education, lower and higher general secondary 
education). Unemployment amongst persons with a vocational education is generally 
much lower. The exception are persons with a lower vocational education (VBO). So, 
a vocational education on mediate and higher level (in certain fields) seems to give 
relatively good perspectives on the labour market. 
The starting position on the labour market of allochthonous young persons is worse 
than the position of native youngsters. The main explanation for the weak position 
of allochthonous youngsters on the labour market is the difference in preliminary 
training (Bokhoven et al, 1994). Another reason is that part of the allochthonous 
young people have foreign diplomas which are valued less than equal Dutch 
certificates. Allochthonous young persons have a high drop-out rate. The bad 
starting position of allochthonous young people is also a result of other factors. Not 
trying to be complete we mention changes in the economic structure, an increasing 
supply of migrants, the workings of the labour market and socio-cultural factors 
(NEI, 1994). Some of the socio-cultural factors are the language barrier, 
discrimination and cultural factors. With respect to cultural factors we can mention 
the labour attitude (not meeting formal requirements, presentation at job interviews). 
V.l.2.2 Special measures 
For unemployed persons additional educational facilities are available. They are 
mainly the responsibility of the PES. The purpose of these measures is to improve 
the chances of the unemployed on the labour market. They aim primarily at persons 
with a weak labour market position (low skilled persons, migrants) . Furthermore, 
a special place is taken by the Guaranteed-Jobs-for-the-Young scheme (JWG). Both 
the training measures for unemployed and the JWG are already discussed in chapter 
4. They may nevertheless be important to alleviate the transition from school to 
work. The JWG may enhance the transition from school to (regular) work by letting 
the young unemployed gain some work-experience in additional jobs. In this context 
we limit ourselves by a supplement of the already mentioned measures. Besides the 
PES social partners are involved. In 1990 the social partners in the various branches 
of industry have obliged themselves to create 60,000 jobs for allochthonous people 
within a period of five years. In practice a smaller number of jobs has been created. 
84 Though we saw in chapter 4 that more privileged unemployed are increasingly reached by these training 
measures. 
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For allochthonous persons the educational and training policy offers four special 
features to improve their chances on the labour market (Bokhoven et al, 1994). These 
are: 
1. Priority policy with regard to education. This means the attribution of extra 
resources to projects in areas with a high percentage of allochthonous 
persons. 
2. Dutch as second language, aimed at the relief of non-natives who flow in 
from foreign countries. 
3. Education in their own language, which mainly has value for the 
reinforcement of the cultural identity and to support the learning of Dutch. 
4. Intercultural education, educational projects and refresher courses of 
teachers to realize that students grow up aware of the multi-cultural society. 
These specific measures only have an indirect link with the labour market. The 
expectation is that the improvement of language and arithmetic skills of minorities 
leads to an equalization of opportunities on the labour market. 
V.l.3 Effects of education 
Education - seen in an economic perspective - is only useful when the benefits out of 
education make up for the cost involved. The potential benefits of education are 
depended on the level of measurement. The potential benefits for an individual 
employee will differ from the potential benefits at company level. For example, net 
income is an important benefit at individual level, while at company and sectoral 
level the productivity-effects are more important. In this section we will discuss the 
effects at three levels (the micro level, the meso level, i.e. branch of industry and the 
macro level). 
Firstly, we will examine the micro level which incorporates both the level of the 
individual and the company level. Three kind of benefits can be distinguished for 
the individual: effects on the (net) wage, other benefits within the labour market and 
benefits outside the labour-market (Gelderblom et al, 1994). Education can be seen as 
an investment. The rewardence exists of an increased life-time income. This aspect of 
education is stressed by the human-capital theory. This higher rewardence is mainly 
expressed in terms of a higher nominal income, but also fringe benefits can form an 
extra source of income. Other benefits within the labour market are among other 
things the chance of being unemployed, the possibilities of job switching and 
working conditions. Higher educated persons normally work under better working 
conditions. Examples of benefits outside the labour market are a higher productivity 
in domestic activities and a longer life-expectation (derived from Haveman en Wolfe, 
1984). On the cost side we can think of the direct costs involved in the education: 
tuition and examination fees, costs of books and other study material. Part of these 
costs will normally be compensated by the government or family members. Other 
costs are opportunity costs. In stead of earning income out of labour, the individual 
is occupied with education. This loss of income forms costs for the individual. These 
costs, however, are partially compensated by the government (grants) or by family 
members. 
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Gelderblom et al (1994) determined the returns of education at the individual level 
by calculating internal rates of return, similar to returns on investments in physical 
capital. Direct costs and opportunity costs were taken into account. Higher wages (in 
comparison with individuals with less extended school-careers) and scholarships and 
other subsidies were taken as the financial benefits. Most important conclusion is 
that the internal rate of returns are in most cases positive. If the differences in 
labour-market participation of those with different educational career paths are taken 
into account, the returns even increase, especially for women. Several very lasting 
career paths also have positive returns, in spite of the relatively large costs of these 
routes. So, individuals do generally make up the costs involved with their education. 
At company level an increased productivity is the primary benefit out of education. 
The wage increase due to education forms the main costs. At branch level the 
productivity-effects may differ from that at company level because at branch level 
there is the possibility of crowding out. A growth of productivity of a company can 
be at the expense of other companies. 
Two studies of the NEI indicate positive effects of education on productivity at both 
the company and the branch level . The higher the educational level of the 
employed in a sector, the higher the productivity of the sector. Comparisons show 
that an increase of the working population by one percent-point of higher educated 
persons leads to an increase in production of nearly 2.5 percent. In the case of 
persons at secondary level or lower educated, the increase in production is slightly 
more than 0.5 and 0.25 percent respectively. Differences in marginal productivity 
between workers with different levels of education seems to be larger than 
differences in (gross) wages. At company level there are also some indications for a 
positive effect of education on productivity, though less convincing than at sectoral 
level86. A striking conclusion of both studies is the substantial positive effects of 
company training on productivity. 
At macro level, other effects besides the ones already mentioned also occur. Raising 
the general educational level means higher taxes and a smaller labour force. On 
lower levels of analysis these effects are neglected. The higher income due to the 
higher educational level also affects the size and pattern of consumption. 
Furthermore do macroeconomic rigidities have their effect on the effectiveness of 
education. 
Gelderblom et al (1994) transformed the private rates of return into social rates of 
return. In order to do this, the net incomes were transformed in gross incomes. 
Moreover, the costs were increased by government expenditure on education. The 
outcomes show positive returns for most educational career paths, though the 
returns differ quite strongly . These differences show that from a pure financial 
point of view, government expenditure is not being optimally invested. Shifting of 
funds from education routes with a low social return to routes with higher social 
returns raises efficiency and thus prosperity. Most of the very lasting career paths 
85 Gelderblom et al, 1995 and Gelderblom et al, 1996. 
86 This may be due to data problems as regards determining productivity. 
87 The most important limitation of the calculation of social returns is that macro-economic feedback effects 
of education are not taken into account. 
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which are considered to be inefficient by policy makers, also show positive return. 
Simulations were made with the assumption that the individuals also pay the 
government costs for the type of education they attend. In such a situation the 
individual rates of return fall to around zero. So, if individuals pay the government 
costs, they have no incentive to invest in education, while from a social point of 
view such investments would be profitable. This underlines the importance of the 
role of the government in financing education. 
V.2 Tax and benefit 
V.2.1 Social security, the tax system and the demand and supply of labour 
In this section we will examine the relationship between social security and the tax 
system on the demand and supply of labour. Expansion of the social security system 
and the increase of taxes and social security contributions may have distorted the 
economy and the functioning of the labour market. 
The link between high labour costs (due to high social security contributions and 
taxes) and the workings of the labour market is stressed more than once . 
High labour costs demand a high labour productivity of workers. Otherwise it is not 
economically efficient to hire workers. This requirement of high productivity has set 
aside a large number of workers who could not meet the high requirements. These 
people "disappeared" in social security regulations (unemployment, WAO, VUT). In 
fact there exists a negative spiral. Due to the high labour costs workers who do not 
meet the required labour productivity leave the working process. This enlarges the 
group of people who depend on social security and diminishes the group of 
workers. The task of the last mentioned group (generating income for both the active 
and inactive) becomes more difficult to accomplish. This puts pressure on the social 
security contributions and indirectly also on labour productivity. The negative spiral 
can only be broken an increase of the group of workers, thus by increasing (net) 
participation rates. Higher labour costs reduce the demand for labour which causes a 
decline in employment (Jehoel-Gijsbers et al, 1995). Therefore, lower (gross) labour 
costs are important for employment growth. 
The fact that the burden of social security premiums is put completely on labour, 
also plays a role. Research shows that if premiums would be based on total value 
added, this would have positive effects on employment (Den Broeder, 1989). 
As previously said, negative effects can arise from the social security system being 
an easy way of getting rid of redundant employees. In the recent past the WAO 
regulation was used to get rid of abundant employees on a large scale. Most 
probably, changes in legislation and implementation has terminated this practice. 
At the supply-side it is commonly acknowledged that benefits reduce the incentive 
to accept work. This is one possible explanation for the low participation rates. In 
economic theory this relation between benefit-level and wage-level is modelled by 
the job-search theory. This theory holds that job-seekers accept a job only when the 
See for instance: WRR, Een werkend perspectief, 1990. 
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wage level exceeds their reservation-wage. Within this theory higher benefit-levels 
lead to higher reservation-wages. This prolongs the search process, because more 
jobs are rejected. When we apply this theory to the Dutch situation, it makes sense 
to include also the effects of income-dependent regulations (like housing-subsidy, 
municipal taxes). A job-seeker who falls under one or more income-dependent 
regulations may lose these revenues by accepting a job because of a rise in income. 
The net income improvement under those circumstances is less or might even be 
negative. This will certainly reduce the incentive to accept a job. 
The mildness of the social security system is not only determined by the level of the 
social security benefits, but also the duration is important in this respect. The 
primary function of the social security system is to provide a basic income to 
persons who are not able to raise sufficient income by themselves. This situation 
should be only temporary. It seems, however, that social security benefits were 
increasingly seen as a regular source of income during the last decades. Also for 
longer periods. This change in moral and values has also put pressure on the 
system. 
V.2.2 The wedge 
The wedge for employees is the difference between gross and net wages. The wedge 
in the Netherlands is high. In 1993, the average level amounts just over 35 
percent . Other European countries, such as Belgium, France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom, have a substantially lower average wedge of about 20 percent. 
Germany and Sweden are in the middle (25 percent) . The Dutch government has 
taken some measures to reduce the wedge on the lowest level. In 1996 the amount of 
income out of labour that is free from tax has been increased substantially (with 
Dfl 1,000,- per year). The lowest tax-rate has gone down the past few years, though 
the decrease has only be modest (from 38.55 percent in 1992 to 37.5 percent in 1996). 
The employees' contributions for the WAO has also gone down. 
The wedge for employers will be more important for labour demand. In section 1.4 it 
was shown that total labour cost is between 1.6 and 2 times as high as the direct 
gross wage. Legal social contributions and contractual social contributions account 
for about half of the difference between total labour cost and the direct wage. This is 
also high compared to other countries. 
The government has also taken measures as regard the wedge for employers (SZW, 
1995). 
The yearly financial burden of employers for positions near the minimum wage is 
decrease with Dfl 1,500.-. If employers hire long-term unemployed then they qualify 
for an extra cut in taxes and social security contributions of Dfl 4,500.-, for a 
maximum of four years. Condition is that the new employee does not earn more 
than 130 per cent of the minimum wage. The first measure implies a reduction in 
wage costs on the minimum wage level of 4.5 per cent. This can mount to over 17 
per cent when we also consider the extra cut for hiring long-term unemployed. Since 
89 See also section 1.4. 
90 OECD, 1994. 
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January 1 1996 a franchise regarding the employers' share of the A W/-contributions 
(General Unemployment-fund) is in effect. This is one of a series of measures to 
reduce the financial burden at the lowest wage segment. This should lead to a 
increased demand for low-skilled labour. The franchise amounts Dfl 26,100.- on a 
yearly basis. 
V.2.3 Changes in the system 
In section IV.l we have already discussed the recent reforms in the level and 
duration of unemployment, social assistance and disability benefits. We will not 
repeat them here: the main conclusion is that the "attractiveness" of social security 
has been diminished. 
The Dutch social security system struggles with four structural and connected 
problems (Van Wijngaarden, 1993). Firstly, there are too many consumers of social 
security which causes problems with it's financing. Secondly, the system is too 
complicated which makes it hard to control and to maintain. Thirdly, the system no 
longer fits the differentiation in family situation and labour patterns. Fourthly, it 
does not offer the security in income it objects to an extensive group of people. 
Within the social security system a structural change in philosophy can be percepted. 
Lowering of benefit levels and more strict regulation as a consequence of budgetary 
cut-backs no longer are sufficient. In the Dutch society the insight has arisen that a 
fundamental choice regarding social security no longer can be avoided (see for 
example Van der Dussen and Van den Heuvel, 1995, p.9). No longer should the 
social security system only aim at the guaranteeing of income but in principle also 
aim at enlarging labour participation (the idea of the NABW). 
To reduce the expenditure on social security and to make the implementation more 
efficient it is sometimes argued that competition should be introduced in social 
security. Until recently the Employee Insurance Institutions (for a discussion see 
section II.1) had a monopoly regarding the implementation of employee insurances. 
The new Organisation Act Social Insurances (nOSV) in effect since January 1, 1995 
affects this monopoly position. 
Another important change is the privatization of the Health Law (Ziektewet). Since 
March 1st 1996, employers are obliged to pay 70 percent of the wage of a sick 
employee for a period of 52 weeks. Before effectuation of the new act, employers 
had to pay at least 70 percent of the wage for 2 to 6 weeks. The extension of this 
period to 52 weeks means a stimulus for employers to take measures which reduce 
sickness of employees, for as far as sickness is caused by insufficient working 
conditions. Employers do no longer receive sickness-money from the Industrial 
Insurance Board but they have the opportunity to enter into private insurances to 
cover the sickness risk of employees. The contributions to the Health Act expire. 
The special employee-regulations for civil servants will be abolished in the near 
future. They will come to fall under the normal employee regulations. 
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V.3 Industrial policies 
In the seventies, large sums of money were involved in the restructuring of a 
number of branches of industry and in the support of individual enterprises (Van 
Hulst and Willems, 1992). For example in the ship-building and the textile industry. 
After the seventies we see a diminished popularity of this policy. In the eighties, this 
decreasing trend persevered. In recent years a strong privatisation tendency can be 
observed. In Europe as a whole but the Netherlands are no exception. Significant 
examples are the privatization of DSM, the Postbank and the PTT. Economic 
reasoning behind privatization of (partially) state-owned companies is an expected 
increase of efficiency, due to for example the improvement of the management and a 
stronger influence of the competitive environment. 
The current industrial policy is primarily aimed at stimulation of investments in 
knowledge and related, in technology and innovation. The role of knowledge within 
the economy is irrefutably important. In a recent report of the Social Economic 
Council the link between knowledge and the economy is examined extensively (SER, 
1995). Knowledge is not only essential for the competitive position of enterprises but 
also for the chances of individuals on the labour market91, for the solution of 
important problems in society and as a result also for prosperity growth. The 
concept of technological development is strongly related with knowledge. 
Technological development aims at the efficiency improvement of production 
processes or the renewal or quality improvement of products. Technological 
development has as consequence that the same production level can be reached with 
the use of lesser resources. Often technological progress is denoted as the engine of 
the economy, as the source of prosperity growth. 
For the Dutch government the stimulation of knowledge and innovations are main 
policy-objectives . Expenditure on research diminished from 2.3 percent of GDP in 
1987 to 1.8 percent of GDP in 1993 . Especially the expenditure of the private 
sector are relatively low in the Netherlands (OECD, 1994). The knowledge-intensity 
of the Dutch economy will be promoted. Research and development will be 
stimulated through fiscal measures. There will be additional means for the 
modernization of vocational education and for technology-programmes. 
Furthermore, the cooperation between companies and so-called knowledge-centres 
(research institutes and universities) will be promoted. The government will invest in 
three main technological institutes. Technological knowledge is central, but other 
forms of knowledge are important too. 
As regards SME's in the "memorie van toelichting" of the budget of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs 1995 the importance of knowledge for the small and medium-sized 
enterprises was already acknowledged. The knowledge infrastructure should become 
more accessible to small and medium-sized companies. Furthermore, the government 
has proposed a number of fiscal measures to reduce the burden for SME's (also new 
started firms). 
91 See also our discussion of the effects of education in section V.1.3. 
92 See "Kennis in beweging". 
93 Which means a middle-position in the list of OECD-countries. 
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As regards active labour market policy, SME's are more than once mentioned as an 
important "target group" on the demand side. Firstly, SME's generally do not have 
sufficient own resources to organize the recruitment of new employees well. Helping 
them with recruitment and personnel policy in general could promote a more 
efficient labour market (matching will be faster). Some RBA's have set up special 
(paid or unpaid services) for SME's. Secondly, it is thought that lower educated will 
primarily have to find work in SME's . 
The measures to reduce labour cost and public investment-programmes in the 
infrastructure can also be seen as forms of industrial policy for they intend to create 
better conditions for the private sector. 
94 SME's are concentrated in sectors which employ a relatively high number of low-skilled workers (retail, 
restaurants and catering, other "personal" services). 
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VI The national debate: policy perspectives 
The key words in today's policy making are: 
1) market mechanism; 
2) privatisation; 
3) decentralisation. 
In the 'seventies and the 'eighties it was widely believed that the government could 
control the economy using the Keynesian approach and that it could strongly 
diminish inequality in power, knowledge and income. Social protection was highly 
valued and was amply provided by the government. There is general agreement 
now that this has led to high government and social security spending, which has 
caused damage in terms of slowing down income and job growth. 
In a way we are now at the other hand of the policy spectrum. There is a strong 
believe in the market mechanism. Many economists are of the opinion that structural 
unemployment is caused by government regulations which hamper the wage 
mechanism. Minimum wages, high social benefits, high firing costs and regulations 
concerning working hours are blamed. Not surprisingly, deregulation is seen as the 
solution. What is actually happening now in policy making is perfectly in line with 
that philosophy. Legal minimum wages still exist, but they are under pressure. For 
the time being a compromise has been reached between the government parties 
about minimum wages. According to this compromise employers are temporarily 
exempted from paying minimum wages when hiring a long-term unemployed 
person. That could be the first step in the direction towards complete abolition. As 
was mentioned in one of the previous sections both minimum wages and social 
benefits have stayed behind average wage growth. Furthermore, it has become less 
easy to receive a social benefit and many social benefits such as the disability benefit 
have been severely cut. It has become more easy for employers to get rid of workers 
and to prolong temporary and flexible contracts. Finally, regulations concerning 
working hours have become more flexible. For instance, shops are allowed to stay 
open longer. 
In social protection more is left to industries and individual decision making. The 
most striking example is the complete privatisation of protection against sickness. If 
a worker is ill the firm has to pay at least 70 per cent of his salary. It can insure itself 
against the financial risk on the private insurance market. Firms and workers are 
free to have additional insurance to supplement payment to the full salary level. 
Similar ideas exist concerning disability. Some people argue that social security could 
be privatised almost completely, each person being responsible for this own social 
protection by insuring himself on the private insurance market. Some government 
regulation is still needed then, for instance to prevent exclusion of certain groups 
from private insurance arrangements and to prevent employers from using 
undesirable hiring practices. 
However, we doubt whether the market philosophy in this extreme form will remain 
the dominant philosophy. This philosophy overlooks the importance of external and 
social effects. Perhaps there has been an overreaction on the previous period in 
which there was to much faith in what a government can do. Now, we are 
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beginning to see the disadvantages of a system in which to much trust is put on the 
market as the co-ordinating mechanism. Poverty, for instance, has not been on the 
political agenda for a long time, but recently the government has recognized that 
poverty is a real problem again. 
Wage moderation has almost become a tradition and will not easily be abolished. 
However, it will be recognized more and more that wage moderation and reduction 
of the costs of low-paid labour is not sufficient to solve the problem that so many 
low-skilled people are unemployed. It is not just a matter of a shortage of low-
skilled work, but in many cases simple work is carried out by skilled workers. 
Therefore, it is also important that more skilled work is created. 
In labour-market policy privatisation and decentralisation are important too. The 
public employment service is no longer part of the government and may evolve 
more and more to a private organization just like START, a former government 
agency for temporary labour. The municipalities are becoming more and more 
important in active labour-market policy. In the future they may become the main 
actors in active labour-market policy. The municipalities are already responsible for 
job creation schemes. The available funds for active labour:market policy are already 
partly transferred from the public employment service to them. On the regional level 
there is strong tendency towards co-operation between the public employment 
service, the municipalities and also the organizations responsible for unemployment 
insurance. 
An unsolved problem which will continuously get attention in the future is the 
backward position of ethnic minorities. Unemployment rates are much higher among 
the various ethnic groups and for some groups unemployment is exceptionally high. 
If the situation does not improve the call for a quota system will be heard again. 
In view of the demographic development the position of older workers will probably 
change. There will be no room left for expensive early retirement or disability 
schemes. Inactivity rates among the 50 to 60 years old as we experience now will be 
unpayable. People will have to stay in the labour process longer. The government is 
already promoting measures that will facilitate that development. For instance, in the 
future old-age pensions will be based more and more on the average wage a person 
has earned during his career instead of the final wage. This will make it more easy 
for older workers to accept a wage reduction, which will lower the gap between 
wage and productivity. Consequently, employers will be more inclined to keep the 
older worker longer in active service. 
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A.l 
Appendix A Possible measures for unemployment 
In the Netherlands unemployment is defined according to the definition of the CBS. 
Although many definitions are used, the CBS definition is the most favourable because most 
of the statistical material is based on this definition. According to the CBS persons are 
unemployed when they do not have a job, are available for work on short notice and are 
actively searching for a job. A job should consist of at least 12 working hours per week. This 
implies that people working less than 12 hours per weeks are not counted as employed but as 
unemployed (when they also met the other criteria). The CBS definition of unemployment 
differs from the commonly used international ILO definition in that it requires a minimum of 
12 working hours a week. The ILO definition does not include a minimum number of 
working hours per week. The CBS (and also the ILO) definition of unemployment does have 
some important drawbacks. Making operational concepts like searching activities and 
availability is rather difficult. Besides, people who really want to have a job stop searching 
for a job because of the high level of structural unemployment (the discouraged worker 
effect). So, it is rather questionable whether the "real" excess supply is measured when using 
this definition of unemployment. 
A second measure for the excess supply on the labour market is the number of registered 
not-working persons at the Public Employment Office (PES). The main drawback of using 
the registrations of the PES as data source is the relative high degree of pollution of the PES-
files. Often persons (still) registered as not-working are in fact having a job (and the other 
way around). This implies that the PES registration do not correctly present the level of 
unemployment. But the development in the number of persons registered at the PES may be 
used as a (conjunctural) labour market indicator. 
To correct for the pollution of the PES-files, the CBS also uses a second concept of 
unemployment. This concerns the registered unemployment. The registered unemployed are 
defined as the persons between 16 and 64 years old who are registered at the PES and work 
not or less than 12 hours per week. Furthermore they must be available for a job containing 
a minimum of 12 working hours a week, or have accepted one so they are going to work 12 
hours a week or more. Persons registered at the PES and not (longer) searching actively for 
work are counted as registered unemployed. 
Finally, the number of unemployment benefit claimants can be used as a measure for 
unemployment. A number of problems arises however. First, we then have to determine 
which social security arrangements are related to unemployment. In theory, the answer on 
this question is quite simple but in practice disability benefit schemes and social 
arrangements contain a certain level of hidden unemployment. The second problem is that 
unemployment benefits may be granted to persons who are partly unemployed. In fact, 
entitlement to a Unemployment Act Benefit already exists when a person loses five working 
hours. So, the number of persons receiving an unemployment benefit overstates the number 
of full-time equivalents of unemployment1. Thirdly, a considerable number of the 
beneficiaries is 57.5 years or older and receive an unemployment benefit up to retirement age 
(65 years). In may cases these persons don't search for a job, they even are not obliged to 
look for a job. A considerable share of the persons receiving an unemployment benefit 
therefore can not be seen as effective labour supply. 
However, the other sources do not give the level of full-time equivalents of unemployment either. All the probable 
measures express unemployment in persons and not in hours of unemployment. 
Appendix Β Overview of active measures (PES) 
Instruments Characterization Implementation Relevance for 
efficiency/equity 
Target group 
Information and advice 
Professional guidance 
Providence of information on professions, 
educational and training courses, etc. with indirect 
interest for the functioning of the labour market 
Other providence of information and advice 
Advice regarding the human resource policy of 
companies 
See name 
See name 
Numerous subjects 
See name 
Both internal and contracted out. 
Sometimes by special agencies. 
Both internal and contracted out (RBO's 
and women and workshops) 
Internal 
Within the framework of product innovation 
at a number of RBA's, sometimes in 
separate agencies 
Efficiency 
Efficiency 
Efficiency and equity 
Efficiency 
Job seekers 
No limitations target group 
No limitations target group 
Employers 
Placement 
Direct placement 
Route placement, including reorientation interviews 
(HOG), Active Labour Market Policy for the Young 
(AAJ), etcetera 
Vacancy bank/presentation 
Application bank 
Job paper 
Permit policy foreign employees 
Policy with respect to the permit of dismissal 
Outplacement 
Reference of registered job 
seekers to registered 
vacancies 
Intensive forms of guidance 
of job seekers, often 
together with the use of 
(other) instruments 
Vacancy presentation (may 
differ by region) 
Presentation of job seekers 
See name 
See name 
See name 
See name 
Implementation primarily internal 
Cooperation between PES and other bodies 
(primarily the municipal social service) 
Service of the PES 
Service of the PES 
Service of the PES 
Internal 
Internal 
Sometimes in separate agencies, established 
by RBA's 
Mainly efficiency 
Equity 
Efficiency 
Efficiency 
Efficiency 
Mainly efficiency 
Efficiency and equity 
Efficiency 
Employers with registered 
vacancies and registered job 
seekers 
Long-term unemployed; 
recently also persons 
endangered with long-term 
unemployment 
All job seekers 
All employers with vacancies 
Differs by region 
Employers with bottlenecks in 
the recruitment of personnel 
Employers with redundant 
personnel and employees 
threatened with dismissal 
Employers with redundant 
personnel and employees 
threatened with dismissal 
> 
to 
Instruments 
Vocational training centre (CV) 
Centre for vocational orientation and preparation 
(CBB) 
Women's vocational school (VVS) 
General training scheme (KRS) for unemployed 
General training scheme (KRS) for employed 
Application club 
Primary Vocational Training for Adults (PBVE) 
Characterization Implementation 
Program Additional Training (PAS)/Basic Instruction 
Contribution Scheme for the Apprenticeships System 
(BVL) 
Contribution Scheme for Sectoral Training (BBS) 
(Vocational) training 
Institution for practically 
oriented qualifying training 
Training institution for 
orientation and preparation 
Institution for qualifying 
vocational training of 
women 
Funding facility 
Funding facility 
See name 
Training of unemployed 
through regular educational 
facilities 
Funding facility 
Subsidy practical 
component of the 
apprenticeships system 
Training unemployed 
initiated by the social 
partners in branches 
Until recently training institution within 
RBA context, at present also other 
constructions 
Until recently administratively part of 
municipality and means primarily through 
RBA's; at present also other constructions 
Financing for the most part through the 
PES; different administrative constructions 
Both internal and contracted out 
Both internal and contracted out 
Institution within RBA-context; also 
contracted out 
Constructions differ by region 
Constructions differ by region, primarily 
contracted out 
Funding facility 
Funding facility 
Relevance for 
efficiency/equity 
Target group 
Efficiency and equity 
Equity 
Equity 
Efficiency and equity 
Efficiency and equity 
Equity 
Equity 
Equity 
Efficiency 
Efficiency 
Mainly unemployed 
Mainly unemployed 
Unemployed women 
Unemployed 
Employed, mainly those who 
are threatened with 
unemployment 
Mainly unemployed 
Unemployed 
Unemployed 
Mostly young people 
Unemployed 
> 
Instruments Characterization Implementation Relevance for 
efficiency/equity 
Target group 
Placement subsidies 
General Employment Scheme regular jobs (KRA-
RAP) 
General Employment Scheme for Temporary 
Employees (KRU) 
Exemption part of 
employers contributions 
and/or once-only subsidy 
Subsidised temporary work 
Mainly internal 
Implemented by TWA's 
Equity 
Equity 
Long-term unemployed; since 
recently also persons threatened 
with long-term unemployment 
Long-term unemployed; since 
recently also persons threatened 
with long-term unemployment 
Work experience 
General Employment Scheme Additional Jobs 
(KRA-WEP) 
Labour pools 
Guaranteed-jobs-for-the-young scheme (JWG) 
Work experience positions 
for maximal 1 year. 
Relatively high one-time 
subsidy for employer; can 
go together with employers 
contributions exempt 
Additional labour 
Additional labour 
Implementation often together with 
municipal social service. 
Implemented by municipal organisation 
Implemented by municipal organisation 
Equity 
Equity 
Equity 
Long-term unemployed; since 
recently also persons threatened 
with long-term unemployment 
Long-term unemployed 
Youngsters threatened with 
long-term unemployment 
Other instruments/activities 
European Social Fund (ESF) aid programme 
Regional instruments 
Training and placement 
subsidies; activities should 
be additional to national 
policy 
Various instruments 
(regional placement 
subsidies, training, job 
creation, etcetera) 
Drawing up a programme in cooperation 
with the Ministry of SZW; 
organisation/coordination internal; 
implementation both internal and external 
Both internal and contracted out 
Equity 
Efficiency and equity 
Mainly aimed at disadvantaged 
groups 
No limitations 
> 
Source: De Koning et all, 1995. 
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Appendix C Number of applications by instrument, in thousands (1985 
1993/1994/1995)a) 
Tolal education and training0' 
1985 
71.2 
1986 
86.9 
1987 
121.7 
1988 
128.2 
1989 
131.4 
1990 
157.9 
1991 
168.2 
1992 
172.2 
1993 
162.4 
1994 
n.a. 
1995 
n.a. 
of which: 
Subsidy practical component 
apprenticeship system (BVL)* 
Contribuüon Scheme Sectoral 
Training (BBS) 
Vocational training centre (CV) 
Centre for vocational orientation 
and preparation (CBB) 
General training scheme (KRS) 
Computer courses (NIIO, etcetera) 
Primary vocational training for 
adults (PBVE)" 
Application club 
Total placement subsidies 
35.6 
-
6.9 
3.0 
25.7 
-
7.3 
-
16.1 
39.9 
-
10.5 
3.2 
28.7 
4.6 
3.2 
-
13.2 
41.3 
11.9 
3.4 
58.5 
6.3 
10.8 
0.3 
16.6 
48.8 
12.1 
3.8 
59.0 
2.9 
16.5 
1.6 
17.7 
46.2 
0.7 
12.6 
4.0 
62.3 
2.0 
18.1 
3.6 
20.8 
57.2 
3.1 
16.1 
4.2 
71.0 
1.0 
18.7 
5.3 
15.6 
56.9 
5.1 
16.2 
4.2 
78.2 
1.1 
16.8 
6.5 
15.1 
56.9 
4.0 
16.2 
4.2 
81.3 
1.2 
21.4 
8.4 
13.8 
45.7 
4.2 
16.9 
5.0 
80.5 
1.1 
20.5 
9.0 
14.8 
n.a. 
n.a. 
16.0 
6.0 
46.5 
n.a. 
-
9.0 
10.7 
n.a. 
n.a. 
19.0 
5.0 
37.0 
n.a. 
-
n.a. 
n.a. 
of which: 
Placement Stimulation Scheme 
(PBM) 
Placement Support Scheme 
(ΜΟΛ) 
Measure long-term unemployed 
(MLW)/Vermeend-Moor Act 
General Employment Scheme 
(KRA), contributions exempt only 
General Employment Scheme, 
regular jobs (KRA-RAP) 
Youth Development Jobs (JOB) 
General Scheme for Temporary 
Work (KRU)0 
7.8 
7.4 
-
-
-
0.9 
2.9 
7.7 
0.8 
-
1.8 
-
-
5.8 
7.7 
-
-
3.1 
-
-
4.6 
8.5 
-
-
4.6 
-
3.3 
10.0 
-
3.9 
3.6 
-
-
-
-
0.2 
12.3 
1.0 
2.1 
-
-
-
4.0 
8.4 
-
2.7 
-
-
-
4.2 
7.0 
-
2.6 
-
-
-
5.5 
7.0 
-
2.3 
-
-
2.1 
6.2 
-
2.4 
■ 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
A.6 
Total work experience* 
1985 
5.5 
1986 
2.6 
1987 
2.5 
1988 
10.0 
1989 
9.7 
1990 
13.6 
1991 
18.9 
1992 
27.6 
1993 
33.3 
1994 
42.0 
1995 
44.0 
of which: 
Employment Creation Scheme 
(WVM) 
General Employment Scheme, 
work experience (KRA-WEP) 
Municipal Employment Initiatives 
for lhe Young (GWJ)W 
Guaranteed-jobs-for-the-young 
(JWG) (in benefit years) 
Labour-pools (in benefit years) 
5.5 
-
-
-
-
2.6 
-
-
-
-
1.3 
-
1.2 
-
-
1.5 
-
8.5 
-
-
0.9 
1.1 
7.7 
-
-
0.2 
6.4 
7.0 
-
-
-
5.9 
n.a. 
7 
6 
-
5.6 
-
6 
16 
-
5.3 
-
12 
16 
-
4.0 
-
18 
20 
n.a. 
-
21 
23 
a) Double counting between instruments does occur. 
b) For as far as known up to and including the third quarter of 1994. 
c) Total excluding PBVE-applications. Those are also counted with KRS. 
d) Formerly Contribution Scheme Vocational Education of the young (BVJ). 
e) Formerly Vocational Qualifying Educational Projects (BKE). 
0 Formerly Expenses Regulation Temporary Work (VU). 
g) Total: new applications WVM and KRA-WEP and benefit years JWG and labour-pool, 
h) Predecessor of the JWG. 
Sources: Rapportage Arbeidsmarkt 1990 (1985-1990). 
Employment Service, revision NEI (1991-1993/1994/1995). 
Figures for JWG and Labour pool: Ministry of SZW, 1995. 
A.7 
Appendix D The effect of the field of education (on each level of 
education) on job-finding-duration 
MAVO/VBO-level, compared to MAVO: 
Technical education 
coastruction 
furniture making/carpenting 
painting/decorating 
other construction 
metal 
welding/forging 
other metal 
mechanical engineering 
electrical engineering 
process engineering 
Economic education 
administrative 
business administration 
process automation 
other administrative 
retail 
Nursing 
home economics 
other 
Languages, history and other 
HAVO/VWO/MBO-level, compared to HAVO: 
Technical education 
construction 
metal 
printing 
electrical engineering 
general electronics 
Effect on job-search-duration 
-44 
-44 
-28 
52 
-17 
-6 
12 
-16 
11 
50 
-3 
-28 
4 
-15 
in days (1992) 
-2 
28 
-20 
63 
40 
-33 
A.8 
MAVO/VBO-level, compared to MAVO: 
Technical education 
Economic education 
process automation 
retail 
tourism 
management 
Care taking 
care of the elderly 
hotel and catering 
Medical education 
Nursing 
Social cultural education 
social work 
HBO-level, compared to graduates HEAO (Higher 
Economic and Administrative Education, general 
economics): 
Economic education 
process automation 
management 
Technical education 
electrical engineering 
Medical education 
nursing 
therapy 
Pedagogical education 
teacher primary education 
Arithmetic and science 
University-level, compared to general economics/business 
economics: 
Economic education 
management 
Technical education 
Medical education 
medicine 
Arithmetic and Science 
Legal and administrative 
Languages, history 
Effect on job-search-duration in days (1992) 
138 
-11 
29 
3 
-7 
-19 
-49 
35 
-34 
51 
-11 
-30 
73 
-1 
43 
15 
-6 
-50 
2 
-6 
518 
A.9 
MAVO/VBO-level, compared to MAVO: 
Technical education 
Social cultural 
Technical Education 
psychology 
other (e.g. sociology) 
Effect on job-search-duration in days (1992) 
116 
112 
All effects are compared to a reference person: 
female; 
native; 
single; 
living in the west of the Netherlands; 
and for: 
MAVO/VBO-level: 16 years old, MAVO-graduate (expected duration of job-search 5 months); 
HAVO/VWO/MBO-level: 18 years old, HAVO graduate (expected duration of job-search 5 
months); 
HBO-level: 24 years old, HEAO-graduate general economics (expected duration of job-search 14 
months); 
University-level: 25 years old, general economics/business economics graduate (expected duration 
17 months). 
Source CBS/SEO. 
Α. 10 
Appendix Ε Unemployment rates by educational level and field of 
education (1994) 
Primary education 
Lower level secondary education 
Lower general secondary education 
Lower vocational education 
nursing 
technical 
economic-administrative 
Higher level secondary education 
Higher general secondary education/pre-university 
education 
Higher secondary vocational education 
nursing 
technical 
economic-administrative 
Higher vocational education 
nursing 
technical 
economic-administrative 
University 
nursing 
technical 
economic-administrative 
unknown 
Total 
Unemployed labour force 
Number (thousands) 
103 
154 
56 
98 
38 
43 
16 
193 
42 
151 
57 
43 
50 
63 
38 
11 
14 
34 
15 
10 
8 
1 
547 
Unemployment rate 
(%) 
17.1 
10.3 
12.0 
9.5 
14.4 
6.8 
12.8 
6.9 
12.0 
6.2 
7.9 
4.5 
6.4 
5.9 
6.3 
5.2 
5.4 
6.9 
6.4 
7.9 
6.6 
8.5 
Source: CBS, Enquête Beroepsbevolking 1994, 1995. 
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